Six candidates are currently engaged in active negotiations: Montenegro (since 2012), Serbia (since 2014), Albania (since 2020), North Macedonia (since 2020), Moldova and Ukraine (since 2024). The most advanced stage of the negotiations, defined as meeting the interim benchmarks for negotiating chapters 23 and 24, after which the closing process for all chapters can begin, has only been reached by Montenegro.[3] Montenegro's declared political goal is to complete its negotiations by the end of 2026, and achieve membership of the EU by 2028.[4][5]
The accession criteria are included in the Copenhagen criteria, agreed in 1993, and the Treaty of Maastricht (Article 49). Article 49 of the Maastricht Treaty (as amended) says that any European state that respects the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, may apply to join the EU. Whether a country is European or not is subject to political assessment by the EU institutions.[6]Past enlargement since the foundation of the European Union as the European Economic Community by the Inner Six states in 1958[7] brought total membership of the EU to twenty-eight, although as a result of the withdrawal of the United Kingdom, the current number of EU member states is twenty-seven.
Of the four major western European countries that are not EU members, Norway, Switzerland and Iceland have submitted membership applications in the past but subsequently frozen or withdrawn them, while the United Kingdom is a former member. Norway, Switzerland, Iceland, as well as Liechtenstein, participate in the EU Single Market and also in the Schengen Area, which makes them closely aligned with the EU; none, however, are in the EU Customs Union.
Current agenda and applicants
Current members (27)
Candidates negotiating (6)
Candidates (2)
Applicant / Potential candidate (1)
Candidate with frozen negotiations (1)
As of 2025, the enlargement agenda of the European Union regards three distinct groups of states:
These states have all submitted applications for accession to the EU, which is the first step of a long multi-year process. They must subsequently negotiate the specific terms of their Treaty of Accession with the current EU member states, and align their domestic legislation with the accepted body of EU law (acquis communautaire), along with ensuring an appropriate level of implementation thereof, before joining.
There are other potential member states in Europe that are not formally part of the current enlargement agenda, either due to having a domestic political debate on potential membership, or having withdrawn a previous membership or application for membership. These other potential member states could be included on the enlargement agenda at some point of time in the future, if their foreign policy changes and paves the way for submitting an application, and EU subsequently recognises them as an applicant or candidate.
Historically the norm was for enlargements to consist of multiple entrants simultaneously joining the European Economic Community (1958–1993) and EU (since 1993). The only previous enlargements of a single state were the 1981 admission of Greece and the 2013 admission of Croatia. However, following the significant effect of the fifth enlargement in 2004, EU member states have decided that a more individualized approach will be adopted in the future, although the entry of pairs or small groups of countries may coincide.[8]
Procedure to become an EU member state
For an applicant to become a member state of the EU, several procedural steps need to get passed. These steps will move the status of the state from applicant (potential candidate) to candidate, and later again to a negotiating candidate. The status as a negotiating candidate is reached by the mutual signing of a negotiation framework at a first intergovernmental conference. The start of substantial negotiations with the EU, is subsequently marked by the opening of the first negotiating chapters at a second intergovernmental conference. Every 35 chapters of the accepted body of EU law (divided into 6 clusters) must be opened and closed during subsequent additional intergovernmental conferences, for a state to conclude the negotiations by the signing of an accession treaty.
After a reform in 2020, the 35 chapters have been divided into six main clusters, where all five chapters of the first cluster are supposed to be opened together at the same time. The opening of chapters, which after the reform occur with several chapters opened together cluster-wise, can only happen by a unanimous decision by the Council of the European Union once the screening procedure report has been completed for the specific chapters (outlining all needed legislative changes to comply with EU law), while there can also be set some "opening benchmarks" requiring a certain amount of legislative changes/implementation to be met even before the opening of the chapters. The closure of a chapter, is done provisionally by a unanimous decision by the Council of the European Union once the state demonstrates to have implemented and aligned their domestic legislation with the EU law, for each specific chapter in concern.
There are no requirement for completion of the screening procedure for all 35 negotiating chapters, before the start of the first and second intergovernmental conference.[9]
Serbia and Montenegro, the most advanced candidates in their negotiation processes with the EU, may join the EU sometime between 2025 and 2030.[14][15][16] Montenegro's declared political goal is to complete its negotiations by the end of 2026, and achieve membership of the EU by 2028.[4][5]
The European Council had endorsed starting negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia on 26 March 2020,[17] however, the negotiation process was blocked by Bulgaria for over two years.[18][a] In June 2022 French President Emmanuel Macron submitted a compromise proposal which, if adopted by both countries, would pave the way for the immediate adoption of negotiating frameworks for North Macedonia and Albania by the EU Council and for the organization of intergovernmental conferences with them.[19] On 24 June 2022, Bulgaria's parliament approved the revised French proposal to lift the country's veto on opening EU accession talks with North Macedonia, with the Assembly of North Macedonia also doing so on 16 July 2022 allowing accession negotiations to begin. On the same day, the start of negotiations was set for 19 July 2022.[20]
On 8 November 2023, the European Commission adopted a new Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, with the aim of bringing them closer to the EU through offering some of the benefits of EU membership to the region in advance of accession. The Growth Plan provides €6 billion financial grants and loans for the entire region in return of implementation of structural reforms. Beside the core financial support of the growth plan, one of the additional embedded priority actions is granting access to the Single Euro Payments Area.[21]
On 8 November 2023, the European Commission recommended opening negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina once the necessary degree of compliance with the membership criteria is achieved.[22] On 12 March 2024, the European Commission recommended opening EU membership negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina, citing the positive results from important reforms the country enacted.[23][24][25] On 21 March 2024, all 27 EU leaders, representing the European Council, gathered for a summit in Brussels, where they unanimously granted conditional approval for opening EU membership negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina.[26][27] On 17 December 2024, the Council reiterated that they still needed to receive an approved Growth Plan reform package along with a national programme for adoption of EU law, and that the country should appoint a chief negotiator and a national IPA III coordinator, before the adoption of a negotiation framework can happen as the next step of the process for Bosnia and Herzegovina.[28]
On 25 December 2024, the National Assembly of Republika Srpska (a federal entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina) adopted conclusions alleging the erosion of the legal order in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and demanded the annulment of all acts resulting from unconstitutional actions by foreign individuals (High Representatives) who lack the constitutional authority to propose or enact laws, and requires representatives from Republika Srpska in state institutions to suspend decisions related to European integration (as well as all decision-making concerned to the overall level of the country) until the process aligns with democratic principles and the rule of law.[29] However, the High Representative issued an order on 2 January 2025 that prohibited the implementation with immediate legal effect of the entirety of these conclusions, due to having found them to violate Republika Srpska's obligations and commitments under the Dayton Agreement.[30] On 8 January 2025, the President of Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik, stated that he would seriously reconsider whether Republika Srpska should pursue the European path, as he instead preferred efforts to secede the entity from Bosnia and Herzegovina, and rejected the authority of the Constitutional Court and High Representative.[31] The Delegation of the European Union to Bosnia and Herzegovina stated in response: The sovereignty, territorial integrity, constitutional order – including Constitutional Court decisions – and international personality of Bosnia and Herzegovina need to be respected. The EU urges the political leadership of the Republika Srpska to refrain from and renounce provocative, divisive rhetoric and actions, including questioning the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the country. The EU urges all political actors in BiH to take resolute action to implement the necessary reforms to advance on the EU path towards opening EU accession negotiations. We reiterate our full commitment to the EU accession perspective of BiH as a single, united and sovereign country.[32]
The Association Trio is sometimes expanded to the Trio + 1 with the inclusion of Armenia, which is not formally on the EU's enlargement agenda but is considering submitting an application for membership.
The European Parliament passed a resolution in April 2014 stating that in accordance with Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, as well as any other European country, have a European perspective and can apply for EU membership in compliance with the principles of democracy, respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights, minority rights and ensuring the rule of rights.[37] In 2016-17 Association Agreements between the EU and Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine were ratified, and collectively these three countries became referred to as the Association Trio. They also entered the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area with the EU, which creates framework for modernising [...] trade relations and for economic development by the opening of markets via the progressive removal of customs tariffs and quotas, and by an extensive harmonisation of laws, norms and regulations in various trade-related sectors, creating the conditions for aligning key sectors of their economies with EU standards.[38] However, the EU did not expand further into the post-Soviet space in the 2010s.[39]
By January 2021, Georgia and Ukraine were preparing to formally apply for EU membership in 2024.[40][41][42] However, following the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Ukraine submitted an application for EU membership on 28 February 2022, followed by Georgia and Moldova on 3 March 2022.[43][44] On 23 June 2022, the European Council granted candidate status to Moldova and Ukraine, and recognized Georgia as a potential candidate for membership.[45] When taking its candidacy decision for Ukraine and Moldova, the Council made opening the accession negotiations conditional to addressing respectively seven and nine key areas related to strengthening the rule of law, fighting corruption and improving governance processes.
In his speech in Moldova on 28 March 2023, President of the European Council Charles Michel mentioned that by the end of the year, the Council will have to decide on the opening negotiations with [Ukraine and Moldova]. It will be a political decision taking into account the report that will be published by the Commission. And I sincerely hope that a positive decision will be possible by the end of the year.[46]
On 8 November 2023, the European Commission recommended opening negotiations with Moldova and Ukraine, and granting candidate status to Georgia,[22] and this was agreed by the European Council on 14 December 2023.[47]
On 25 June 2024, the first Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) was called by the Belgian Presidency of the Council of the EU, officially marking the start of the accession negotiations with Moldova and Ukraine.[48]
On 9 July 2024, following the adoption of a law by Georgia's ruling Georgian Dream party requiring non-governmental and media entities to register as "foreign agents", the EU ambassador in Georgia announced that in response the EU would de facto halt the country's accession progress, with no further steps to advance the process to be expected and no financial support granted for as long as the law exists.[49][50] The European Union has threatened Georgia with sanctions and suspension of relations if the country becomes a "one-party state" without political opposition following parliamentary elections in October 2024.[51]
The 2024 Georgian parliamentary elections resulted in Georgian Dream retaining power, but were disputed by opposition parties which claimed that the vote was not free and fair and was subject to widespread voter fraud. The European Parliament adopted a non-binding resolution which rejected the validity of the results, and called for the vote to be repeated within a year.[52] Following this, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze stated that accession negotiations would be suspended until the end of 2028,[53] though he insisted that his government would continue to implement the reforms required for accession and that it still planned for Georgia to join the EU by 2030.[54]
The EU have halted all financial aid for the Georgian government since 27 June 2024, and instead redirected its financial support only to be received by civil society and the media in Georgia.[50] Similair to the growth plans and IPA III grants launched towards supporting strucutural reforms to improve accession perspectives for candidates from the Western Balkans, the EU launched – or is about to launch – similair growth plan programmes for Ukraine and Moldova:[28]
Ukraine Facility: Established on 29 February 2024.[55] Provides up to €50 billion over four years to support financial stability, recovery, and implementation of key reforms to assist in the Accession of Ukraine to the European Union between 2024 and 2027.[56][57]
Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova: Establishment pending ongoing legal approval in 2025.[58] Provides up to €285 million in grants and €1.5 billion in loans with long repayment time and advantageous interest rates, during the period from 2025 to 2027. The facility is the financial pillar of the Moldova Growth Plan, but will also assist in the Accession of Moldova to the European Union and in undertaking EU-related reforms. Payments will be subject to strict conditions in terms of the achievement of reforms set out in the agreed Reform Agenda.[59][60]
Turkey's candidacy to join the EU has been a matter of major significance and considerable controversy since it was granted in 1999. Turkey has had historically close ties with the EU, having an association agreement since 1964,[64] being in a customs union with the EU since 1995 and initially applying to join in 1987. Only after a summit in Brussels on 17 December 2004 (following the major 2004 enlargement) did the European Council announce that membership negotiations with Turkey were officially opened on 3 October 2005.
Turkey's large population would also alter the balance of power in the representative European institutions. Upon joining the EU, Turkey's 84 million inhabitants would bestow it the largest number of MEPs in the European Parliament. It would become the most populous country in the EU.[69] Another problem is that Turkey does not recognise one EU member state, Cyprus, because of the Cyprus problem and the Cypriot government blocks some chapters of Turkey's talks.[70][71]
Turkey's relations with the EU have seriously deteriorated in the aftermath of the 2016 Turkish coup d'état attempt and subsequent purges.[70][71] On 25 July 2016, President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker said that Turkey was not in a position to become a member of the European Union in the near future and that accession negotiations between the EU and Turkey would be stopped immediately if the death penalty was brought back.[72] On 24 November 2016, the European Parliament approved a non-binding resolution calling for the temporary freeze of the ongoing accession negotiations with Turkey over human rights and rule of law concerns.[73][74][75] On 13 December 2016, the European Council (comprising the heads of state or government of the member states) resolved that it would open no new areas in Turkey's membership talks in the "prevailing circumstances",[76] as Turkey's path toward autocratic rule made progress on EU accession impossible.[77] On 6 July 2017, the European Parliament accepted the call for the suspension of full membership negotiations between the EU and Turkey,[78] and a repeat of the exact same vote ended with the same result in March 2019[79] and May 2021.[80] As of 2022, and especially following Erdoğan's victory in the constitutional referendum, Turkish accession talks are effectively at a standstill.[2][81][82]
In July 2023, Erdoğan brought up Turkey's accession to EU membership up in the context of Sweden's application for NATO membership.[83] However, in September 2023, he announced that the European Union was well into a rupture in its relations with Turkey and that they could part ways during Turkey's European Union membership process.[84]
Screening completed for all chapters in March 2015.[90] First chapters opened in December 2015.[91]
Every chapter must be opened and closed to conclude the negotiations. Benchmarks have been met for the opening of all 3 remaining chapters in cluster 3, but this has been postponed due the opening being conditional on "substantial further progress made by Serbia, in particular in accordance with...the rule of law (chapter 23+24) and the normalisation of relations with Kosovo".[28][92]
Screening completed for all chapters in December 2023.[97]
The opening of the first 5 negotiating chapters (Fundamentals cluster) at a second intergovernmental conference will not begin until the opening phase has been completed, which according to the Council conclusions of July 2022 is conditional on the Assembly of North Macedonia approving a constitutional amendment related to the Bulgarian minority.[98][99][28]
Screening of chapters (the explanatory phase) began in January 2024,[9] and the bilateral phase of the screening started in July 2024.[102]
The opening of the first 5 negotiating chapters (Fundamentals cluster) at a second intergovernmental conference. Every chapter must be opened and closed to conclude the negotiations.
Screening of chapters (the explanatory phase) began in January 2024,[9] and the bilateral phase of the screening started in July 2024.[105]
The opening of the first 5 negotiating chapters (Fundamentals cluster) at a second intergovernmental conference. Every chapter must be opened and closed to conclude the negotiations.
The European Council granted conditional approval for the opening of accession negotiations in March 2024.[107][106] Screening of chapters (the explanatory phase) began in April 2024.[108]
The European Commission needs to prepare a negotiating framework for adoption by the Council, once all relevant steps set out in the Commission's recommendation of 12 October 2022 have been taken by Bosnia and Herzegovina.[109] The state claimed to meet 98% of conditions demanded by the European Commission by passing a 2024 budget and Growth Plan reform package in July 2024.[110][111][112] Final approval of the Growth Plan reform package was however blocked by four cantons on 25 July.[113] As of December 2024, the Council reminded they still needed to receive an approved Growth Plan reform package along with a national programme for adoption of EU law, and that the country should appoint a chief negotiator and a national IPA III coordinator, before the adoption of a negotiation framework can happen as the next step of the process.[28]
The European Council granted candidate status in December 2023.[114] The Georgian government suspended its EU membership application process until the end of 2028.[53][28]
The European Commission needs to recommend starting negotiations.
Screening completed for all chapters in October 2006.[115] First chapters opened in June 2006.[115] Chapter opening frozen in December 2016, due to backsliding in the areas of democracy, rule of law, and fundamental rights.[76] Chapter closing dialogue frozen since June 2018.[117][116]
Negotiations frozen, with no further chapters being considered for opening or closing, which has been reconfirmed by the Council each year since 2018.[116][117][118][119][120][99][28]
^Montenegro started negotiations in November 2005 while a part of Serbia and Montenegro. Separate technical negotiations were conducted regarding issues of sub-state organizational competency. A mandate for direct negotiations with Montenegro was established in July 2006. Direct negotiations were initiated on 26 September 2006 and concluded on 1 December 2006.[136]
^Serbia started negotiations in November 2005 while part of Serbia and Montenegro, with a modified mandate from July 2006.
Level of preparation for acquis chapters
Current situation
The table below shows the level of preparation of applicant countries with EU standards (acquis communautaire) on a 5-point scale, using data from the European Commission's 2024 reports. The analysis is based on the analysis performed by the online media outlet European Pravda for Ukraine; scores for other countries, as well as additional sections (public administration reform and economic criteria) were added based on official data from the European Commission's reports.[169][170]
Cluster 1: The fundamentals of the accession process
Public administration reform
3
2
3
3
3
2
1.5
3
2
2.5
23. Judiciary and fundamental rights
3
2
3
2.5
2
2
2
2
1.5
1
24. Justice, freedom and security
3
2
3.5
3
2.5
2
2
2
2
3
The existence of a functioning market economy
4
1.5
3
2
4
1.5
1
3
2
5
The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union
2
1.5
3
3
3
1
1.5
2
1
4
5. Public procurement
3
2
3.5
3
3
2
2
2
2.5
3
18. Statistics
3
2
3
3.5
3.5
2
1
2
2
3
32. Financial control
3
1
3
3
3
1
2
2
2
4
Cluster 2: Internal Market
1. Free movement of goods
2.5
2
3
3
3
3
1
2
2.5
4
2. Freedom of movement for workers
2
1
2
1
3
1
2
1
2
1
3. Right of establishment and freedom to provide services
3
2
3
3
3
2
1
3
3
1
4. Free movement of capital
3
2.5
3
3
3
2.5
3
3
3
3
6. Company law
3
1.5
4
4
4
2
2
2
2
5
7. Intellectual property law
3
2
4.5
3
4
2
3
2
3
4
8. Competition policy
2.5
2
3
3
3
2
2
1.5
2
2
9. Financial services
3.5
2
3
3
3
2
2.5
2
3
4
28. Consumer and health protection
1
2
3
3
3
2
1
2
1
4
Cluster 3: Competitiveness and inclusive growth
10. Digital transformation and media
3.5
2
4
3
3
3.5
1
2
2
2
16. Taxation
3
2
3
3
3.5
2
2
2.5
2
3
17. Economic and monetary policy
3.5
2
3
3.5
3.5
3
1
3
3
2
19. Social policy and employment
3
2
2
3
3
1
2
2
1.5
2
20. Enterprise and industrial policy
3.5
2
4
3.5
3
2.5
1
3
3
3
25. Science and research
2
3
4
4
4
3
2
3
1
5
26. Education and culture
3
2.5
4
3
4
2
1
3
2
3
29. Customs union
3
3
3
4
4
4
2
3
3
4
Cluster 4: The Green agenda and sustainable connectivity
14. Transport
2
2
3.5
3
4
2
2
2
1
3
15. Energy
3.5
3
4
3
3
4
1
2
2
3
21. Trans-European networks
2
2
3.5
4
3.5
2
2
2
2
5
27. Environment and climate change
2
1.5
2
2
2
2
1.5
1
1
2
Cluster 5: Resources, agriculture and cohesion
11. Agriculture and rural development
2
1
3
3
2
1
1
1
2
2
12. Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy
2
2
3
4
3
3
2
2
2.5
2
13. Fisheries and aquaculture
3
1
2
3
3
2
1
2
1
3
22. Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments
3
2
3
3
3
2
1
1.5
1
3
33. Financial and budgetary provisions
2
1
2
1
2
1
1
1
—
2
Cluster 6: External relations
30. External relations
4
3
4
4
3
4
2
3
1
3
31. Foreign, security and defence policy
4
3.5
4
4
3
4
2
3
—
2
Average level
2.82
1.99
3.18
3.06
3.13
2.22
1.64
2.18
1.99
2.99
5 Well advanced
4.5 Good / Well advanced
4 Good level of preparation
3.5 Moderate / Good
3 Moderately prepared
2.5 Some / Moderate
2 Some level of preparation
1.5 Early stage / Some
1 Early stage
Progress over the past year
The table below shows the progress over the past year of applicant countries on a 4-point scale, using data from the European Commission's 2024 reports. The analysis is based on the analysis performed by the online media outlet European Pravda for Ukraine; scores for other countries, as well as additional sections (public administration reform and economic criteria) were added based on official data from the European Commission's reports.[171][172]
The Maastricht Treaty (Article 49) states that any European country (as defined by a European Council assessment) that is committed to democracy may apply for membership in the European Union.[173] In addition to European states, other countries have also been speculated or proposed as future members of the EU.
States in Europe that have chosen, for various reasons, not to join the EU have integrated with it to different extents according to their circumstances. Iceland, Norway, and Liechtenstein participate directly in the single market via the EEA, Switzerland does so via bilateral treaties and the other European microstates (Andorra, Monaco, San Marino, Vatican City) have specific agreements with the EU and neighbouring countries, including their use of the euro as their currency. Most of these countries are also part of the Schengen Area. Norway, Iceland, and Switzerland have all previously had live applications to join the EU, which have been withdrawn or otherwise frozen. Such applications could be resubmitted in the event of a change in the political landscape.
On 5 March 2024, Armenian prime minister Nikol Pashinyan said that his country would apply for EU candidacy by autumn 2024 at the latest.[174] On 12 March 2024, the European Parliament passed a resolution confirming Armenia met Maastricht TreatyArticle 49 requirements and that the country may apply for EU membership.[175] At the 2024 Copenhagen Democracy Summit, Pashinyan stated that if possible he would like Armenia to become a member of the European Union this year.[176]A petition calling for a referendum on whether Armenia should apply for membership of the EU,[177] which was supported by Pashinyan,[178] succeeded in reaching the 50,000 signatures required in order to be submitted for a vote in the National Assembly.[179][180] The National Assembly is expected to vote on the matter in January 2025.[181] Prior to the vote,[182] the Armenian government expressed a positive position for supporting the bill's approval, with Pashinyan further elaborating that if the bill was approved, then a roadmap should be agreed to with the European Union prior to holding the referendum.[183] The decision for the government to support the bill was reported to be the first step of "the beginning of the accession process of the Republic of Armenia to the European Union".[184][185]
Canada is a non-European country with values, culture, trade, and politics closely linked with the EU. Its membership has been proposed due to this.[227] (See: Canada–European Union relations)
Internal enlargement is the process of new member states arising from the break-up of an existing member state.[229][230][231] There have been and are a number of active separatist movements within member states (for example in Catalonia and Flanders) but there are no clear agreements, treaties or precedents covering the scenario of an existing EU member state breaking into two or more states, both of which wish to remain EU member states. The question is whether one state is a successor and one a new applicant or, alternatively, both are new states which must be admitted to the EU.[232][233]
In some cases, a region desires to leave its state and the EU, namely those regions wishing to join Switzerland. But most, namely the two movements that held referendums during the 2010s, Scotland and Catalonia, see their future as independent states within the EU. This results in great interest in whether, once independent, they would retain EU membership or conversely whether they would have to re-apply. In the later case, since new members must be approved unanimously, any other state which has an interest in blocking their membership to deter similar independence movements could do so.[234][235] Additionally, it is unclear whether the successor state would retain any opt-outs that the parent state was entitled to.
Opinions on membership
European Commission
Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission (2014–2019): If there were to be a 'yes' vote in favour of Catalan independence, then we will respect that opinion. But Catalonia will not be able to be an EU member state on the day after such a vote.[236] This was repeated in October in an official press release: We [...] reiterate the legal position held by this Commission as well as by its predecessors. If a referendum were to be organised in line with the Spanish Constitution it would mean that the territory leaving would find itself outside of the European Union.[237]
José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission (2004–2014), stated in 2012 in the context of the 2014 referendum for independence in Scotland, that any newly independent country would have to apply for membership and negotiate its terms, but that the rest of the original country would not have to re-negotiate its position and would continue its membership.[238][239] In 2014 he said that it would have been 'very difficult' for an independent Scotland to join the EU, 'if not impossible', because of the difficulty of getting the approval of all member states, particularly Spain, which fears a possible secession of Catalonia and has blocked Kosovo's accession to the EU.[240]
Joaquín Almunia (Spanish, being at the time an EU Commissioner) in 2013 claimed that Catalonia would have to apply for EU membership in the event of secession from Spain.[241]
Government of Spain
Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy, said in November 2013 that an independent Scotland's entry to the EU would require the consent of all existing members and that an independent Scotland or other regions gaining independence, taken as a reference to Catalonia, would end up outside of the EU.[242][243]
Spanish Foreign Minister José García-Margallo, having said in February 2012 that Spain would not veto Scottish accession to the EU, provided Scottish independence had UK agreement (thus making it different from Catalan independence).[244]
The presence of a strong Basque Nationalist movement, strongly majoritary in several territories of the Basque Country, makes possible the future existence of an independent Basque Country under different potential territorial configurations. In overall terms the Basque nationalism is pro-European.
On 1 October 2017, the Catalan government held a referendum on independence, which had been declared illegal by the Constitutional Court of Spain, with potential polling stations being cordoned off by riot police. The subsequent events constituted a political crisis for Catalonia. The EU's position is to keep distance from the crisis while supporting Spain's territorial integrity and constitution.[245][246] While the debate around Scotland's referendum may inform the Catalan crisis, Catalonia is in a distinct situation from Scotland whereby the central government does not recognise the legitimacy of any independence declaration from Catalonia. If Spain does not recognise the independence of a Catalan state, Catalonia cannot separately join the EU and it is still recognised as part of Spain's EU membership.
Corsica has a strong and electorally successful nationalist movement, with positions ranging from autonomy to outright independence, the latter option with around 10–15% public support.[247] The independist party Corsica Libera envisions an independent Corsica within the European Union as a union of various European peoples, as well as recommendations for alignment within European directives.[248]
According to a 2012 survey conducted in a joint effort between the University of Cagliari and that of Edinburgh,[253][254][255] 41% of Sardinians would be in favour of independence (with 10% choosing it from both Italy and the European Union, and 31% only from Italy with Sardinia remaining in the EU), whilst another 46% would rather have a larger autonomy within Italy and the EU, including fiscal power; 12% of people would be content to remain part of Italy and the EU with a Regional Council without any fiscal powers, and 1% in Italy and the EU without a Regional Council and fiscal powers.[256][257][258][259][260][261][262] A 2017 poll by the Ixè Institute found that 51% of those questioned identified as Sardinian (as opposed to an Italian average of 15% identifying by their region of origin), rather than Italian (19%), European (11%) and/or citizen of the world (19%).[263][264]
Sardinian nationalists address a number of issues, such as the environmental damage caused by the military forces[265][266][267][268][269][270][271][272][273] (about 60% of such bases in Italy are located on the island),[274] the financial and economic exploitation of the island's resources by the Italian state and mainland industrialists,[275] the lack of any political representation both in Italy and in the European Parliament[276][277] (due to an unbalanced electoral constituency that still remains to this day,[278] Sardinia has not had its own MEP since 1994),[279] the nuclear power and waste (on which a referendum was proposed by a Sardist party,[280] being held in 2011[281]) and the ongoing process of depopulation and Italianization that would destroy the Sardinian indigenous culture.[282]
Similarly to Sardinia, Veneto has a strong and electorally successful nationalist movement, with positions ranging from autonomy to outright independence. In a controversial online poll held in 2014, 89% of participants were in favour of Veneto becoming "a federal, independent and sovereign state" and 55% supported accession to European Union membership.[283] Three years later, in the 2017 autonomy referendum, with a 58% turnout, 98% of the participants voted in favour of "further forms and special conditions of autonomy to be attributed to the Region of Veneto".[284] Consequently, negotiations between the Venetian government and the Italian one started.
The longstanding and largest Venetist party, Liga Veneta (LV), was established in 1979 under the slogan "farther from Rome, closer to Europe",[285] but has later adopted more Eurosceptic positions. Luca Zaia, a LV member who has served as president of Veneto since 2010, usually self-describes as a pro-Europeanist and has long advocated for a "Europe of regions" and "macro-regions".[286][287][288][289]
Member state expansion scenarios
This scenario consists of the event of an EU member state taking over a land area outside the union, previously independent or part of a different country. One such event has taken place in history, when East Germany became part of a united Germany in 1991.
Opinion polls in both Moldova and Romania show significant support for the unification of the two countries, based on their reciprocal historical and cultural ties.[293][294] Such a scenario would result in Moldova becoming part of an enlarged Romania and therefore receiving the benefits and obligations of the latter's EU membership.[295] An obstacle would be the existence of the breakaway Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (Transnistria), which is considered by Moldova and most of the international community to be de jure part of Moldova's sovereign territory but is de facto independent. Transnistria's absence of strong historical or cultural links to Romania and its close political and military relationship with Russia have been seen as major hurdles to integration of the region with both Romania and the EU.[294] Another likely barrier from within Moldova would be opposition on the part of the autonomous territory of Gagauzia, whose population has been mostly against integration with Romania since at least the 1990s.[296] A 2014 referendum held by the Gagauzian government showed both overwhelming support for the region joining the Customs Union of the Eurasian Economic Union and a similar level of rejection to closer ties with the EU.[297]
Possible incorporation of special member state territories
European Union
Outermost regions
Overseas countries and territories
Special cases
Other special territories
There are multiple special member state territories, some of which are not fully covered by the EU treaties and apply EU law only partially, if at all. It is possible for a dependency to change its status regarding the EU or some particular treaty or law provision. The territory may change its status from participation to leaving or from being outside to joining.
The Faroe Islands, a self-governing nation within the Kingdom of Denmark, is not part of the EU, as explicitly asserted by both Rome treaties.[298] The relations with the EU are governed by a Fisheries Agreement (1977) and a Free Trade Agreement (1991, revised 1998). The main reason for remaining outside the EU is disagreements about the Common Fisheries Policy,[299] which disfavours countries with large fish resources. Also, every member has to pay for the Common Agricultural Policy, which favours countries having much agriculture which the Faroe Islands does not. When Iceland was in membership negotiations around 2010, there was a hope of better conditions for fish-rich countries[citation needed], but to no avail. The Common Fisheries Policy was introduced in 1970 for the very reason of getting access for the first EC members to waters of candidate countries, namely the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark including the Faroe Islands.[citation needed]
Nevertheless, there are politicians, mainly in the right-wing Union Party (Sambandsflokkurin), led by their chairman Kaj Leo Johannesen, who would like to see the Faroes as a member of the EU. However, the chairman of the left-wing Republic (Tjóðveldi), Høgni Hoydal, has expressed concerns that if the Faroes were to join the EU as is, they might vanish inside the EU, comparing this with the situation of the Shetland Islands and Åland today, and wants the local government to solve the political situation between the Faroes and Denmark first.[300]
Greenland is part of the Kingdom of Denmark, and became part of the EEC (the predecessor entity of the EU) when Denmark joined in 1973. After the establishment of Greenland's home rule in 1979, which made it an autonomous community, Greenland held a referendum on EEC membership. The result was (mainly because of the Common Fisheries Policy) to leave, so on 1 February 1985, Greenland left the EEC and EURATOM. Its status was changed to that of an Overseas Country.[301][302] Danish nationals residing in Greenland (i.e. all native population) are nonetheless fully European citizens; they are not, however, entitled to vote in European elections.
There has been some speculation as to whether Greenland may consider rejoining the now-European Union. On 4 January 2007, the Danish daily Jyllands-Posten quoted the former Danish minister for Greenland, Tom Høyem, as saying I would not be surprised if Greenland again becomes a member of the EU... The EU needs the Arctic window and Greenland cannot alone manage the gigantic Arctic possibilities.[303] Greenland has a lot of natural resources, and Greenland has, especially during the 2000s commodities boom, contracted foreign private companies to exploit some of them, but the cost is considered too high, as Greenland is remote and severely lacks infrastructure which has to be built. After 2013 prices declined so such efforts stalled.
The Brexit debate has reignited talk about the EU in Greenland with calls for the island to join the Union again.[304] In 2024, an opinion poll found that 60 percent of Greenland's population would vote in favour of re-joining the EU.[305]
When Bonaire, Sint Eustatius, and Saba were established as Dutch public bodies after the dissolution of the Netherlands Antilles (which was an OCT) in 2010, their status within the EU was raised. Rather than change their status from an OCT to an outermost region, as their change in status within the Netherlands would imply, it was decided that their status would remain the same for at least five years. After those five years, their status would be reviewed.[needs update]
New Caledonia is an overseas part of France with its own unique status under the French Constitution, which is distinct from that of overseas departments and collectivities. It is defined as an "overseas country of France" under the 1998 Nouméa Accord, and enjoys a high degree of self-government.[307] Currently, in regard to the EU, it is one of the Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT).
As a result of the Nouméa Accord, New Caledonians voted in three consecutive independence referendums in 2018, 2020, and 2021. The referendums were to determine whether the territory would remain a part of the French Republic as a "sui generis collectivity", or whether it would become an independent state. The accords also specify a gradual devolution of powers to the local New Caledonian assembly. The results of all three referendums determined that New Caledonia would remain a part of the French Republic.
^Bulgaria demanded: good neighbourly relations to be a criterion for the Republic of North Macedonia's membership in the EU; to use the official constitutional name of the Republic of North Macedonia instead of the short North Macedonia and the wording for the language should be the "official language" of the candidate country, not Macedonian.[18]
^Directorate-General for Communication (6 February 2024). "The Ukraine Facility". European Commission. Archived from the original on 22 December 2024. Retrieved 22 December 2024.
^Gonen, Emre (2 May 2017). "A truce with the EU?". Daily Sabah – Euronews. Archived from the original on 19 September 2020. Retrieved 21 November 2019.
^"Conditions for membership". European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations. European Commission. Archived from the original on 27 November 2016. Retrieved 21 December 2014.
^"Über Uns". Campaign for an Independent and Neutral Switzerland official website. Archived from the original on 13 April 2016. Retrieved 4 April 2016.
^Holehouse, Matthew (16 February 2014). "Jose Manuel Barroso: nearly impossible for Scotland to join EU". Sunday Telegraph. London. Archived from the original on 20 September 2020. Retrieved 4 September 2014. Spain, which fears the separation of the Catalonia region, has blocked the accession of Kosovo ... Jose Manuel Barroso, the president of the European Commission ... went on: 'It will be extremely difficult to get the approval of all the other member states to have a new member coming from one member state.' 'We have seen that Spain has been opposing even the recognition of Kosovo, for instance. It's to some extent a similar case because it's a new country, and so I believe it's going to be extremely difficult, if not impossible.'
^"Scottish independence: Spain warning over EU entry". The Scotsman. Edinburgh. 3 February 2014. Archived from the original on 24 September 2015. Retrieved 20 November 2019. 'They have to resolve a mountain of problems, as Better Together has explained very well,' he said.'You have to achieve candidate status. You have to negotiate 35 chapters . It has to be ratified by the institutions of the EU. It then has to be ratified by 28 national parliaments.'
^Gianmario Demuro; Ilenia Ruggiu; Francesco Mola (2013). Identità e Autonomia in Sardegna e Scozia. Maggioli Editore. pp. 35–39. ISBN978-8-8387-8243-5.
^<<In chiave antimilitarista, nel quadro del tradizionale attivismo contestativo contro la presenza di strutture militari sul territorio nazionale, a fronte del tono minore che ha caratterizzato l'impegno dei comitati siciliani contro il sistema satellitare MUOS, si è rilevato un innalzamento della tensione mobilitativa in Sardegna, ove espressioni dell'antagonismo e dell'indipendentismo sardo hanno rivitalizzato la protesta contro le esercitazioni nei poligoni e nelle installazioni militari dell'Isola, reclamando la smilitarizzazione del territorio.>> Relazione sulla politica dell'informazione per la sicurezza, pg.69
^"Legislation (Greenland)". Official Journal of the European Communities. 28. 1 February 1985. Archived from the original on 11 December 2020. Retrieved 27 December 2020.
"European Parliament resolution of 17 July 2014 on Ukraine (2014/2717(RSP))". European Parliament. 17 July 2014. Archived from the original on 24 January 2016. Retrieved 20 July 2015. pursuant to Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine – like any other European state – have a European perspective and may apply to become members of the Union provided that they adhere to the principles of democracy, respect fundamental freedoms and human and minority rights and ensure the rule of law;
Bahhouth, Victor; Ziemnowicz, Christopher (6 March 2018). "Meeting the Global Challenges of Doing Business in the Five Candidate Countries on the Road to Join the European Union". Journal of the Knowledge Economy. 10 (3): 1297–1318. doi:10.1007/s13132-018-0531-3. S2CID158074120.
