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Filozofija veštačke inteligencije je grana filozofije uma i filozofije računarstva^[1] koja istražuje veštačku inteligenciju i njene implikacije na znanje i razumevanje inteligencije, etike, svesti, epistemologije i slobodne volje.^[2]^[3] Štaviše, tehnologija se bavi stvaranjem veštačkih životinja ili veštačkih ljudi (ili, barem, veštačkih stvorenja; pogledajte veštački život), tako da je disciplina od velikog interesa za filozofe.^[4] Ovi faktori su doprineli nastanku filozofije veštačke inteligencije.

Filozofija veštačke inteligencije pokušava da odgovori na sledeća pitanja:^[5]

Može li mašina da deluje inteligentno? Može li to da reši bilo koji problem koji bi čovek rešio razmišljanjem?
Da li su ljudska inteligencija i inteligencija mašina iste? Da li je ljudski mozak u suštini kompjuter?
Može li mašina imati um, mentalna stanja i svest u istom smislu kao i ljudsko biće? Može li se osetiti kako stvari stoje? (tj. da li ima svest?)

Pitanja poput ovih odražavaju različita interesovanja istraživača veštačke inteligencije, kognitivnih naučnika i filozofa. Naučni odgovori na ova pitanja zavise od definicije „inteligencije” i „svesti” i tačno o kojim se „mašinama” raspravlja.

Važne propozicije u filozofiji veštačke inteligencije uključuju neke od sledećih tema:

Tjuringova „pristojna konvencija“: Ako se mašina ponaša inteligentno kao ljudsko biće, onda je inteligentna kao i ljudsko biće.^[6]
Dartmutski predlog: „Svaki aspekt učenja ili bilo koja druga karakteristika inteligencije može se u principu tako precizno opisati da se može napraviti mašina da ga simulira.“^[7]
Hipoteza o sistemu fizičkih simbola Alena Njuela i Herberta A. Sajmona: „Fizički sistem simbola ima neophodna i dovoljna sredstva opšte inteligentne akcije.“^[8]
Snažna hipoteza veštačke inteligencije Džona Sirla: „Odgovarajuće programirani računar sa pravim ulazima i izlazima bi stoga imao um u potpuno istom smislu kao i ljudska bića.“^[9]
Hobsov mehanizam: „Jer 'razum'... nije ništa drugo do 'računanje', to je sabiranje i oduzimanje, posledica opštih imena dogovorenih za 'obeležavanje' i 'označavanje' naših misli...”^[10]

Reference

^ „Philosophy of Computer Science”. obo (на језику: енглески).
^ McCarthy, John. „The Philosophy of AI and the AI of Philosophy”. jmc.stanford.edu. Архивирано из оригинала 2018-10-23. г. Приступљено 2018-09-18.
^ Müller, Vincent C. (2023-07-24). „Philosophy of AI: A structured overview”. Nathalie A. Smuha (Ed.), Cambridge Handbook on the Law, Ethics and Policy of Artificial Intelligence.
^ Bringsjord, Selmer; Govindarajulu, Naveen Sundar (2018), „Artificial Intelligence”, Ур.: Zalta, Edward N., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2018 изд.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, Архивирано из оригинала 2019-11-09. г., Приступљено 2018-09-18
^ Russell & Norvig 2003, стр. 947 define the philosophy of AI as consisting of the first two questions, and the additional question of the ethics of artificial intelligence. Fearn 2007, стр. 55 writes "In the current literature, philosophy has two chief roles: to determine whether or not such machines would be conscious, and, second, to predict whether or not such machines are possible." The last question bears on the first two.
^ This is a paraphrase of the essential point of the Turing test. Turing 1950, Haugeland 1985, стр. 6–9, Crevier 1993, стр. 24, Russell & Norvig 2003, стр. 2–3 and 948
^ McCarthy et al. 1955. This assertion was printed in the program for the Dartmouth Conference of 1956, widely considered the "birth of AI."also Crevier 1993, стр. 28
^ Newell & Simon 1976 and Russell & Norvig 2003, стр. 18
^ This version is from Searle (1999), and is also quoted in Dennett 1991, стр. 435. Searle's original formulation was "The appropriately programmed computer really is a mind, in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to understand and have other cognitive states." Searle 1980, стр. 1. Strong AI is defined similarly by Russell & Norvig (2003, стр. 947): "The assertion that machines could possibly act intelligently (or, perhaps better, act as if they were intelligent) is called the 'weak AI' hypothesis by philosophers, and the assertion that machines that do so are actually thinking (as opposed to simulating thinking) is called the 'strong AI' hypothesis."
^ Hobbes 1651, chpt. 5

Literatura

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[1] „Philosophy of Computer Science”. obo (на језику: енглески).

[2] McCarthy, John. „The Philosophy of AI and the AI of Philosophy”. jmc.stanford.edu. Архивирано из оригинала 2018-10-23. г. Приступљено 2018-09-18.

[:0-3] Müller, Vincent C. (2023-07-24). „Philosophy of AI: A structured overview”. Nathalie A. Smuha (Ed.), Cambridge Handbook on the Law, Ethics and Policy of Artificial Intelligence.

[sep-4] Bringsjord, Selmer; Govindarajulu, Naveen Sundar (2018), „Artificial Intelligence”, Ур.: Zalta, Edward N., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2018 изд.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, Архивирано из оригинала 2019-11-09. г., Приступљено 2018-09-18

[5] Russell & Norvig 2003, стр. 947 define the philosophy of AI as consisting of the first two questions, and the additional question of the ethics of artificial intelligence. Fearn 2007, стр. 55 writes "In the current literature, philosophy has two chief roles: to determine whether or not such machines would be conscious, and, second, to predict whether or not such machines are possible." The last question bears on the first two.

[T-6] This is a paraphrase of the essential point of the Turing test. Turing 1950, Haugeland 1985, стр. 6–9, Crevier 1993, стр. 24, Russell & Norvig 2003, стр. 2–3 and 948

[MMRS-7] McCarthy et al. 1955. This assertion was printed in the program for the Dartmouth Conference of 1956, widely considered the "birth of AI."also Crevier 1993, стр. 28

[NS-8] Newell & Simon 1976 and Russell & Norvig 2003, стр. 18

[SWAI-9] This version is from Searle (1999), and is also quoted in Dennett 1991, стр. 435. Searle's original formulation was "The appropriately programmed computer really is a mind, in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to understand and have other cognitive states." Searle 1980, стр. 1. Strong AI is defined similarly by Russell & Norvig (2003, стр. 947): "The assertion that machines could possibly act intelligently (or, perhaps better, act as if they were intelligent) is called the 'weak AI' hypothesis by philosophers, and the assertion that machines that do so are actually thinking (as opposed to simulating thinking) is called the 'strong AI' hypothesis."

[H-10] Hobbes 1651, chpt. 5

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