Intellegentia artificialis

Asimo, robotum humanum.

Intellegentia artificialis,[1] vel intellegentia ficticia,[2] est subdisciplina informatica quae machinis intellegentibus creandis studet. Disciplina intellegentiae artificialis enchiridiis hoc modo describitur: "studium et formatio actorum intellegentium",[3] ubi "actor intellegens" est systema quod confinia sua sentit et ita agit, ut successus habeat quam maximos.[4]

Ioannes McCarthy, qui anno 1956 artificial intelligence terminum technicum composuisse videtur, intellegentiam artificiosam describit scientiam et artem esse machinas intellegentes faciendi.[5] Quae schola investigat notam potissimam hominum, intellegentiam (sapientiam Hominis sapientis) tam exacte describere, ut machina simulari possit.[6] Quod studium quaestiones philosophicas de natura mentis et de finibus gloriae scientiae offert: quaestiones quae mythis, fabulis, et philosophia ab ultima antiquitate examinatae sunt.[7] Intellegentia artificiosa initio spem animum incitantem iniecit, deinde regressus accepit,[8] et nunc est pergravis industriae technologicae pars, quae multis in quaestionibus difficillimis informaticae solvendis adiuvit.[9]

Intellegentia artificiosa in investigatione tam technica et speciali consistit, ut aliqui existimatores eam obtrectent, quod campus centifidus sit.[10] Subcampi A.I. quaedam problemata, usus quorundam instrumentorum et diuturnas opinionum contentiones complectuntur. Gravissima intellegentiae artificialis problemata pertinent ad ratiocinationem, cognitionem, praedispositionem, eruditionem, communicationem, sensus nec non rerum movendarum tractandarumque facultates.[11] Alii intellegentiam generalem (sive A.I. fortem, Anglice: "strong A.I.") consectantur,[12] alii non iam credunt fortem A.I. impetrari posse.

Intellegentia artificialis in mythis, fabulis, coniecturis

Machinae cogitantes et res artificiales in mythis Graecis apparent, ut Talus Cretensis, ut automata aurea Hephaesti, ut Galatea Pygmalionis.[13] Effigies hominum intellegentes creditae in multis societatibus antiquis aedificatae sunt, inter quas antiquissimae sunt statuae sacrae in Aegypto Graeciaque veneratae,[14][15] et machinae Yan Shi,[16] Heronis Alexandrini,[17] Al-Jazari,[18] et Wolfgangi von Kempelen.[19] Opinio vulgaris est re artificiales tamquam animantes a Gebero,[20] Iuda Loew[21] et Paracelso[22] aedificatas esse. Fabulae de illis rebus earumque fortunis factae de iisdem atque A.I. exspectationibus, timoribus, curis ethicis disserunt.[7]

Frankenstein, mythistoria a Maria Shelley scripta,[23] quaestionem pergravem ad ethicam intellegentiae artificialis pertinentem considerat: si machina intellegens creari possit, habeatne animi adfectus? si sentiat, habeatne iura hominum? Eadem quaestio in litteris rerum futurarum proponitur: Artificial Intelligence: A.I., pellicula a Stephano Spielberg facta, machinam in puerum parvulum formatam considerat cui adfectus dati sunt humani animi, et ne doloris quidem exsorti animo carebat. Haec quaestio, "iura roboti" nunc appellata, apud Institutum futuris praecipiendis Californiense[24] ponderatur, quamquam alii hanc disputationem praematuram esse credunt.[25]

Scriptores et studiosi rerum futurarum etiam sciscitantur, quae novae res impulsu intellegentiae artificialis societati pariantur. In litteris, intellegentia artificialis partes egit servi (R2D2 in pellicula Star Wars), exactoris legis (K.I.T.T. in programmate televisifico Knight Rider), comitis (Lt. Commander Data in programmate televisifico Star Trek), subiugatoris (pellicula Matrix), dictatoris (novella With Folded Hands, exterminatoris (pellicula Terminator et programma televisificum Battlestar Galactica), humanarum facultatum extensionis (manga Ghost in the Shell), servatoris humani generis (R. Daneel Olivaw in serie litterarum Foundation series). Docti autem has res consideraverunt: deminutus operariorum usus,[26] humani ingenii amplificatio,[27] humanitas et ethica nova ratione constituenda.[28]

Nonnulli rerum futurarum studiosi dicunt fore, ut intellegentia artificialis fines progressus transcendat et homines penitus transformet. Raimundus Kurzweil Lege Moore (quae exponentialem digitalis technologiae progressum mira subtilitate describit) usus existimavit anno 2029 ferme computatris mensalibus computandi vim fore instar cerebri hominis, et post annum 2045 intellegentiam artificialem eo iam loci fore, ut sese emendare ea velocitate possit, quae, quidquid umquam possit animo concipi, superet. Quae res a Vernor Vinge scriptore Singularitas technologica appellata est.[27] Eduardus Fredkin autem arguit intellegentiam artificialem esse posterum evolutionis gradum.[29] Quam opinionem a Samuele Butler libro Darwin among the Machines anno 1863 edito primum propositam Georgius Dyson anno 1998 suo libro eodem nomine inscripto amplificavit. Nonnulli futurorum studiosi et scriptores praedixerunt homines cum machinis commixtos in "cyborgos", si uti licet, sive homines cyberneticos mutatum iri, qui utroque capaciores potentioresque sint. Haec transhumanismi notio ex Aldous Huxley et Roberto Ettinger orta animum nunc refert ad Hans Moravec, machinatorem robotorum, et Kevin Warwick, cyberneticum, et Raimundum Kurzweil, inventorem.[27] Transhumanismus etiam narrationibus commenticiis inlustratus est, exempli causa dicimus mangam Ghost in the Shell appellatam et litterarum futura tractantium seriem Dune nuncupatam. Pamela McCorduck denique ex hoc scribit apparere "deos fabricandi" desiderium antiquum humanitatis.[7]

Historia investigationis intellegentiae artificiosae

Medio saeculo vicensimo, nonnulli eruditi machinas novi generis intellegentes aedificandi initium fecerunt, quae ex recentibus inventis neurologicis, ex nova theoria mathematica informationis, ex cybernetica sive gubernationis stabilitatisque scientia et praesertim, computatro digitali invento, ex machina ad humanam mathematicam ratiocinationem simulandam designata orirentur.[30]

Campus investigationis intellegentiae artificialis hodiernae in colloquio apud Collegium Dartmuthense aestate anni 1956 institutus est.[31] Omnes qui aderant duces investigationis A.I. postea exstiterunt, praesertim Ioannes McCarthy, Marvin Minsky, Allen Newell et Herbertus Simon, qui laboratorium A.I. apud MIT, CMU et Universitatem Stanfordiensem instituerunt. Illi cum discipulis suis programmata computatralia scripserunt, quibus plurimi stupuerunt:[32] problemata verborum algebraica computatris persolvebantur, theoremata logica demonstrabantur, et computatra Anglice loquebantur.[33] Usque ad medium annorum 1960, huius generis investigationes largis pecuniis per ministerium defensionis CFA comparatis factae sunt,[34] et illi, qui intererant, has praedixerunt res:

  • Simon (1965): "Viginti annis, omnia opera ab hominibus facta per machinas fient."[35]
  • Minsky (1967): "Intra aetatem hominis ... problema creandae intellegentiae artificialis re vera persolvetur."[36]

Hae praedictiones multaeque similes verae non exstiterant. Investigatores enim instantes difficultates non viderant. Anno 1974, Iacobo Lighthill, mathematico Britannico, repudiante, et Congressu CFA hortante ad pecunias fructuosioribus investigationibus dandas, regimina CFA et Britanniae omnem intellegentiae artificialis investigationem amputaverunt fundamentalem. Inde prima hiems intellegentiae artificialis.[37]

Ineuntibus annis 1980, investigatio A.I. resuscitata est mercatorio successu systematorum consiliis capiendis designatorum sive systematorum expertorum,[38] quae sunt programmata A.I. ad scientiam et artes analyticas unius aut plurium hominum expertorum simulandas confecta. Anno 1985 ineunte, mercatus A.I. plus miliardum dollariorum erat, et regimina per orbem terrarum pecuniam campo A.I. praestare coeperunt.[39] Nihilo minus, paucis annis post, mercatu machinarum Lisp anno 1987 confracto, intellegentia artificialis ad infamiam iterum tracta est. Quo facto, secunda, longior hiems A.I. incepit.[40]

Annis 1990 et ineunte saeculo 21, intellegentia artificialis successus supremos patravit, quamquam hoc aliquantum post siparium factum est. A.I. logisticam sive rerum flumina praedisponendi artem, "effossionem" notitiae, diagnosin medicam multosque alios industriae technologicae campos adiuvat.[9] Quae prosperitates multis rebus effectae sunt, sicut computandi vi computatrorum modernorum (vide Legem Moorianam), maiore cura in subproblematis particularibus adseverate persolvendis suscepta, necessitudinibus novis inter intellegentiam artificialem et consimilia studia coniunctis, et praesertim ideo, quod investigatores solidis methodis mathematicis pergravibusque regulis scientificis se addixerunt.[41]

Philosophia A.I.

Intellegentia artificiosa, cum se facultates mentis humanae recreare posse adfirmat, et provocatrix et inspiratrix philosophiae exstitit. Certisne finibus, quam intellegentes esse possint machinae, circumscribi potest? Verumne discrimen inter intellegentiam hominis et intellegentiam machinae est an non? Utrum machina mentem animamque habet an non? Haec sunt nonnulla responsa potiora:[42]

"Comis conventio" ab Alano Turing proposita
Machina aliqua, si aeque intellegenter agit atque homo aliqui, intellegentia hominem aequat. Turing enim docuit nos intellegentiam machinae postremo nullo modo nisi actionibus eiusdem diiudicare posse. Qua in theoria consistit examen Turing.[43]
Propositio Dartmuthensis
Omnis discendi modus aut quaelibet alia intellegendi proprietas tam exacte describi potest, ut machina simulari possit. Haec adfirmatio in propositione ad Conventum Dartmuthense demonstrata anno 1956 impressa est, quae etiam est opinio plurimorum investigatorum in intellegentia artificiali operosorum.[6]
Hypothesis systematis symbolorum physicorum a Newell et Simon proposita
Systema symbolorum physicorum facultates necessarias et sufficientes ad actionem intellegentem generalem habet. Quae coniectura postulat intellegentiam tractatione symbolorum constare. Hubertus Dreyfus contra arguit scientiam hominis a naturae instinctu quodam inscio potius quam a conscia symbolorum tractatione dependere.[44][45]
Theorema imperfectionis Gödel
Systema formale (ut programma computatrale) omnes propositiones veras confirmare non potest. Rogerius Penrose est unus inter multos, qui hoc theoremate actiones machinarum finiri adfirmant.[46][47]
Hypothesis intellegentiae artificialis fortis a Searle proposita
Computatrum, si rectis initibus exitibusque proprie programmetur, mentem habeat instar mentis humanae.[48] Searle hanc hypothesin refutat suo ad conclave Sinense argumento, quo nos, intra computatrum videamus et "mentem" reperire conemur, hortatur.[49]
Argumentum ex cerebro facticio
Cerebrum simulari potest. Hans Moravec, Raimundus Kurzweil et alii adfirmaverunt artificio fieri posse, ut cerebrum simpliciter in armaturam et programma transcribatur, et illud simulamen reapse par cerebro germano sit.[50]

Problemata A.I.

Investigatio ad intellegentiam artificialem pertinens saeculi 21 in subcampos instituta, investigatores, quaestiones, instrumenta complexos divisa est, qui inter se vix colloquuntur.

Opus intellegentiae simulandae in multa opuscula specialia dissolutum est, quae in proprietatibus facultatibusve consistunt, quas investigatores systemati intellegenti esse volunt. Proprietates infra descriptae plurimorum animos attenderunt:[11]

Deductio rationalis, ratiocinatio, problemata persolvenda

Initio investigatores A.I. algorithmos creaverunt, qui gradatim ratiocinationem imitarentur, qua homines problemata persolventes, ludos mensales ludentes vel deductionem rationalem adhibentes utantur. [51] Exeuntibus annis 1980 et ineuntibus 1990, ab investigatoribus notionibus probabilitatis et oeconomiae usis methodi valde efficaces creatae erant, quae informationem inperfectam vel incertam attingerent. [52]

Ad problemata aegre persolvenda plurimi algorithmorum ingentes opes computatrales requirunt — plurimi inordinata rerum combinandarum accretione laborant: cum problema quoddam certam magnitudinem excedit, inopia memoriae capacitatis aut temporis computatralis ingentissima fit. Indagatio algorithmorum, quibus problemata efficacius persolvantur, maximi momenti est in investigatione intellegentiae artificialis.[53]

Homines plurimas quaestiones potius intuitivis velocibusque iudiciis solvunt quam conscia ratiocinatione, cuius gradus ab investigatoribus A.I. initio formari potuerunt.[54]

Intellegentia artificiosa aliquantum profecit in simulando huiusmodi "subsymbolicas" quaestionum solutiones: quiqui ea, quae agente corporeo constat, ratione utuntur adfirmant? sollertias sensorimotrices magni interesse superioris ratiocinationis; retium autem neuralium studios intimas in humani et animali cerebro conformationes simulare conantur, e quibus haec sollertiae genera oriuntur.

Nexus interni

Nexus externi

Vicimedia Communia plura habent quae ad intellegentiam artificiosam spectant.

Notae

Verba quae insequuntur vicificanda sunt ut rationibus qualitatis et Latinitatis propositis obtemperent. Quaesumus ut paginam emendes.

  1. ↑ Latinitate classica, intellegentia artificiosa.
  2. ↑ Twitter.
  3. ↑ Poole, Mackworth, et Goebel 1998: 1 (ubi "computational intelligence" intellegentiam artificialem significat); item fere Nilsson (1998) et Russell et Norvig 2003.
  4. ↑ Russell & Norvig (2003).
  5. ↑ Ioannes McCarthy, What is Artificial Intelligence?.
  6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 Dartmouth proposal: McCarthy et al. 1955.
  7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 Quod est prima notio libri Machines That Think, quo Pamela McCorduck scribit: "I like to think of artificial intelligence as the scientific apotheosis of a venerable cultural tradition" (2004: 34). Praeterea, "Artificial intelligence in one form or another is an idea that has pervaded Western intellectual history, a dream in urgent need of being realized" (2004: xviii): "Our history is full of attempts—nutty, eerie, comical, earnest, legendary and real—to make artificial intelligences, to reproduce what is the essential us—bypassing the ordinary means. Back and forth between myth and reality, our imaginations supplying what our workshops couldn't, we have engaged for a long time in this odd form of self-reproduction" (2004: 3). She traces the desire back to its Hellenistic roots and calls it the urge to "forge the Gods." (2004: 340-400).
  8. ↑ ALPAC report (1966), derelictio perceptrorum (1970), Lighthill Report (1973), mercatus machinarum LISP conlapsus (1987).
  9. ↑ 9.0 9.1 De rebus post siparium in usum conlatis: Russell & Norvig 2003: 28; Kurzweil 2005: 265; NRC 1999: 216-22.
  10. ↑ Fractioning of AI into subfields:
    • McCorduck 2004, pp. 421-425
  11. ↑ 11.0 11.1 This list of intelligent traits is based on the topics covered by the major AI textbooks, inter quos:
    • Russell & Norvig 2003
    • Luger & Stubblefield 2004
    • Poole, Mackworth & Goebel 1998
    • Nilsson 1998
  12. ↑ General intelligence (strong AI) is discussed in popular introductions to AI:
    • Kurzweil 1999
    • Kurzweil 2005
  13. ↑ AI in Myth:
    • McCorduck 2004, p. 4-5
    • Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 939
  14. ↑ Sacred statues as artificial intelligence:
    • Crevier (1993, p. 1) (statue of Amun)
    • McCorduck (2004, pp. 6-9)
  15. ↑ These were the first machines to be believed to have true intelligence and consciousness. Hermes Trismegistus expressed the common belief that with these statues, craftsman had reproduced "the true nature of the gods", their sensus and spiritus. McCorduck makes the connection between sacred automatons and Mosaic law (developed around the same time), which expressly forbids the worship of robots (McCorduck 2004, pp. 6-9)
  16. ↑ Needham 1986, p. 53
  17. ↑ McCorduck 2004, p. 6
  18. ↑ "A Thirteenth Century Programmable Robot". Shef.ac.uk. 2007 
  19. ↑ McCorduck 2004, p. 17
  20. ↑ Takwin: O'Connor, Kathleen Malone (1994). "The alchemical creation of life (takwin) and other concepts of Genesis in medieval Islam". University of Pennsylvania 
  21. ↑ Golem: McCorduck 2004, p. 15-16, Buchanan 2005, p. 50
  22. ↑ McCorduck 2004, p. 13-14
  23. ↑ McCorduck (2004, p. 190-25) discusses Frankenstein and identifies the key ethical issues as scientific hubris and the suffering of the monster, i.e. robot rights.
  24. ↑ Robot rights:
  25. ↑ See the Times Online, Human rights for robots? We’re getting carried away
  26. ↑ Russell & Norvig (2003, p. 960-961).
  27. ↑ 27.0 27.1 27.2 Singularitas technologica, transhumanism: Kurzweil 2005; Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 963.
  28. ↑ De Iosepho Weizenbaum intellegentiae artificialis aestimatore: Weizenbaum 1976; Crevier 1993, pp. 132−144; McCorduck 2004, pp. 356-373; Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 961. Weizenbaum enim anno 1976 putavit abusu intellegentiae artificialis effici, ut vita humana despiciatur.
  29. ↑ Quoted in McCorduck (2004, p. 401)
  30. ↑ AI's immediate precursors: McCorduck 2004, 51-107; Crevier 1993, 27-32; Russell & Norvig 2003, 15,940; Moravec 1988, 3. Among the researchers who laid the foundations of the theory of computation, cybernetics, information theory and neural networks were Alan Turing, John Von Neumann, Norbert Weiner, Claude Shannon, Warren McCullough, Walter Pitts and Donald Hebb.
  31. ↑ Dartmouth conference: McCorduck, pp. 111-136; Crevier 1993, pp. 47-49; Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 17; NRC 1999, pp. 200-201
  32. ↑ Russell and Norvig write "it was astonishing whenever a computer did anything kind of smartish." Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 18
  33. ↑ "Golden years" of AI (successful symbolic reasoning programs 1956-1973): McCorduck, pp. 243-252; Crevier 1993, pp. 52-107; Moravec 1988, p. 9; Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 18-21. The programs described are Daniel Bobrow's STUDENT, Newell and Simon's Logic Theorist and Terry Winograd's SHRDLU.
  34. ↑ DARPA pours money into undirected pure research into AI during the 1960s: McCorduck 2005, pp. 131; Crevier 1993, pp. 51, 64-65; NRC 1999, pp. 204-205.
  35. ↑ Simon 1965, p. 96 quoted in Crevier 1993, p. 109.
  36. ↑ Minsky 1967, p. 2 quoted in Crevier 1993, p. 109.
  37. ↑ Prima hiems AI: Crevier 1993, pp. 115-117; Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 22; NRC 1999, pp. 212-213; Howe 1994.
  38. ↑ Systemata experta: ACM 1998, I.2.1; Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 22−24; Luger & Stubblefield 2004, pp. 227-331; Nilsson 1998, chpt. 17.4; McCorduck 2004, pp. 327-335, 434-435; Crevier 1993, pp. 145-62, 197−203.
  39. ↑ Boom of the 1980s: rise of expert systems, Fifth Generation Project, Alvey, MCC, SCI: McCorduck 2004, pp. 426-441; Crevier 1993, pp. 161-162, 197-203, 211, 240; Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 24; NRC 1999, pp. 210-211.
  40. ↑ Hiems A.I. secunda: McCorduck 2004, pp. 430-435; Crevier 1993, pp. 209-210; NRC 1999, pp. 214-216
  41. ↑ Formal methods are now preferred ("Victory of the neats"): Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 25-26; McCorduck 2004, pp. 486-487
  42. ↑ All of these positions below are mentioned in standard discussions of the subject, such as: Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 947-960; Fearn 2007, pp. 38-55.
  43. ↑ Philosophical implications of the Turing test: Turing 1950; Haugeland 1985, pp. 6-9; Crevier 1993, p. 24; Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 2-3 and 948.
  44. ↑ Dreyfus criticized the necessary condition of the physical symbol system hypothesis, which he called the "psychological assumption": "The mind can be viewed as a device operating on bits of information according to formal rules". (Dreyfus 1992, p. 156)
  45. ↑ Dreyfus' Critique of AI: Dreyfus 1972; Dreyfus & Dreyfus 1986; Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 950-952; Crevier 1993, pp. 120-132.
  46. ↑ This is a paraphrase of the important implication of Gödel's theorems.
  47. ↑ The Mathematical Objection: Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 949; McCorduck 2004, p. 448-449; Refuting Mathematical Objection: Turing 1950 under “(2) The Mathematical Objection” Hofstadter 1979. Making the Mathematical Objection: Lucas 1961; Penrose 1989. Background: Gödel 1931, Church 1936, Kleene 1935, Turing 1937.
  48. ↑ This version is from Searle (1999), and is also quoted in Dennett 1991, p. 435. Searle's original formulation was "The appropriately programmed computer really is a mind, in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to understand and have other cognitive states." (Searle 1980, p. 1). Strong AI is defined similarly by Russell & Norvig (2003, p. 947): "The assertion that machines could possibly act intelligently (or, perhaps better, act as if they were intelligent) is called the 'weak AI' hypothesis by philosophers, and the assertion that machines that do so are actually thinking (as opposed to simulating thinking) is called the 'strong AI' hypothesis."
  49. ↑ Argumentum ad conclave Sinense a Searle propositum: Searle 1980; Searle 1991; Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 958-960; McCorduck 2004, pp. 443-445; Crevier 1993, pp. 269-271.
  50. ↑ Cerebrum facticium: Moravec 1988; Kurzweil 2005, p. 262; Russell Norvig, p. 957; Crevier 1993, pp. 271 and 279. The most extreme form of this argument (the brain replacement scenario) was put forward by Clark Glymour in the mid-70s and was touched on by Zenon Pylyshyn and John Searle in 1980. Daniel Dennett sees human consciousness as multiple functional thought patterns; see "Consciousness Explained".
  51. ↑ De problematis aenigmatisque solvendis, lusibus ac deductione (Russell & Norvig 2003, capita 3-9; Poole et al. capita 2,3,7,9; Luger & Stubblefield 2004, capita 3,4,6,8; Nilsson, ccapita 7-12.
  52. ↑ Ratiocinatio incerta (Russell & Norvig 2003), pp. 452–644; Poole, Mackworth & Goebel 1998, pp. 345–95; Luger & Stubblefield 2004, pp. 333–81; Nilsson 1998, caput 19.
  53. ↑ De his rebus, vide Russell & Norvig 2003, pp. 9, 21-22.
  54. ↑ Ex scientia cognitiva multa exempla notissima adlata sunt:
    • Wason (1966) demonstravit hominibus male contigisse, ut quaestiones perquam abstractas persolverent. Sin autem quaestio ita restituta erit, ut locus intellegentiae intuitivae sociali daretur, rei gerendae facultas valde augescet.
    • Tversky, Slovic & Kahnemann (1982) demonstraverunt homines inertes esse in solvendis quaestionibus simplicibus, quae incertam poscunt ratiocinationem.
    • Lakoff & Núñez (2000) affirmaverunt, non sine controversia, etiam artem mathematicam a scientia quadam e corpore oriunda (id est: a sollertia sensorimotrice et perceptuali) pendere.

Bibliographia

Enchiridia A.I. maiora

  • Luger, George, et William Stubblefield. 2004. Artificial Intelligence: Structures and Strategies for Complex Problem Solving. Ed. 5a. The Benjamin/Cummings Publishing Company, Inc. ISBN 0-8053-4780-1.
  • Nilsson, Nils. 1998. Artificial Intelligence: A New Synthesis. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, ISBN 978-1-55860-467-4.
  • Russell, Stuart J., et Peter Norvig. 2003. Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (2nd ed.) Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, ISBN 0-13-790395-2.
  • Poole, David, Alan Mackworth, et Randy Goebel. 1998. Computational Intelligence: A Logical Approach. Novi Eboraci: Oxford University Press.
  • Winston, Patrick Henry. 1984. Artificial Intelligence. Reading Massachusettae: Addison-Wesley, ISBN 0-201-08259-4.

Historia A.I.

  • Crevier, Daniel. 1993. AI: The Tumultuous Search for Artificial Intelligence. Novi Eboraci: BasicBooks, ISBN 0-465-02997-3.
  • McCorduck, Pamela. 2004. Machines Who Think. Ed. 2a. Natick Massachusettae: A. K. Peters, Ltd. ISBN 1-56881-205-1.

Artes aliae

  • ACM (Association of Computing Machinery). 1998. ACM Computing Classification System: Artificial intelligence.
  • Brooks, Rodney. 1990. "Elephants Don't Play Chess." Robotics and Autonomous Systems 6: 3–15, doi:10.1016/S0921-8890(05)80025-9.
  • Buchanan, Bruce G. 2005. "A (Very) Brief History of Artificial Intelligence." AI Magazine, 53–60.
  • Dreyfus, Hubert. 1972. What Computers Can't Do. Novi Eboraci: MIT Press, ISBN 0-06-011082-1.
  • Dreyfus, Hubert. 1979 What Computers Still Can't Do. Novi Eboraci: MIT Press.
  • Dreyfus, Hubert; Dreyfus, Stuart (1986) Mind over Machine: The Power of Human Intuition and Expertise in the Era of the Computer. Oxoniae: Blackwell.
  • Gladwell, Malcolm. 2005. Blink. Novi Eboraci: Little, Brown and Co., ISBN 0-316-17232-4.
  • Haugeland, John. 1985. Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea. Cantabrigiae Massachasettae: MIT Press, ISBN 0-262-08153-9.
  • Hawkins, Jeff; Blakeslee, Sandra. 2004. On Intelligence. Novi Eboraci: Owl Books, ISBN 0-8050-7853-3.
  • Hofstadter, Douglas. 1979. Gödel, Escher, Bach: an Eternal Golden Braid. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
  • Howe, J. 2007. "Artificial Intelligence at Edinburgh University: a Perspective." [1]
  • Kahneman, Daniel, D. Slovic, et Arnos Tversky. 1982. Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Novi Eboraci: Cambridge University Press.
  • Kurzweil, Ray. 1999. The Age of Spiritual Machines. Penguin Books, ISBN 0-670-88217-8.
  • Kurzweil, Ray. 2005. The Singularity is Near. Penguin Books, ISBN 0-670-03384-7.
  • Lakoff, George. 1987. Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal About the Mind. University of Chicago Press. ISBN 0-226-46804-6.
  • Lakoff, George, et Rafael E. Núñez. 2000. Where Mathematics Comes From: How the Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics into Being. Basic Books. ISBN 0-465-03771-2.
  • Lenat, Douglas; Guha, R. V. 1989. Building Large Knowledge-Based Systems. Addison-Wesley
  • Lighthill, Professor Sir James. 1973. "Artificial Intelligence: A General Survey." In Artificial Intelligence: a paper symposium. Science Research Council
  • Lucas, John. 1961. "Minds, Machines and Gödel." In Minds and Machines, ed. A. R. Anderson. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.
  • McCarthy, John; Minsky, Marvin; Rochester, Nathan; Shannon, Claude (1955) "A Proposal for the Dartmouth Summer Research Project on Artificial Intelligence." [2]
  • McCarthy, John, et P.J. Hayes. 1969 "Some philosophical problems from the standpoint of artificial intelligence." Machine Intelligence 4: 463–502.
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