Nel 2012 riceve il premio Nobel per l'economia assieme ad Alvin E. Roth con la motivazione: "per la teoria delle allocazioni stabili e gli studi sulla configurazione dei mercati".[3].
Opere
A Simple Three-Person Poker Game, con J.F. Nash e H.F. Bohnenblust, in Contributions to the Theory of Games, Vol. I, (curatori H.F. Bohnenblust e altri), Annals of Mathematics Studies, n. 24, Princeton University Press, 1950.
Stochastic Games, 1953.
A Value for n-person Games, in Contributions to the Theory of Games, Vol. II, (curatori: H.W. Kuhn and A.W. Tucker), Annals of Mathematics Studies, n. 28, pp. 307–317. Princeton University Press, 1953.
Advances in game theory, curatore, con Melvin Dresher e A.W. Tucker, Princeton University Press, 1964.
Geometric Properties of the Kernel, Nucleolus, and Related Solution Concepts, con M. Maschler e B. Peleg, Rand Corporation, 1971.
Values of non-atomic games, con R.J. Aumann, Princeton University Press, 1974.
Theory of games and its applications to economics and politics, con L.K. Raut, New Delhi, Macmillan India, 1981.
Potential Games, con Dov Monderer, in Games and Economic Behavior 14, pp. 124–143, 1996.