Coat of Arms of Archduke Charles, Duke of Teschen, showing the batons of a field marshal of the Austrian Army and the black cross of the Grand Master of the Teutonic Order (1801-1804)
Archduke Charles Louis John Joseph Laurentius of Austria, Duke of Teschen (German: Erzherzog Karl Ludwig Johann Josef Lorenz von Österreich, Herzog von Teschen; 5 September 1771 – 30 April 1847) was an Austrian field-marshal, the third son of Emperor Leopold II and his wife, Maria Luisa of Spain. He was also the younger brother of Francis II, Holy Roman Emperor. He was epileptic, but achieved respect both as a commander and as a reformer of the Austrian army. He was considered one of Napoleon's most formidable opponents and one of the greatest generals of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars.
As a military strategist, Charles was able to successfully execute complex and risky manoeuvres of troops. However, his contemporary Carl von Clausewitz criticised his rigidity and adherence to "geographic" strategy. Many Austrians nevertheless remember Charles as a hero of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars.
In 1795 he served on the Rhine, and in the following year, he was entrusted with chief control of all the Austrian forces on that river. His conduct of the operations against Jourdan and Moreau in 1796 marked him out at once as one of the greatest generals in Europe. At first, falling back carefully and avoiding a decision, he finally marched away, leaving a mere screen in front of Moreau. Falling upon Jourdan, he beat him in the battles of Amberg (August), Würzburg and Limburg (September), and drove him over the Rhine with great loss. He then turned upon Moreau's army, which he defeated and forced out of Germany after the battles of Wetzlar, Emmendingen and Schliengen.[1]
In 1797 he was sent to arrest the victorious march of General Bonaparte in Italy, and he conducted the retreat of the over-matched Austrians with the highest skill. In the campaign of 1799 he once more opposed Jourdan, whom he defeated in the battles of Ostrach and Stockach, following up his success by invading Switzerland and defeating Masséna in the First Battle of Zurich, after which he re-entered Germany and drove the French once more over the Rhine after winning at Mannheim in 1799.[1][2]
Ill-health, however, forced him to retire to Bohemia, but he was soon recalled to undertake the task of checking Moreau's advance on Vienna. The result of the Battle of Hohenlinden had, however, foredoomed the attempt, and the archduke had to make the armistice of Steyr. His popularity was now such that the Perpetual Diet of Regensburg, which met in 1802, resolved to erect a statue in his honour and to give him the title of saviour of his country, but Charles refused both distinctions.[1]
In the short and disastrous war of 1805 Archduke Charles commanded what was intended to be the main army in Italy, but events made Germany the decisive theatre of operations; Austria sustained defeat on the Danube, and the archduke was defeated by Massena in the Battle of Caldiero. With the conclusion of peace he began his active work of army reorganisation, which was first tested on the field in 1809.[1]
In 1806 Francis II (now Francis I of Austria) named the Archduke Charles, already a field marshal, as Commander in Chief of the Austrian army and Head of the Council of War.[citation needed] Supported by the prestige of being the only general who had proved capable of defeating the French, he promptly initiated a far-reaching scheme of reform, which replaced the obsolete methods of the 18th century. The chief characteristics of the new order were the adoption of the nation in arms principle and the adoption of French war organization and tactics. The army reforms were not yet completed by the war of 1809, in which Charles acted as commander in chief, yet even so it proved a far more formidable opponent than the old and was only defeated after a desperate struggle involving Austrian victories and large loss of life on both sides.[1]
Its initial successes were neutralised by the reverses of Abensberg, Landshut and Eckmühl but, after the evacuation of Vienna, the archduke won a strong victory at the Battle of Aspern-Essling but soon afterwards lost at the Battle of Wagram after heavy casualties on both sides. At the end of the campaign the archduke gave up all his military offices.[1]
In 1808, when Napoleon had crowned his brother Joseph king of Spain, Archduke Charles had said to his brother, Emperor Francis II, "Now we know what Napoleon wants – he wants everything".[3]
Later life
When Austria joined the ranks of the allies during the War of the Sixth Coalition, Charles was not given a command and the post of commander-in-chief of the allied Army of Bohemia went to the Prince of Schwarzenberg.[citation needed] Charles spent the rest of his life in retirement, except for a short time in 1815 when he was military governor of the Fortress Mainz. In 1822 he succeeded to the duchy of Saxe-Teschen.[1] In 1830 Charles was a candidate for the throne of Belgium.[4]
Charles died at Vienna on 30 April 1847. He is buried in tomb 122 in the New Vault of the Imperial Crypt in Vienna.[5] An equestrian statue was erected to his memory on the Heldenplatz in Vienna in 1860.
Assessment of his achievements
The caution which the archduke preached so earnestly in his strategic works, he displayed in practice only when the situation seemed to demand it, although his education certainly prejudiced him in favor of the defensive at all costs. He was at the same time capable of forming and executing the most daring offensive strategy, and his tactical skill in the handling of troops, whether in wide turning movements, as at Würzburg and Zürich, or in masses, as at Aspern and Wagram, was certainly equal to that of most leaders of his time, with only a few exceptions.[1]Arthur Wellesley named Charles as the greatest general of his time.[6] Charles was arguably the best commander ever produced by the House of Habsburg,[7] and undoubtedly the most able Habsburg general of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic era.[8] Archduke Charles is credited with handing Napoleon his first major defeat.[9][10] He has been described as the best general Republican France ever fought, with the exception of Alexander Suvorov.[11]
According to the Encyclopædia Britannica Eleventh Edition, his campaign of 1796 is considered almost faultless. That he sustained defeat in 1809 was due in part to the great numerical superiority of the French and their allies, and in part to the condition of his newly reorganized troops. His six weeks' inaction after the victory of Aspern is, however, open to unfavorable criticism. As a military writer, his position in the evolution of the art of war is very important, and his doctrines had naturally the greatest weight. Nevertheless, they cannot but be considered antiquated even in 1806. Caution and the importance of strategic points are the chief features of his system. The rigidity of his geographical strategy may be gathered from the prescription that "this principle is never to be departed from."[1]
Again and again he repeated the advice that nothing should be hazarded unless one's army is completely secure, a rule which he himself neglected with such brilliant results in 1796. Strategic points, he says, not the defeat of the enemy's army, decide the fate of one's own country, and must constantly remain the general's main concern, a maxim which was never more remarkably disproved than in the war of 1809. The editor of the archduke's work is able to make but a feeble defense against Clausewitz's reproach that Charles attached more value to ground than to the annihilation of the foe. In his tactical writings the same spirit is conspicuous. His reserve in battle is designed to "cover a retreat."[12]
The baneful influence of these antiquated principles was clearly shown in the maintenance of Königgrätz-Josefstadt in 1866 as a strategic point, which was preferred to the defeat of the separated Prussian armies, and in the strange plans produced in Vienna for the campaign of 1859, and in the almost unintelligible Battle of Montebello in the same year. The theory and the practice of Archduke Charles form one of the most curious contrasts in military history. In the one he is unreal, in the other he displayed, along with the greatest skill, a vivid activity which made him for long the most formidable opponent of Napoleon.[13]
When Karl Mack von Leiberich became chief of staff of the army under Prince Josias of Saxe-Coburg-Saalfeld in the Netherlands, he issued the Instruktionspunkte fur die gesamte Herren Generals, the last of 19 points setting out the roles of staff officers, dealing with offensive and defensive operations, while helping the Commander-in-chief. In 1796, Archduke Charles augmented these with his own Observationspunkte, writing of the Chief of Staff: "he is duty bound to consider all possibilities related to operations and not view himself as merely carrying out those instructions".[14] On 20 March 1801, Feldmarschalleutnant Duka became the world's first peacetime Generalquartiermeister at the head of the staff and the wartime role of the Chief of Staff was now focused on planning and operations to assist the Commander. Archduke Charles produced a new Dienstvorschrift on 1 September 1805,[15] which divided the staff into three: 1) Political Correspondence; 2) the Operations Directorate, dealing with planning and intelligence; 3) the Service Directorate, dealing with administration, supply and military justice. The Archduke set out the position of a modern Chief of Staff: "The Chief of Staff stands at the side of the Commander-in-Chief and is completely at his disposal. His sphere of work connects him with no specific unit". "The Commander-in-Chief decides what should happen and how; his chief assistant works out these decisions, so that each subordinate understands his allotted task". With the creation of the Korps in 1809, each had a staff, whose chief was responsible for directing operations and executing the overall headquarters plan.
^Wilson, Peter H. (2023). Iron and Blood: A Military History of the German-Speaking Peoples since 1500 (1st ed.). Harvard University Press. p. 284. ISBN978-0-674-98762-3.
^Wilson, Peter H. (2023). Iron and Blood: A Military History of the German-Speaking Peoples since 1500 (1st ed.). Harvard University Press. p. 274. ISBN978-0-674-98762-3.
^Clodfelter, Micheal (2017). Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Encyclopedia of Casualty and Other Figures, 1492–2015 (4th ed.). Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers. p. 108. ISBN978-0-7864-7470-7.
^Liste der Ritter des Königlich Preußischen Hohen Ordens vom Schwarzen Adler (1851), "Von Seiner Majestät dem Könige Friedrich Wilhelm III. ernannte Ritter" p. 17
^Shaw, Wm. A. (1906) The Knights of England, I, London, p. 187
Clausewitz, Carl von (2020). Napoleon Absent, Coalition Ascendant: The 1799 Campaign in Italy and Switzerland, Volume 1. Trans and ed. Nicholas Murray and Christopher Pringle. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas. ISBN978-0-7006-3025-7
Clausewitz, Carl von (2021). The Coalition Crumbles, Napoleon Returns: The 1799 Campaign in Italy and Switzerland, Volume 2. Trans and ed. Nicholas Murray and Christopher Pringle. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas. ISBN978-0-7006-3034-9
Criste, Oscar "Erzherzog Carl" (3 vols) (Vienna 1912)
Eysturlid, Lee "The Formative Influences, Theories, and Campaigns of the Archduke Carl of Austria" (2000)
Hertenberger, H & Wiltschek, F "Erzherzog Karl: der Sieger von Aspern" (1983)
Rothenberg, Gunther E. Napoleon's Great Adversary: Archduke Charles and the Austrian Army, 1792-1814. Staplehurst: Spellmount, 1995. ISBN1-873376-40-5
Generations are numbered by male-line descent from the first archdukes. Later generations are included although Austrian titles of nobility were abolished in 1919.
Generations are numbered from the children of Francesco de' Medici, first Grand Duke of Tuscany. Later generations are included but the grand duchy was abolished in 1860.