Stalin and the Fate of Europe: The Postwar Struggle for Sovereignty is a historical book written by Stanford University historian Norman Naimark.

Published in 2019 by Harvard University Press, the book delves into Soviet leader Joseph Stalin's post-World War II strategies and interactions with Eastern European countries as they sought to assert their sovereignty amidst growing Cold War tensions. Naimark provides an examination of Stalin's influence in shaping post-war Europe, contesting simplistic narratives of Soviet domination and highlighting the complexities of power dynamics during this period.^[1]

The end of World War II marked a pivotal moment in European history as countries devastated by war sought to rebuild their political and economic systems. The Soviet Union, under Stalin, extended its influence across Eastern Europe, and the emergence of the Cold War heightened the struggle for control over these newly liberated nations. Naimark's work focuses on this fraught period, examining how European countries, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, navigated the competing pressures of Soviet control and their desires for national autonomy.

Naimark's book represents a deviation from his most recent previous works which had focused more on the theme of genocide (both in the context of Soviet and World History).^[2]

At the core of Stalin and the Fate of Europe is the theme of sovereignty, which Naimark views as a complex and contested concept in the post-war era. He argues that while Stalin is often portrayed as an uncompromising imperialist bent on expanding Soviet influence, the reality was more intricate. Stalin was a pragmatic leader who, while seeking to secure Soviet interests, was sometimes willing to tolerate a degree of independence among Eastern European states.

This theme is explored through case studies of countries like Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Finland, Austria, Italy and Hungary.^[3] Naimark argues that Stalin's policies were not universally consistent, and his interactions with European leaders often reflected a mix of ideological commitment and realpolitik. For example, Stalin's relationship with Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito demonstrates how Soviet control could be challenged, while events in Poland highlight how Stalin navigated the competing pressures of his allies and local political forces.

The book is structured as a series of case studies, each of which explores the post-war political dynamics of different European countries. In these chapters, Naimark examines key moments of crisis and negotiation between local leaders and Stalin's Soviet government. This approach allows the reader to see the diversity of responses to Soviet influence and the variety of outcomes in different regions.

Among the most notable case studies are:

• Poland: Naimark discusses the role of the Polish Communist Party and its interactions with Stalin, who was often forced to accommodate nationalist tendencies while maintaining Soviet influence.
• Yugoslavia: The Tito-Stalin split is a central focus, highlighting how Stalin's ideological rigidity clashed with Tito's ambitions for an independent path.
• Finland: After Finland fought alongside Nazi Germany in the Continuation War, many feared that Stalin would seek to annex the country or impose a Soviet-style government. However, Naimark shows that Stalin adopted a more pragmatic approach, seeking security guarantees rather than direct control. Stalin's decision to accept Finland's neutrality and sovereignty, rather than turning it into a satellite state like the rest of Eastern Europe, illustrates the flexibility and pragmatism that shaped his policies in certain regions.^[4]
• Denmark: While the final phase of World War II saw many significant events, the Soviet occupation of the small Danish island of Bornholm often fades into obscurity. In May 1945, amidst Germany's surrender, the Red Army seized Bornholm. This strategic island, located northeast of Lübeck, Germany, held the potential to give the Soviets control over the vital Baltic-North Sea route, offering them leverage in postwar negotiations. Furthermore, Stalin saw a Soviet presence on Bornholm as a way to pressure Denmark into political and economic cooperation. Despite these ambitions, the Soviet occupation lasted less than a year and Denmark joined NATO.^[5] The Danish government, particularly through the efforts of Foreign Ministers Christmas Møller and Gustav Rasmussen, engaged in careful diplomacy to appease the Soviets while subtly pushing for their withdrawal. This involved instructing the Danish press to downplay any criticism of the occupation, emphasizing to the Soviets the potential for positive economic relations, and expressing appreciation for the Soviet Union's wartime contributions. It also meant emphasizing that the Danish military was strong enough help ensure Baltic security (which the Soviets saw as vital to their own interests) without the presence of Soviet troops ^[6]
• Czechoslovakia: Naimark details the 1948 Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, which served as a turning point in the consolidation of Soviet control in Eastern Europe.
• Hungary: The analysis of the 1956 Hungarian Uprising and its brutal suppression by Soviet forces illustrates Stalin's successors' continuation of the policy of ensuring Soviet dominance in the region.
• Italy: Stalin's policies demonstrated flexibility. A strong post-war Italian Communist Party contended for power in Rome and considered seizing control of the government through violent means. Stalin initially hesitated, but eventually insisted on restraint, fearing that a civil war in Italy would lead to military intervention by the United States.^[4]
• Austria: Naimark details how the country became a focal point for four-power negotiations after the war. Austria was divided into four occupation zones controlled by the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. Naimark explores how the Soviets initially supported the Communist Party of Austria and aimed to keep a foothold in Austria, yet ultimately agreed to withdraw in exchange for Austria's neutrality. This culminated in the Austrian State Treaty of 1955, which allowed Austria to regain its sovereignty as a neutral state. Naimark emphasizes the importance of Austrian leaders like Karl Renner and Leopold Figl, whose ability to negotiate with both the Western powers and the Soviets was crucial in maintaining Austrian independence and preventing its absorption into the Soviet bloc.

Stalin and the Fate of Europe has been praised for its in-depth research and nuanced analysis. Critics have highlighted Naimark's careful use of archival sources and his ability to provide a balanced view of Stalin's foreign policy during the immediate post-war years.

In a review for The Guardian, historian and writer David Aaronovitch described Naimark's work as a refreshing departure from the typical narrative of Soviet domination over Eastern Europe. Aaronovitch emphasizes that Naimark challenges the common view of Stalin as a rigid, unyielding imperialist. Instead, the book portrays Stalin as a more pragmatic and flexible leader who, while unquestionably seeking to advance Soviet influence, often acted based on realpolitik considerations rather than sheer ideological dogmatism. For example, Aaronovitch notes how Naimark shows that Stalin, in certain circumstances, tolerated a degree of autonomy among Eastern European leaders. This pragmatism is exemplified in Stalin's cautious handling of the Tito-Stalin split, which demonstrated that Soviet control in the region was far from absolute. Aaronovitch further praises the book for its focus on European leaders and how they navigated the precarious balance between asserting national sovereignty and accommodating Soviet interests. He suggests that the book is less about Stalin as an individual and more about the interplay between local agency and Soviet power in shaping postwar Europe. By doing so, Naimark reframes the historical narrative, giving more weight to the choices and actions of European leaders rather than viewing them solely as pawns of Soviet power.^[7]

A review hosted by the Wilson Center echoes many of these sentiments, noting Naimark's success in "complicating the notion" that Stalin had a "grand, coherent" post-war strategy for the Eastern Bloc. Instead, the book presents Stalin as reacting to local conditions and internal political dynamics in each country. The Wilson Center review also praises Naimark for demonstrating how post-war leaders across Europe were not merely subordinates of Moscow, but rather influential actors in shaping their respective countries' fates. The reviewer commends the book's use of rich archival materials, adding that Naimark brings these case studies to life, showing that national leaders and their decisions were crucial in determining their countries’ trajectories.^[8]

A 2023 review by historian Günter Bischof, published in the journal Austrian History Yearbook, similarly lauds the book for its extensive use of archival research, spanning Soviet, American, British, German, and Austrian sources. Bischof highlights the unexpected insight that Stalin did not have a preconceived plan for creating a Soviet-style bloc in Europe. Instead, Stalin's concerns were more rooted in Soviet security and post-war stability, particularly in strategic countries like Germany, Poland, and Finland. Bischof underscores Naimark's attention to the role of local leaders such as Ernst Reuter in Berlin, Juho Kusti Paasikivi in Finland, and Alcide de Gasperi in Italy, who resisted communist control and helped their nations regain sovereignty. Bischof praises Naimark's ability to show that these leaders were not passive, but rather critical actors in shaping post-war outcomes. Bischof also commends the case studies that constitute the "meat" of the book, including the Soviet occupation of the Danish island of Bornholm, Tito's break with Stalin over Albania, and the Austrian communists' role in post-war politics. The review notes that Naimark's exploration of memory politics and contemporary geopolitical shifts, particularly the Russian invasion of Ukraine and Finland's accession to NATO, adds a contemporary dimension to the book's conclusions. Bischof concludes by describing Naimark's work as essential for understanding the post-war dynamics that continue to shape modern Europe.^[9]

In his review, Mark Kramer, the director of the Cold War Studies Project at Harvard University's Davis Center, praises Naimark's work as “first-rate” and emphasizes the significance of the case studies, describing the book as “lapidary, engaging, and concise.” Kramer commends Naimark's decision to explore lesser-known episodes, such as the Soviet occupation of Bornholm, but he also critiques the omission of certain countries, notably Romania and Bulgaria. According to Kramer, the inclusion of these countries would have been valuable for understanding the broader picture of Soviet involvement in Eastern Europe, especially given Stalin's use of direct military intervention to impose communist rule there. While Naimark focuses on countries where Stalin's strategies were more ambiguous, Kramer believes a study of Romania and Bulgaria would have shown the contrast between Soviet domination in these regions and other nations like Finland, where Stalin ultimately allowed greater autonomy. Despite these critiques, Kramer appreciates the diversity and complexity of Naimark's chosen cases and concludes that the book remains an essential read for understanding the origins of the Cold War in Europe.^[10]

Patryk Babiracki, an associate Professor of History at the University of Texas at Arlington, commends Naimark for challenging simplistic Cold War-era narratives and for emphasizing the agency of European leaders, both communist and non-communist, in shaping post-war events. He notes that Naimark skillfully highlights the fluidity and open-endedness of post-war settlements in Europe, particularly Stalin's varied approaches toward different countries. Babiracki describes the book's portrayal of Stalin's post-war policies as a "three-dimensional chess game," where Soviet goals and European agency intertwined in complex, sometimes contradictory, ways. Babiracki also praises Naimark's ability to provoke deeper questions about the interpretative challenges inherent in studying Stalin's foreign policy, which was often secretive and lacked transparency.^[10]

A review by George Washington University historian Hope M. Harrison emphasizes the evocative nature of Naimark's writing and his ability to transport readers into the uncertain postwar period, urging them to “forget what you know” about the division of Europe into two blocs. She compares Naimark's arguments to those made by other historians who believe Stalin had no grand master plan for Europe, namely Melvyn P. Leffler and Vladisak Zukob. Harrison notes that while Stalin's policies were significant, Naimark also highlights the actions of European leaders themselves, although their influence is often overshadowed by the decisions of the great powers. Harrison underscores Naimark's ability to depict the diverse political developments across seven European countries and Stalin's direct involvement in micromanaging policies, such as his cautious approach to avoiding war with the West. Although Harrison questions the extent to which local actions outweighed the influence of superpowers, she praises the book for providing a vivid portrayal of the interaction between domestic developments and international influences.^[10]

Elidor Mëhilli, an associate professor at Hunter College of the City University of New York, describes Stalin and the Fate of Europe as a panoramic view of postwar Europe, with Naimark effectively selecting case studies that challenge traditional Cold War narratives. Mëhilli appreciates Naimark's decision to focus on less-explored regions like Albania, highlighting the importance of diversity in postwar conditions and outcomes. He praises Naimark's ability to portray Stalin's shifting tactics based on changing geopolitical circumstances and how the Soviet leader's motivations were often less ideological and more pragmatic. Mëhilli further notes that Naimark captures the complex interactions between local leaders and Moscow, showing how figures like Enver Hoxha navigated Stalin's inconsistent policies. He commends the book for its nuanced approach to interpreting Stalin's thinking, particularly Naimark's willingness to grapple with ambiguity and uncertainty in the historical record.^[10]

Marc Trachtenberg of UCLA, praises Naimark for his detailed case studies and their ability to shed new light on Stalin's policies. Further, he emphasizes how they illustrate the fluidity of the postwar period and the importance of local politics in shaping outcomes. Trachtenberg agrees with Naimark's assessment that Stalin's policies were more pragmatic than ideologically driven, and he appreciates how the book reframes the postwar struggle as one that involved European agency as much as Soviet and American influence. However, Trachtenberg questions whether Stalin's supposed flexibility truly applied in key areas like East Germany and Poland, noting that some aspects of Soviet control in these regions appear far more rigid than Naimark suggests.^[10]

Stephen Lovell of King's College in London further emphasizes Naimark's argument that Stalin was not driven by an ideological blueprint but was instead a "hyperrealist" who sought to avoid unnecessary provocations with the Western allies. Lovell highlights how Stalin showed flexibility in various regions, such as in his decision to withdraw from the Danish island of Bornholm and his tolerance of Władysław Gomułka's version of communism in Poland—up to a point. Lovell points out that while Stalin's ideological rigidity was tempered by pragmatism, he made serious miscalculations, most notably during the Berlin blockade. Lovell praises Naimark for emphasizing that the true heroes of this period were not Stalin and his officials but the European elites who navigated complex political terrain to regain sovereignty for their countries. He concludes that Naimark's analysis of these local political leaders offers valuable lessons for contemporary European leaders.^[11]

The book was listed as one of the best history books of 2019 by the Financial Times.^[12] It also won the 2020 Norris and Carol Hundley Award and the 2020, US-Russia Relations Book Prize.^[13]