Relations between the governments of the two states deteriorated since the Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in 2014, when Greece condemned Russian intervention and refused to recognize Crimea as part of Russia.[1] In the summer of 2018 relations deteriorated even further.[2] Since the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine political relations hit a historic low since Russian independence.[3]
Before the Russian Invasion of Ukraine Greeks were split in their opinion of Russia. A poll in 2018 found that 52% viewed Russia positively. However the Russian Invasion of Ukraine severely damaged Russia's image in Greece. As of 2024, only 28% of Greeks have a favorable view of Russia, while 70% have a negative opinion.[4]
Pontic Greeks historically inhabited the northern coast of the Black Sea and Crimea, the latter of which was incorporated into the Russian Empire in the latter half of the 18th century.
During the early years of the Kievan Rus', Vladimir the Great of what is now Russia and Ukraine sent out various missionaries to study different faiths that would suit the country, and most crucially, for him. One of his missionaries travelled to the Byzantine Empire and experienced enlightenment for themselves as they had come across Eastern Orthodoxy being practised in now modern-day Greece. The missionary described it as being Heaven on Land. This began the very first ties and cultural similarities between Russia and Greece.
The USSR and the Kingdom of Greece established diplomatic relations on 8 March 1924.[7] Official relations were frosty in the 1930s, especially under the staunchly-anticommunist authoritarian regime of Greek Prime Minister Ioannis Metaxas. The Percentages Agreement struck by Joseph Stalin and Winston Churchill in Moscow in October 1944, which placed Greece firmly in the British sphere of influence, led to the Soviet Union's noninterference in support of the communist uprising in Athens in December 1944, which was crushed with British help as and Stalin's refusal to render tangible assistance to the Greek Communists during the Greek Civil War, which they lost in October 1949.[9][10]
According to Western intelligence officials, Greece's society and political establishment have been deeply penetrated by the Soviet and later the Russian espionage agencies.[12]
Diplomatic spat of 2018
In early July 2018, the government of Greece expelled two Russian diplomats and barred the entry of two others accusing them of undermining Greece's national security. The move was made public, which was seen by experts as unprecedented in mutual relations.[13][14][15] Amid the subsequent acrimonious exchange of official statements, Greece accused the Russian Foreign Ministry of "disrespect for a third country and a lack of understanding of today's world, in which states, regardless of their size, are independent and can exercise an independent, multidimensional and democratic foreign policy".[16] Following Russia's retaliatory move in early August, it was revealed Greece intended to recall its ambassador, Andreas Fryganas, who had been appointed in May 2016.[17][18][19][20]
The Greek Foreign Ministry′s statement on 10 August 2018 stated: ″Since [Russia] began fighting as a comrade in arms with Turkey, providing it with a number of facilitations in the security sector, it appears to be steadily distancing itself from positions befitting the level of friendship and cooperation that has characterized Greek-Russian relations for the past 190 years. It appears not to understand that Greece has its own interests and criteria in international politics".[21] The statement accused Russia of ″attempts to a) bribe state officials, b) undermine its foreign policy, and c) interfere in its internal affairs″.[21]
On 7 December 2018, Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras went to Russia on a working visit, his first visit there in three years.[22] After talks with Vladimir Putin, both leaders expressed hope that the spat between the two countries was in the past, bilateral agreements were signed and international issues like the Cyprus dispute were discussed.[23][24][25][26] Tsipras said that he had expressed to Putin his concern at Turkey buying advanced weapons, such as S-400 missile systems, from Russia.[27][28] Experts noted that Greek-Russian relations were not as they had been prior to the spat because of the growing importance of Greece's strategic military ties with the US, and military co-operation between Russia and Turkey was increasing.[29] On 13 December 2018, in Washington, D.C., the Greek Foreign Minister and the American Secretary of State formally launched what they called "the inaugural U.S.-Greece Strategic Dialogue",[30][31] which Greek Acting Foreign Minister Georgios Katrougalos characterised as ″a procedure that shows the upgrading of our relations with that country″[32] and ″the apex of our bilateral relations″.[33]
On 14 January 2019, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a commentary that referred to the agreement as the "Prespa deal" and stated that the decision by the Parliament of North Macedonia to change the country's name had been imposed from outside and did not reflect the will of the people and came "with an aim of pulling Skopje into NATO as soon as possible". The statement went on to cite "the recent developments in Greece — withdrawal from the government coalition of the Independent Greeks Party leader, Panos Kammenos, coming out against the Prespa accord" as evidence that stability and security in the Balkans was thus being undermined. The ministry suggested that "the issue must be considered by the UN Security Council in accordance with Article 3 of UN Security Council Resolution 845".[35][36] The Russian Foreign Ministry's statement on the Prespa agreement was condemned by Greece, whose official statement concluded by saying, "We express our certitude that Russia, which has for years recognized F.Y.R.O.M as the 'Republic of Macedonia' will respect the sensibilities of the Greek people in using the name Macedonia and will henceforth refer to this country with its new constitutional name, i.e. 'North Macedonia', and most importantly that it will refrain from such statements, which constitute an intervention in Greece's interior affairs".[37][38][39]
A diplomatic crisis sparked between Greece and Russia, when the latter's air forces allegedly bombarded two Greek minority villages near Mariupol in Ukraine, during the Russian invasion of Ukraine, killing 12 ethnic Greeks.[41] Greece protested strongly, summoning the Russian ambassador.[42]France's President Emmanuel Macron, and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken,[43] along with Germany,[44]Poland, Sweden[45] and other countries, expressed their condolences to Greece for the massacre, while Moscow denied any involvement, with the Russian embassy claiming a Ukrainian far-right militant organization, the Azov Battalion, was behind the incident.[46] Athens refuted Moscow's claims, announcing evidence of Russian involvement.[47] Following this, Greece's Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis announced Greece will send defensive military equipment and humanitarian aid to support Ukraine.[48][49][50]
Mitsotakis' decision to send military equipment to Ukraine has been challenged; only New Democracy and KINAL were in favor. On the other hand, the majority of Greek people did not approve of sending the weapons; according to a recent poll, 63% of Greeks believe that the action puts relations with Russia at risk, while only 33% agree on providing Ukraine with military equipment. In March 2022 60% of Greeks considered Russia's invasion unacceptable, and in May 2022 the majority supported sanctions against Russia.[54]
The diplomatic crisis between the two countries continues as the invasion is in progress. On March 6, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova accused Greece of anti-Russian propaganda, which goes against the countries' historical ties.[55] The Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs described Zakharova's statements as "unacceptable", insinuating that Greece has not opposed Russia in any way as of then.[56] Greece joined other countries in spring 2022 in declaring a number of Russian diplomatspersona non grata.
Through 2022 and 2023 military equipment was provided to Ukraine, with the Greek Government confirming support for Ukraine and a need to punish Russia for war crimes.[57] In August 2023 Greece offered to train Ukrainian pilots on F-16 fighters.[58]
Greece is one of the few pre-1990 NATO member countries (alongside Germany for a time) that makes extensive use of Russian weapons. Greece first received many Soviet-era surplus weapons, such as BMP-1 armoured fighting vehicles, RM-70 rocket launchers, ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft guns and SA-8 anti-aircraft missile systems from the former East GermanNational People's Army inventory in the early 1990s. Since then, Greece has additionally procured the TOR M-1 and S-300 anti-aircraft missile systems (the latter originally destined for Cyprus), the Kornet-E anti-tank missile, AK-74M assault rifles and ZUBR hovercraft. The militaries of both countries also participate in programmes of military cooperation in the Aegean Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, as well as giving military support and training to countries that they have close relations with, such as Armenia, with Greece often accepting Armenian military officials in the Hellenic Military Academy.
Economic relations
Burgas-Alexandroupoli pipeline
The Burgas-Alexandroupoli pipeline was proposed in 1993–1994 by several Russian and Greek companies.[59] In 1994, for construction of the pipeline Greece and Bulgaria signed a bilateral agreement, followed by a memorandum of cooperation, signed by Greece and Russia.[60]
In February 1998, a Greek consortium for pipeline construction named Bapline was established, and in May 1998, a memorandum of creation of the Transbalkan Oil Pipeline Company was signed.[60] In 2000, a technical specifications and an economic evaluation of the project were prepared by the German company ILF.[59] A joint protocol for preparing the pipeline's construction was signed by the three countries in January 2005.[61]
The political memorandum between both governments was signed on 12 April 2005. An inter-governmental agreement on the project was agreed on 7 February 2007, and it was signed on 15 March 2007 in Athens, by the involved ministers of the three countries, under the presence of their leaders, Vladimir Putin (Russian president), Sergei Stanishev (Bulgarian prime-minister), and Kostas Karamanlis (prime-minister of Greece).[62][63]
The agreement establishing the international project company was signed in Moscow on 18 December 2007 and the company, called Trans-Balkan Pipeline B.V., was incorporated in the Netherlands on 6 February 2008.[64][65] Construction of the pipeline was scheduled to start in October 2009, and was estimated to be completed by 2011.[66] In 2011, the project was definitively terminated.
Trade
Between 1995 and 2021 Russian exports to Greece have risen by an average of 9.27% per annum.[67]
There is a large imbalance in trade, in 2021 Greece imported $6.3 billion of goods, mainly energy related oil and gas, whilst exports to Russia were just $468m.[67] In 2022 and 2023 the EU introduced sanctions over Russian oil and oil products as well as gas imports, which Greece has complied with and will greatly reduce the trade imbalance with Russia.
Following the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine Greek shipping continued its major role in transporting Russian oil and oil products, in accordance with international sanction regulations, however Greek shipping companies also profited by selling a large number of older tankers at high prices to companies intending to operate the tankers to facilitate sanction breaking, so called "grey tankers".[68]
Religious and cultural ties, mutual perceptions
Religious ties between the two nations with majorities of both countries adhering to the Eastern Orthodox Church, have played a major role in fostering bilateral relations. Since its formation in 1994, the Athens-based Interparliamentary Assembly on Orthodoxy has become a relevant institution in promoting exchange and cooperation.
Those relations have faltered with the Russian Orthodox Church supporting the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Greek church being one of the most vocal against Russian aggression.[69]
^Panagoula Diamanti-Karanou, "Migration of ethnic Greeks from the former Soviet Union to Greece, 1990-2000: Policy decisions and implications." Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 3.1 (2003): 25-45.
^"Russian President Vladimir Putin in Greece next week for pipeline deal". Athens News Agency. March 7, 2007. Archived from the original on June 5, 2011. Retrieved 2009-06-19. Russian President Vladimir Putin will be visiting Greece on March 15 to participate in a Russo-Bulgarian-Greek conference, after visiting Italy on March 13–14 for a Russo-Italian conference, the Kremlin announced late on Tuesday, according to a dispatch by the Agence France Press (AFP) agency.
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