Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP; Japanese: 自由で開かれたインド太平洋, romanized: jiyū de hirakareta Indotaiheiyō)[1] is an umbrella term that encompasses Indo-Pacific-specific strategies of countries with similar interests in the region.[2] The concept, with its origins in Weimar Germangeopolitics, has been revived since 2006 through Japanese initiatives and American cooperation.[3][4]
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan introduced the FOIP concept and formally put it down as a strategy in 2016.[5][2] In 2019 the United States Department of State published a document formalizing its concept of a free and open Indo-Pacific.[6] Since then, multiple countries in regions from the European Union to Southeast Asia, have referred to the Indo-Pacific in national security or foreign policy documents.
Origin
Historians and political scientists have shown that the "Indo-Pacific" emerged in the context of Weimar German geopolitics in the 1920s-1930s, and since then spread to Japan through Karl Haushofer's intervention.[7][8][9][10]
During 2006–07 when Taro Aso was Foreign Minister, the Japanese government presented the idea of "Freedom and Prosperity".[11]
"We are now at a point at which the Confluence of the Two Seas is coming into being. The Pacific and the Indian Oceans are now bringing about a dynamic coupling as seas of freedom and of prosperity."
It was the base model of FOIP according to Keiichi Ichikawa, the diplomat who had been in charge of Abe's Policy Coordination Division,[13] and Katsuyuki Yakushiji [ja], one of the consulted experts.[4]
However, even before then, the concept of FOIP also fell in place with Abe's thinking of "diplomacy that takes a panoramic perspective of the world map". In 2012, Abe's first elucidation of FOIP went as follows:[4][15]
"Peace, stability, and freedom of navigation in the Pacific Ocean are inseparable from peace, stability, and freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean. Japan, as one of the oldest sea-faring democracies in Asia, should play a greater role—alongside Australia, India, and the US—in preserving the common good in both regions"
In January 2013, the Japanese government had prepared a PM Abe's speech on "Five New Principles" to be delivered in Jakarta. However, as PM Abe had to go back to Japan before the scheduled date to respond to In Amenas hostage crisis, the speech was not realized; instead its script was made available.[16]
In 2015, to implement the framework, Japan upgraded "The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation" with US,[17] agreed and shared "Japan and India Vision 2025 Special Strategic and Global Partnership" with India,[18] agreed and shared "Next steps of the Special Strategic Partnership: Asia, Pacific and Beyond" with Australia,[19] and the quadrilateral framework was prepared.
In November 2017, President of the United StatesDonald Trump visited Japan, and summit meeting was held with PM Abe. Regarding regional and global affairs, the two leaders discussed on "Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy", and affirmed that Japan and the United States will work together to promote peace and prosperity in the region by developing the Indo-Pacific as free and open and directed relevant ministers and institutions to flesh out detailed cooperation, in particular, in the following areas:[20]
Promotion and establishment of fundamental values (rule of law, freedom of navigation, etc.)
Pursuit of economic prosperity (improvement of connectivity, etc.)
Commitment for peace and stability (capacity building on maritime law enforcement, etc.)
On 10 February 2023, PM Fumio Kishida oversaw the signing of several defense pacts and investment deals with President Bongbong Marcos of the Philippines; Marcos also announced he was considering opening tripartite defense talks with the United States and Japan.[21][22]
On 20 March 2023, Kishida, who visited New Delhi, India, delivered a policy speech entitled "the Future of the Indo-Pacific—Japan's New Plan for a `Free and Open Indo-Pacific'– `Together with India, as an Indispensable Partner'" at the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA), announcing Japan's new plan for a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)". S. Jaishankar, External Affairs Minister of India, attended the speech, representing the Indian government.[23]
As of April 2023[update], Japan is boosting Pacific Island Country resilience through increased collaboration under this vision.[24][25]
India's foreign policy
In June 2018, PM Narendra Modi articulated India's vision towards the "Indo-Pacific region" for the first time.[26]
A central feature of Indian PM Modi's foreign policy has been to advance the need to create a "free, open, and inclusive" Indo-Pacific.[27]
According to defense minister Rajnath Singh, the Indian government stands for a free, open and rules-based Indo-Pacific as it is important for economic development of the region and the wider global community.[28]
The Biden administration states that it supports a "free and open Indo-Pacific strategy".[31]: 178 In December 2021, Secretary of State Antony Blinken delivered a speech on the United States' approach to the Indo-Pacific in Jakarta.[32] On 23 May 2022, the administration released an Indo-Pacific Economic Framework.[31]: 178 It was 12 paragraphs long and did not contain concrete details.[31]: 178
In November 2023, the United States halted plans for the IPEF's trade component.[33] The Biden administration had intended to conclude the negotiations during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, but reversed course following opposition from Democratic members of Congress including Sherrod Brown.[33]
Australia's foreign policy
In the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, a stable and prosperous Indo–Pacific is described as the most important Australia's interest, and Indo–Pacific democracies are described as of first order importance to Australia.[34]
New Zealand's strategic direction
In October 2021, the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) published the MFAT Strategic Intentions 2021-2025 which describes "seven strategic goals". For the Indo-Pacific, the MFAT's goal is:
"Embed Aotearoa New Zealand as an active and integral partner in shaping an Indo-Pacific order that delivers regional stability and economic integration."
"Free and Open Indo-Pacific constructs", "free and open trade" and "free and open regional development" are also described in the document.[35]
Canada's Indo-Pacific strategy
In November 2022, Canada launched the Indo-Pacific Strategy to support long-term growth, prosperity, and security for Canadians.[36][37]
The United Kingdom's strategic framework
After Brexit in 2020, the UK Government expressed its wish to participate in promoting a free and open Indo-Pacific, reflected in its Integrated Review Refresh 2023.[38][39]
ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP)
In June 2019 at the 34th ASEAN Summit, they released ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), which is consistent with and anchored in the principles of ASEAN centrality through ASEANjournal-led mechanisms like the East Asia Summit (EAS).[40]
The AOIP was of Indonesia's proposal, and the document calls for dialogue, co-operation, inclusivity, and a rule-based framework, rather than rivalry.[41]
While accepting FOIP's basic idea that an ASEAN-led AOIP is "free and open," AOIP also considers "inclusiveness," which does not uniformly exclude China, and it is appropriate to understand that the "centrality of ASEAN" was emphasized as a device for that purpose.[42]
At the CSIS Global Dialogue in May 2018 in Jakarta, Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi unveiled the Indo-Pacific Cooperation Concept. The concept is based on the principles of being "open, transparent and inclusive, promoting the habit of dialogue, promoting cooperation and friendship, and upholding international law".[45]
And in August 2018, Retno formally presented the Indonesian Indo-Pacific Cooperation Concept to the 8th Ministerial Meeting of the East Asia Summit (EAS).[46]
In November 2018, president Joko Widodo said that "The Indo-Pacific Cooperation Concept puts emphasis on several principles, including cooperation, instead of rivalry, inclusiveness, transparency and openness as well as respect for international law", at the 13th EAS plenary session held at the Suntec Singapore Convention and Exhibition Centre.[47]
The Philippines' diplomatic strategy
While it has yet to produce a definitive Indo-Pacific strategy document as of April 2023[update], the administration of Bongbong Marcos has discussed intensifying cooperation with the U.S. government, whose officials have made agreements with the Philippines on energy, telecommunications, human rights, education, food security, and nuclear technology sales.[48] In February 2023, Marcos briefly met with U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin to finalize an agreement to add U.S.-accessible Philippine military bases to the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement allowing U.S. military visits.[49] The Philippines also signed a defense agreement with Japan earlier that year, and Marcos announced that talks for a joint defense pact between Japan, the Philippines, and the United States are underway. The Philippines is also a prolific buyer of South Korean arms and military equipment,[50] and has a long-standing security partnership with Australia and India.[51][52]
In April 2023, the foreign ministry of Bangladesh formally announced its Indo-Pacific Outlook with 15 points which emphasized a "peaceful, secure and inclusive" Indo-Pacific.[53] The Bangladeshi strategy promotes resilience in global value chains; food, water and energy security; freedom of navigation and overflight; maritime security and counter-terrorism; combating crime networks; nonproliferation, peacekeeping, sustainable development, SDG 14, and the "unimpeded and free flow of commerce in the Indo-Pacific".[53][54][55]
Although Bangladesh is not a member of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), it considers the framework vital for fostering stability, openness, and cooperation across the Indo-Pacific region, including the Bengal Basin, and for enhancing its economic growth through the Bay of Bengal.[56]
South Korea's approach to the Indo-Pacific is based on cooperation and complementarity between its New Southern Policy and the U.S.'s and the Quad's Indo-Pacific policy, but without openly antagonizing China.[57]
In this respect, South Korea is balancing the desire for foreign policy autonomy with the need for strategic alliances, above all with the United States.[58]
In December 2022, South Korea published its "Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region".[59]
NATO
In June 2022, the NATO Madrid Summit was joined by the leaders of Indo-Pacific Four nations: Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea,[60][61] followed by summits in Vilnius (July 2023)[62] and in the U.S. (October 2024).[63]
Apart from the U.S., more recently other NATO countries have reoriented their maritime policy in defense of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP).[64]
Countries in the European Union
France's territories and EEZ, excluding Antarctic territories. A large proportion of France's overseas territories are located in the Indo-Pacific region.
In September 2021, the European Union published its Joint Communication on the EU's Indo-Pacific Strategy.[65]
France
France is an Indo-Pacific power because of the several territories of France located there.
The administration of Emmanuel Macron released a strategy in 2019 which was subsequently updated in 2021.[66]
Germany
Germany adopted policy guidelines for the region in September 2020.[67]
Netherlands
In November 2020, the Netherlands published the white paper "Indo-Pacific: Guidelines for strengthening Dutch and EU cooperation with partners in Asia".
[68]
Criticism
This section needs expansion. You can help by adding to it. (April 2023)
Political scientist Sharifah Munirah Alatas has argued that the origin of the term "Indo-Pacific" was Euro-centric, so it lacked the input of Asian countries in a broader anticolonial context.[9] The Australian Citizens Party has publicly denounced the "Nazi roots" of the "Indo-Pacific" concept.[69]
Chinese officials often criticize the "Indo-Pacific" concept and see it as a tool to contain China.[70] China's partner, Russia, also echoes Chinese views,[71] describing it as a "closed and exclusive group structure", and called for an "equal, open, and inclusive Asia-Pacific security system that does not target third countries".
^"自由で開かれたインド太平洋". Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (in Japanese). Archived from the original on 2024-12-27. Retrieved 2025-01-03.
^ abHosoya, Nicholas Szechenyi, Yuichi; Hosoya, Nicholas Szechenyi, Yuichi (10 October 2020). "Working Toward a Free and Open Indo-Pacific". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Archived from the original on 2020-10-29. Retrieved 2020-11-04.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
^"自由で開かれたインド太平洋 誕生秘話" [The behind-the-scenes story of the birth of "Free and Open Indo-Pacific"]. NHK (in Japanese). 30 June 2021. Retrieved 29 July 2022.
^ abcMa, Xinru; Kang, David C. (2024). Beyond Power Transitions: The Lessons of East Asian History and the Future of U.S.-China Relations. Columbia Studies in International Order and Politics. New York: Columbia University Press. ISBN978-0-231-55597-5.
Insisa, Aurelio, and Giulio Pugliese. "The free and open Indo-Pacific versus the belt and road: Spheres of influence and Sino-Japanese relations." Pacific Review 35.3 (2022): 557–585. online
Katagiri, Nori. "Shinzo Abe's Indo-Pacific Strategy: Japan's recent achievement and future direction." Asian Security 16.2 (2020): 179–200. online
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