Aristotle's views on women influenced later Western thinkers, who quoted him as an authority until the end of the Middle Ages.

Aristotle gave equal weight to women's happiness as he did to men's, commenting in Rhetoric that a society cannot be happy unless women are happy too.^[1] Aristotle believed that in nature a common good came of the rule of a superior being; he states in Politics that "By nature the female has been distinguished from the slave. For nature makes nothing in the manner that the coppersmiths make the Delphic knife – that is, frugally – but, rather, it makes each thing for one purpose. For each thing would do its work most nobly if it had one task rather than many. Among the barbarians the female and the slave have the same status. This is because there are no natural rulers among them but, rather, the association among them is between male and female slave. On account of this, the poets say that 'it is fitting that Greeks rule barbarians', as the barbarian and the slave are by nature the same." Greeks were fit to rule barbarians as the latter's ruling principle is "brawn", that is, the dominion of slavish men over women through physical superiority, reducing the status (taxis) of women to that of slaves, as opposed to the civility of the Greeks' "brains" over "brawns" rule, which differentiates between the roles of women and slaves.^[1] But he does not indicate a common good for men being superior to women.^[1][2][3]

Aristotle's inheritance model sought to explain how the parents' characteristics are transmitted to the child, subject to influence from the environment.^[4] The system worked as follows. The father's semen and the mother's menses encode their parental characteristics.^[4] The model is partly asymmetric, as only the father's movements define the form or eidos of the human, while the movements of both the father's and the mother's fluids define features other than the form, such as the father's eye colour or the mother's nose shape.^[4] The theory has some symmetry, as semen movements carry maleness while the menses carry femaleness. Aristotle thought that the female body being well-suited to reproduction entails that it has a different body temperature than the male body's.^[5] If the semen is hot enough to overpower the cold menses, the child will be a boy; but if it is too cold to do this, the child will be a girl. Inheritance is thus particulate (definitely one trait or another), as in Mendelian genetics, unlike the Hippocratic model which was continuous and blending.^[4] The child's sex can be influenced by factors that affect temperature, including the weather, the wind direction, diet, and the father's age. Features other than sex also depend on whether the semen overpowers the menses, so if a man has strong semen, he will have sons who resemble him, while if the semen is weak, he will have daughters who resemble their mother.^[4]

Many scholars believe that Aristotle did not consider women suitable for politics, even though their interpretations of Aristotle might vary in other aspects.^[6][7][8][9] Many argue that Aristotle's stance on excluding women is unequivocal.^[10][11][12] Indeed, Aristotle often made clear-cut statements, as seen in works like Prior Analytics 1.2-3.25alff-25b1ff, 1.26.43b32ff, and frequently mentioned women. In Politics 1.1254b, Aristotle writes, "the male is by nature superior and the female inferior, the male ruler and the female subject."

Aristotle's observations on the household and the ideal polity have caused controversy. In some segments, he does express that women are naturally inferior and ought to be governed, consistently within the household and in the optimal state. Additionally, when discussing the ideal citizen, he frequently employs the term aner, meaning "man" (Politics 1259b2-4; 3.4.1276b16ff, 1277b18ff; Rhetoric 1.9.1367a16-18; Eudemian Ethics 7.2.1237a4-6). Aristotle's Greek terminology for a "ruled" woman, such as to archomenon or arxetai, might hint at someone who is both under governance and in a governing role. Notably, he underlines that those who are governed should, in various situations, also govern. In the Ethics, he contends that a virtuous woman should both be governed and govern in the household (8.10.1160b23-1161a4, 22–25). Hence, in Aristotle's view, women aren't so subordinate that they can't attain mature virtue or have a role in household leadership.

Regarding the ideal state, Aristotle's position is not straightforward, especially when referencing women who are "ruled." Rather than consistently using the term aner, which means "man", he occasionally employs anthropos, a gender-neutral term translating to "human", to describe the exemplary individual in the optimal state (Politics 7.3.1325b27, 32). This choice is especially evident when he contrasts political and philosophical lifestyles (Politics 7.2.1324a5ff, 25, 35). This ambiguity seems to allow Aristotle to maintain a form of internal coherence. In the Eudemian Ethics, he depicts the dynamic between husband and wife as reflective of an aristocracy, even positing aristocracy as the supreme form of governance (7.9.1241b27-39). Similarly, in the Ethics, he uses the mutual governance between spouses as an archetype (8.10.1160b23-25) for political power-sharing in an aristocratic system. Drawing a parallel between the collaborative governance of a well-matched couple and an effective political system wouldn't align with an intent to entirely exclude women from governance in the optimal state. Yet, even if it could be argued that Aristotle does bar women from the highest form of governance, there is no textual evidence on whether Aristotle believed women should be excluded from governance in other, potentially less ideal, political systems.

In the Generation of Animals (2.1.732a3-10), Aristotle argues that while a man's semen imparts the superior form, a woman's menstrual fluid provides the inferior matter to the formation of a fetus. However, based on Aristotle's political standards, this observation does not serve as a rationale, nor is it ever utilized by him as such, to justify excluding women from political roles. He doesn't argue that the contribution of a man's semen alone qualifies him for a share in governing. Aristotle's perspective is intricate: women inherit a version of the human essence that, while inferior to men's in certain non-rational capacities (notably courage), surpasses men's in rational abilities, particularly in the virtue of prudence.^[13]

He describes women as mathimatikoteron, meaning they have a heightened capacity for rational learning; phrontistikotera, indicating they are more thoughtful in child-rearing; and mnemonikoteron, highlighting their superior memory. Conversely, men are described as hetton epiboula, or less strategic. Aristotle does not limit women's intellectual strengths to domestic spheres alone. Both women and men can exhibit political discernment, especially concerning child upbringing. The intellectual strengths in which women excel, notably their ability to strategize, learn, remember, and rear children, are linked to the virtue of prudence, which is especially crucial for lawmakers focused on the nurturing of the young (Politics 8.1.1337a11).^[14] This virtue of prudence, highlighted as a distinctive attribute for political leaders in Politics 3.4.1277b25ff, is portrayed as a particular natural strength of women.

On the topic of motherhood, when Aristotle discusses citizenship, he doesn't explicitly say or hint that he excludes women from political life. In fact, he acknowledges mothers as citizens. If Aristotle wanted to sideline women, he could suggest that women should be regarded as citizens in name only. He could also categorically group mothers alongside others he deems as citizens in a limited or nominal sense, like underage children. However, he doesn't put forth or even suggest such a perspective. Instead, he aligns mothers with fathers, not with children or other groups with limited citizenship (Politics 3.1.1275a5-24, 1275b17-33; 3.5.1278a1-8).

• Leroi, Armand Marie (2014). The Lagoon: How Aristotle Invented Science. Bloomsbury. ISBN 978-1-4088-3622-4.