Turkish nationalism (Turkish: Türk milliyetçiliği) is nationalism among the people of Turkey and individuals whose national identity is Turkish. Turkish nationalism consists of political and social movements and sentiments prompted by a love for Turkish culture, Turkish languages and history, and a sense of pride in Turkey and Turkish people. While national consciousness in Turkish nation can be traced back centuries, nationalism has been a predominant determinant of Turkish attitudes mainly since the 20th century. Modern Turkish nationalism rose during the Tanzimat era. It also has a complicated relationship with Muslim identity, Pan-Turkism, and Turanism.
The early Turkish nationalists were typically secular and often influenced by Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924).[6] Gökalp aimed for the Turkification of Islam; that the Quran should be translated from Arabic into Turkish, and that the adhan should be recited in Turkish instead of Arabic from the Minarets.[6] During the early years of the republic, religious traditions were not important and Turkish nationalists were much more open to the westernization of the Turkish society.[6]
Implemented by Atatürk, the founding ideology of the Republic of Turkey features nationalism (Turkish: milliyetçilik) as one of its six principles. Following the proclamation of the republic in 1923, the Kemalism or "Turkish state nationalism"[9] became the official state ideology and the guiding principle behind the widespread socio-political reforms.[9]
The Kemalist revolution aimed to create a nation state from the remnants of the multi-religious and multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire. Kemalist nationalism originates from the social contract theories, especially from the civic nationalist principles advocated by Jean-Jacques Rousseau and his Social Contract. The Kemalist perception of social contract was effected by the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire which was perceived as a product of failure of the Ottoman "Millet" system and the ineffective Ottomanism policy. Kemalist nationalism, after experiencing the Ottoman Empire's breakdown, defined the social contract as its "highest ideal".[citation needed]
In the 1930s Kemalism became an all-encompassing state ideology based on Atatürk's sayings and writings. The Kemalist definition of nationality was integrated to Article 66 of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey. Legally, every citizen is defined as a Turk, regardless of ethnicity or religion. Turkish nationality law states that he or she can be deprived of his/her nationality only through an act of treason.[10]
Kemalist nationalism believes in the principle that the Turkish state is an indivisible whole comprising its territory and people, which is defined as the "unity of the state".
"Turanist" nationalism began with the Turanian Society founded in 1839, followed in 1908 with the Turkish Society, which later became the Turkish Hearths[11] and eventually expanded to include ideologies such as Pan-Turanism and Pan-Turkism.
Pan-Turkism (Turkish: Türkçülük or Pan-Türkizm), as he stated in his book Principles of Turkism, was also a part of Ziya Gökalp's nationalist view which he called "Turkism", as an ideal of the unity of Turkic peoples.[12]
In the early Republican era, some intellectuals like Hilmi Ziya Ülken,[15] Mehmet Râif Ogan[16] and Nurettin Topçu[17] proposed that the origins of the Turkish nationalism should be sought in Anatolia, not in "Turan".[18]
Hilmi Ziya Ülken, one of the founders of Anatolianism, was opposed to Neo-Ottomanism and Pan-Islamism, as well as to Turanism. In 1919, Ülken wrote a book titled Anadolunun Bugünki Vazifeleri (Present Duties of Anatolia), but it was not published. Ülken and friends published the periodical Anadolu. They worked to form an alternative philosophy to Ottomanism, Islamism and Turanism.
Turkish-Islamic nationalism, also known as the Turkish-Islamic synthesis (Turkish: Türk-İslam sentezi) is a far-right Islamic-conservative ideology that combines Turkish nationalism and Islam.
The term was coined in 1972 by the conservative historian İbrahim Kafesoğlu, who traced the Turkish-Islamic synthesis back to the first Muslim Turkic dynasty, the Karakhanids, in the 11th century. Kafesoğlu viewed the contact between the ancient steppe culture of the Turks and Islam as a process of refinement. The "synthesis" was represented in the 1970s in the intellectual club Aydınlar Ocağı (Turkish: Intellectuals' Hearth) of which cofounder was Kafesoğlu.[19] Representatives of the intellectual club explicitly formulated their thoughts and in particular their understanding of history in 1973 in the text Aydınlar Ocağı'nın Görüşü (Turkish: The View of the Intellectuals's Hearth). The starting point was anti-communism and an endeavor to counter the Marxist ideology, which was perceived as a threat to Turkish values.
After the turmoil of the 1970s with bloody clashes between political camps and the 1980 Turkish coup d'état, the junta tried, despite reservations about religious fundamentalism (Turkish: irtica), to use Islamic-conservative ideas and values to restore order and unity.[20] Following the 1980 coup d'état, the military dictatorship made a combination of Pan-Turkism,[21]Turkish-Islamic synthesis, and Kemalism as the official state ideology.[22] Thought leaders of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis assumed that the Turks played a prominent role in the spread of Islam and thereby developed their national identity as part of the Islamic ummah. According to this conception, being Turkish is only possible in connection with Islam. The idea of a Turkish-Islamic synthesis is still very popular in circles of the Ülkücü movement.
Turkish Cypriot nationalism emphasizes the support for the independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and desires that the TRNC stay independent from Turkey while opposing the idea of a united Cyprus with the Greek-dominated Republic of Cyprus.[23]
Today, apart from neo-fascist[32]Grey Wolves and the Turkish ultranationalist[39]MHP, there are some neo-Nazi organizations in Turkey such as the Ataman Brotherhood,[40] or the Turkish Nazi Party[41] and the National Socialist Party of Turkey which are mainly based on the Internet.[42][43][44]
21st century secular nationalism
Following two decades long Islamic-conservative AKP rule, many authors and scholars point out a newly emerging wave, called secular nationalism by the most.[45] This new wave is yet to acquire a precise form and discourse,[46] but attracted interest mainly from young adults who are disillusioned with government policies - especially unregulated migrant inflow.[47]
Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code, which is perceived as contrary to the notion of freedom of speech, took effect on June 1, 2005, and was amended in 2008, states: The person who publicly denigrates the Turkish Nation, the Republic of Turkey, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the judicial organs of the State, shall be punished with imprisonment of six months to two years. The article also states, expressions of thought intended to criticize shall not constitute a crime, and that it cannot be invoked without the approval of the Minister of Justice.[48]
There have been recent indications that Turkey may repeal or modify Article 301, after the embarrassment suffered by some high-profile cases.[49] Nationalists within the judicial system, intent on derailing Turkey's full admission into the European Union, have used Article 301 to initiate trials against people like Nobel Prize–winning Turkish novelist Orhan Pamuk, the Turkish novelist Elif Shafak, and the late Hrant Dink[50] for acknowledging the existence of the Armenian genocide.
In May 2007, a law was put into effect allowing Turkey to block websites that are deemed insulting to Atatürk.[51]
^Xypolia, Ilia (2017). British Imperialism and Turkish Nationalism in Cyprus, 1923-1939 : divide, define and rule. London: Routledge.
^Rayner, Jeremy; Falls, Susan; Souvlis, George; Nelms, Taylor C. (2020). Back to the '30s?: Recurring Crises of Capitalism, Liberalism, and Democracy. Springer Nature. p. 161. ISBN978-3-030-41586-0. In the prevailing literature, the term ultra-nationalism is often used to describe Turkish nationalism.
^ abCengiz Gunes (2020). The Political Representation of Kurds in Turkey: New Actors and Modes of Participation in a Changing Society. Bloomsbury Publishing. p. 6.
^Guy E. Métraux, International Commission for a History of the Scientific and Cultural Development of Mankind, The new Asia, New American Library, 1965, p. 73.
^Arıkan, E. Burak (July 2002). "Turkish ultra–nationalists under review: a study of the Nationalist Action Party". Nations and Nationalism. 8 (3): 357–375. doi:10.1111/1469-8219.00055.
Eissenstat, Howard. "Anatolianism: The History of a Failed Metaphor of Turkish Nationalism". Paper presented at Middle East Studies Association Conference, Washington, D.C., November 2002.
Çetin, Zafer M. (October 2004). "Tales of past, present, and future: mythmaking and nationalist discourse in Turkish politics". Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs. 24 (2): 347–365. doi:10.1080/1360200042000296708. S2CID143320570.
Poulton, Hugh (May 1999). "The struggle for hegemony in Turkey: Turkish nationalism as a contemporary force". Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans. 1 (1): 15–31. doi:10.1080/14613199908413984.
Note: Forms of nationalism based primarily on ethnic groups are listed above. This does not imply that all nationalists with a given ethnicity subscribe to that form of ethnic nationalism.