the impossibility, de jure or de facto, of bringing the perpetrators of violations to account – whether in criminal, civil, administrative or disciplinary proceedings – since they are not subject to any inquiry that might lead to their being accused, arrested, tried and, if found guilty, sentenced to appropriate penalties, and to making reparations to their victims.[11]
The First Principle of that same document states that:
Impunity arises from a failure by States to meet their obligations to investigate violations; to take appropriate measures in respect of the perpetrators, particularly in the area of justice, by ensuring that those suspected of criminal responsibility are prosecuted, tried and duly punished; to provide victims with effective remedies and to ensure that they receive reparation for the injuries suffered; to ensure the inalienable right to know the truth（英语：right to know the truth） about violations; and to take other necessary steps to prevent a recurrence of violations.
真相委員會（英语：Truth commission）s are frequently established by nations emerging from periods marked by human rights violations – coups d'état（英语：coup d'état）, military dictatorship（英语：military dictatorship）s, civil war（英语：civil war）s, etc. – in order to cast light on the events of the past. While such mechanisms can assist in the ultimate prosecution of crimes and punishment of the guilty, they have often been criticised for perpetuating impunity by enabling violators to seek protection of concurrently adopted amnesty law（英语：amnesty law）s.[12]
The primary goal of the 国际刑事法院罗马规约 of the 国际刑事法院, adopted on 17 July 1998 and entered into force on 1 July 2002, is "to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators" [...] "of the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole".[13]
^Scharf, Michael. The Letter of the Law: The Scope of the International Legal Obligation to Prosecute Human Rights Crimes. Law and Contemporary Problems. 1996, 59 (4): 41–61 [2022-09-20]. ISSN 0023-9186. JSTOR 1192189. doi:10.2307/1192189. （原始内容存档于2018-07-19）. Initially, the Allied Powers sought the prosecution of those responsible for the massacres. The Treaty of Sevres, which was signed on August 10, 1920, would have required the Turkish Government to hand over those responsible to the Allied Powers for trial. Treaty of Peace between the Allied Powers and Turkey [Treaty of Sevres], art. 230, at 235, Aug. 10, 1920, reprinted in 15 AM. J. INT'L L. 179 (Supp 1921). "The Treaty of Sevres was, however, not ratified and did not come into force. It was replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne, which not only did not contain provisions respecting the punishment of war crimes, but was accompanied by a 'Declaration of Amnesty' of all offenses committed between 1914 and 1922." Treaty of Peace between the Allied Powers and Turkey [Treaty of Lausanne], July 24, 1923, League of Nations Treaty Series 11, reprinted in 18 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (Supp. 1924). 99.
^Bassiouni, M. Cherif. Crimes Against Humanity: The Case for a Specialized Convention. Washington University Global Studies Law Review. 2010, 9 (4): 575–593 [2022-09-20]. ISSN 1546-6981. （原始内容存档于2022-09-21）. During World War I (WWI) (1914-18), almost twenty million people were killed... During that conflict, one situation stood out: the estimated 200,000-800,000 civilian Armenians killed in 1915. (4) In 1919, the Inter-Allied Commission (save for the U.S. and Japan) called for the prosecution of Turkish officials responsible. (5) That call was advanced on the basis of the 1907 Hague Convention's preamble referring to "the laws of humanity." (6) However, no prosecutions ensued. Instead, Turkey received immunity in a secret annex of the Treaty of Lausanne. (7)
^Dadrian, Vahakn. The Historical and Legal Interconnections Between the Armenian Genocide and the Jewish Holocaust: From Impunity to Retributive Justice. Yale Journal of International Law. 1998, 23 (2) [2022-09-20]. ISSN 0889-7743. （原始内容存档于2020-12-03）. The delayed peace settlement is, of course, the Lausanne Treaty. Yielding to the pressures of the implacable Kemalists, the victorious Allies abjectly discarded the two-year-old S~vres Treaty,26 through which they had attempted to prosecute and punish the authors of the Armenian genocide and, at the same time, redeem their promises for a future Armenia. After expunging all references to Armenian massacres (and, indeed, to Armenia itself) from the draft version,27 they signed the Lausanne Peace Treaty, thus helping to codify impunity by ignoring the Armenian genocide. The international law flowing from this treaty, while a sham in reality, lent an aura of respectability to impunity because the imprimatur of a peace conference was attached to it. A French jurist observed that the treaty was an "assurance" for impunity for the crime of massacre; indeed, it was a "glorification" of the crime in which an entire race, the Armenians, was "systematically exterminated." 2 " For his part, David Lloyd George, wartime Prime Minister of Great Britain, found it appropriate to vent his ire when he was out of power: He declared the Western Allies' conduct at the Lausanne Conference to be "abject, cowardly and infamous." 29 A creature of political deal-making, the Lausanne Treaty was a triumph of the principle of impunity over the principle of retributive justice.
^Penrose, Mary. Impunity- Inertia, Inaction, and Invalidity: A Literature Review. Boston University International Law Journal. 1999, 17: 269 [2022-09-20]. （原始内容存档于2022-09-22）. Beginning with the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, the award of amnesty to defeated forces has often been the political price paid for achieving a cessation of hostilities.
