Državni udar u Hondurasu 1963.

Državni udar u Hondurasu 1963.
Datum 3. listopada 1963.
Lokacija  Honduras
Ishod Uspjeh pučista i svrgavanje demokratske vlasti Ramóna Villede Moralesa
Sukobljene strane
Vlada Hondurasa Oružane snage Hondurasa
Komandanti i vođe
Ramón Villeda Morales Oswaldo López Arellano

Državni udar od 3. listopada 1963. godine bio je vojni puč kojim je svrgnut demokratski izabrani predsjednik Hondurasa, Ramón Villeda Morales, a na vlast je došla vojna hunta na čelu s generalom Oswaldom Lópezom Arellanom. Ovaj vojni udar označio je početak dvadesetogodišnje vojne vladavine u Hondurasu, koja je dokinuta tek 1982. godine.

Villeda Morales je na vlast bio došao 1957. godine te je za svog mandata donio vrlo progresivne radne zakone i proveo značajne agrarne reforme; uz to, želio je i oduzeti zemlju od američke kompanije United Fruit Company, što je, iako nikada nije provedeno, bilo izvor velikih tenzija. Američki ambasador Charles F. Burrows vršio je veliki pritisak na Villedu Moralesa da vodi računa o američkim interesima u Hondurasu, što je ovaj spretno odbio; takva individualistička politika dovela je do optužbi za komunističke simpatije koje, međutim, nisu naštetile ugledu njegove stranke i njega. Uz to, predsjednikovi odnosi s vojskom su se od 1957. naglo pogoršavali; pokušaj državnog udara 1959. godine spretno su spriječili studenti i pobornici Villede Moralesa, a subsekventno osnivanje Civilne garde kao zasebne predsjedničke vojske samo je pogoršalo odnose. Uz to, raspravljalo se i o ukidanju vojske u cijelosti.

Predsjednički izbori bili su zakazani za 13. listopada 1963. godine, a očekivalo se da će Villedin stranački kolega, Modesto Rodas Alvarado, uvjerljivo pobijediti i tako nastaviti njegovu politiku. Deset dana prije izbora, general Oswaldo López Arellano podigao je vojsku i izveo nasilni vojni puč koji je započeo noćnim napadom na nespremnu Civilnu gardu. Vojska je vrlo brzo preuzela faktičnu vlast, a predsjednikom je postao López Arellano, koji je izdao deklaraciju u kojoj je istaknuo četiri problematične točke bivšeg režima – postojanje Civilne garde, favoriziranje interesa iste u odnosu na redovne vojne organe, infiltracija ljevičarskih i komunističkih ideja te kršenje načela slobodnih izbora.[1] Naravno, ne treba posebno naglašavati kako se ovdje radilo o blatantnoj propagandi, a Arellanove snage su u danima nakon puča nastavile s ubijanjem članova Civilne garde i Villedinih simpatizera. Villeda Morales i Rodas Alvarado su hitno deportirani u Kostariku.[2]

Sjedinjene Države, koje su imale direktan interes u Hondurasu, reagirale su nekonzistentno. Američki ambasador Burrows otvoreno je podržao puč, smatrajući ga opravdanim zbog infiltracije komunističkih ideja u Honduras.[3] S druge strane, predsjednik Kennedy, koji je ugostio Villedu u Sjedinjenim Državama u studenom 1962. godine, osudio je puč te je odbio priznati Arellanovu vlast kao legalnu.[4][5][6] No, nakon što je Kennedy ubijen u studenom 1963. godine, njegov nasljednik, Lyndon B. Johnson priznao je vojnu vlast u prosincu 1964. godine.[7] Političari u Hondurasu također nisu bili blagonakloni prema vojnoj vlasti, međutim pritisci su s vremenom postali toliko snažni da su se morali pokoriti. Zahvaljujući Arellanu, Sjedinjene Države su dodatno pojačale svoju gospodarsku eksploataciju Hondurasa,[8][9] a država je u narednih 20 godina živjela pod vojnom diktaturom.[10]

Reference

  1. ↑ MacCameron, Bananas, Labor, and Politics (1983), p. 117.
  2. ↑ Euraque, Reinterpreting the Banana Republic (1996), p. 108.
  3. ↑ MacCameron, Bananas, Labor, and Politics (1983), pp. 117–118.
  4. ↑ Schulz & Schulz, The United States, Honduras, and the Crisis in Central America (1994), p. 31. "Villeda had been one of John F. Kennedy's favorites: a democrat and a reformer but also a fervent anticommunist who respected private property. He was, moreover, the fourth democratically elected Latin American president to be overthrown since 1962. Such coups undercut one of the basic assumptions of the Alliance for Progress—namely that the way to prevent Castro-style regimes was to eliminate the conditions that gave rise to them.”
  5. ↑ Morris W. Rosenberg, “Coup Setback for Alliance: Military Oppose U.S. Plan”; Evening Independent, 4 October 1963.
  6. ↑ LaFeber, Ineevitable Revolutions (1993), p. 181.
  7. ↑ Schulz & Schulz, The United States, Honduras, and the Crisis in Central America (1994), p. 31. "His successor, Lyndon Johnson, abruptly changed course. When the new head of the Honduran government Colonel Oswaldo López Arellano, proved willing to pay the necessary lip service to democracy, relations were restored. Even had Kennedy lived, it is unlikely that things would have turned out differently."
  8. ↑ LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions (1993), pp. 182–184. "U.S. direct investment declined in Honduras during 1960 and 1961, rose during 1962 and 1963, and then doubled between 1963 and 1971 to well over $200 million (in book value). Despite this inflow, U.S. Companies took more out of Honduras after 1963 than they put in: in 1968 the outflow reached $22.4 million and in 1969, $17.7 million. The country exported more goods than it imported, yet its current account balance swam ever deeper in red ink until it threatened to drown amidst the benefits of the Alliance for Progress. The United States continued to control the banana industry, the largest mining companies, and key parts of the infrastructure including the two most important railroads. The two largest commercial banks, Atlantide and Bank of Honduras, came under the respective control of Chase Manhattan in 1967 and National City Bank of New York in 1965.”
  9. ↑ Schulz & Schulz, The United States, Honduras, and the Crisis in Central America (1994), p. 34. “The 1960s witnessed a rapid increase in foreign—mostly U.S.—economic penetration. Between 1963 and 1967, U.S. investment doubled. Of the sixty-three major companies in the country, thirty-five were set up between 1960 and 1968. One hundred percent of the production of the five largest Honduran firms was controlled by U.S. multinationals; the comparable figures for the twenty and fifty largest companies were 88.7 percent and 82 percent, respectively.”
  10. ↑ Bowman, "Public Battles over Militarisation and Democracy in Honduras" (2001), pp. 558–560.

Literatura

  • Bowman, Kirk. "The Public Battles over Militarisation and Democracy in Honduras, 1954–1963". Journal of Latin American Studies 33(3), August 2001; pp. 539–560. Accessed via JStor, 12 September 2013.
  • Bowman, Kirk. Militarization, Democracy, and Development: The Perils of Praetorianism in Latin America. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002. ISBN 0-271-02229-9
  • Euraque, Darío A. Reinterpreting the Banana: Region and State in Republic Honduras, 1870–1972. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996. ISBN 0-8078-2298-1
  • LaFeber, Walter. Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America, Second Edition. New York: W. W. Norton & Co, 1993. ISBN 0-393-30964-9
  • Leonard, Thomas M. The History of Honduras. Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood (ABC-CLIO), 2011. ISBN 978-0-313-36303-0
  • MacCameron, Robert. Bananas, Labor, and Politics in Honduras: 1954–1963. Foreign and Comparative Studies/Latin American Series, No. 5; Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs; Syracuse University, 1983. ISBN 0-915984-96-2
  • Schulz, Donald E., and Deborah Sundloff Schulz. The United States, Honduras, and the Crisis in Central America. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994. ISBN 0813313236

Vanjske veze