Total military dead: 333,620 (1960–1974) – 392,364 (total) Total military wounded: ≈1,340,000+[7] (excluding FARK and FANK) Total military captured: est. 1,000,000+
Following the Gulf of Tonkin incident in 1964, the US Congress passed a resolution that gave President Lyndon B. Johnson authority to increase military presence, without a declaration of war. Johnson ordered deployment of combat units and dramatically increased American military personnel to 184,000 by the end of 1965, and to 536,000 by the end of 1968.[54] US and South Vietnamese forces relied on air supremacy and overwhelming firepower to conduct search and destroy operations. The US conducted a strategic bombing campaign against North Vietnam[25]: 371–374 [55] and built up its forces, despite little progress. In 1968, North Vietnam launched the Tet Offensive; a tactical defeat, but a strategic victory, as it caused US domestic support to fade.[25]: 481 In 1969, North Vietnam declared the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam. The 1970 deposing of Cambodia's monarch, resulted in a PAVN invasion of the country, and then a US-ARVN counter-invasion, escalating Cambodia's Civil War. After Richard Nixon's inauguration in 1969, a policy of "Vietnamization" began, which saw the conflict fought by an expanded ARVN, while US forces withdrew due to domestic opposition. US ground forces had mostly withdrawn by 1972, the 1973 Paris Peace Accords saw all US forces withdrawn[56]: 457 and were broken almost immediately: fighting continued for two years. Phnom Penh fell to the Khmer Rouge in April 1975, while the 1975 spring offensive saw the Fall of Saigon to the PAVN, marking the end of the war. North and South Vietnam were reunified on 2 July the following year.
The war exacted enormous human cost: estimates of Vietnamese soldiers and civilians killed range from 970,000 to 3 million. Some 275,000–310,000 Cambodians, 20,000–62,000 Laotians, and 58,220 US service members died.[A 7] Its end would precipitate the Vietnamese boat people and the larger Indochina refugee crisis, which saw millions leave Indochina, an estimated 250,000 perished at sea.[60][61] The US destroyed 20% of South Vietnam's jungle and 20–50% of the mangrove forests, by spraying over 20 million U.S. gallons (75 million liters) of toxic herbicides;[62][56]: 144–145 [63] a notable example of ecocide.[64] The Khmer Rouge carried out the Cambodian genocide, while conflict between them and the unified Vietnam escalated into the Cambodian–Vietnamese War. In response, China invaded Vietnam, with border conflicts lasting until 1991. Within the US, the war gave rise to Vietnam syndrome, a public aversion to American overseas military involvement,[65] which, with the Watergate scandal, contributed to the crisis of confidence that affected America throughout the 1970s.[66]
Names
Various names have been applied and have shifted over time, though Vietnam War is the most commonly used title in English. It has been called the Second Indochina War since it spread to Laos and Cambodia,[67] the Vietnam Conflict,[68][69] and Nam (colloquially 'Nam). In Vietnam it is commonly known as Kháng chiến chống Mỹ (lit.'Resistance War against America').[70][71] The Government of Vietnam officially refers to it as the Resistance War against America to Save the Nation.[72] It is sometimes called the American War.[73]
Vietnam had been under French control as part of French Indochina since the mid-19th century. Under French rule, Vietnamese nationalism was suppressed, so revolutionary groups conducted their activities abroad, particularly in France and China. One such nationalist, Nguyen Sinh Cung, established the Indochinese Communist Party in 1930, a Marxist–Leninist political organization which operated primarily in Hong Kong and the Soviet Union. The party aimed to overthrow French rule and establish an independent communist state in Vietnam.[74]
In September 1940, Japan invaded French Indochina, following France's capitulation to Nazi Germany. French influence was suppressed by the Japanese, and in 1941 Cung, now known as Ho Chi Minh, returned to Vietnam to establish the Viet Minh, an anti-Japanese resistance movement that advocated for independence.[74] The Viet Minh received aid from the Allies, namely the US, Soviet Union, and Republic of China. Beginning in 1944, the US Office of Strategic Services (O.S.S.) provided the Viet Minh with weapons, ammunition, and training to fight the occupying Japanese and Vichy French forces.[75][76] Throughout the war, Vietnamese guerrilla resistance against the Japanese grew dramatically, and by the end of 1944 the Viet Minh had grown to over 500,000 members.[77] US President Franklin D. Roosevelt was an ardent supporter of Vietnamese resistance, and proposed that Vietnam's independence be granted under an international trusteeship following the war.[78]
Tensions between the Viet Minh and French authorities had erupted into full-scale war by 1946, a conflict which soon became entwined with the wider Cold War. On March 12, 1947, US President Harry S. Truman announced the Truman Doctrine, an anticommunist foreign policy which pledged US support to nations resisting "attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures".[80] In Indochina, this doctrine was first put into practice in February 1950, when the United States recognized the French-backed State of Vietnam in Saigon, led by former Emperor Bảo Đại, as the legitimate government of Vietnam, after the communist states of the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China recognized the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, led by Ho Chi Minh, as the legitimate Vietnamese government the previous month.[81]: 377–379 [25]: 88 The outbreak of the Korean War in June convinced Washington policymakers that the war in Indochina was another example of communist expansionism, directed by the Soviet Union.[25]: 33–35
Military advisors from China began assisting the Viet Minh in July 1950.[53]: 14 Chinese weapons, expertise, and laborers transformed the Viet Minh from a guerrilla force into a regular army.[25]: 26 [82] In September 1950, the US further enforced the Truman Doctrine by creating a Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) to screen French requests for aid, advise on strategy, and train Vietnamese soldiers.[83]: 18 By 1954, the US had spent $1 billion in support of the French military effort, shouldering 80% of the cost of the war.[25]: 35
During the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954, US carriers sailed to the Gulf of Tonkin and the US conducted reconnaissance flights. France and the US discussed the use of tactical nuclear weapons, though reports of how seriously this was considered and by whom, are vague.[84][25]: 75 According to then-Vice President Richard Nixon, the Joint Chiefs of Staff drew up plans to use nuclear weapons to support the French.[84] Nixon, a so-called "hawk", suggested the US might have to "put American boys in".[7]: 76 President Dwight D. Eisenhower made American participation contingent on British support, but the British were opposed.[7]: 76 Eisenhower, wary of involving the US in an Asian land war, decided against intervention.[25]: 75–76 Throughout the conflict, US intelligence estimates remained skeptical of France's chance of success.[85]
On 7 May 1954, the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu surrendered. The defeat marked the end of French military involvement in Indochina. At the Geneva Conference, they negotiated a ceasefire with the Viet Minh, and independence was granted to Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.[86][87]
At the 1954 Geneva Conference, Vietnam was temporarily partitioned at the 17th parallel. Ho Chi Minh wished to continue war in the south, but was restrained by Chinese allies who convinced him he could win control by electoral means.[88][25]: 87–88 Under the Geneva Accords, civilians were allowed to move freely between the two provisional states for a 300-day period. Elections throughout the country were to be held in 1956 to establish a unified government.[25]: 88–90 However, the US, represented at the conference by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, objected to the resolution; Dulles' objection was supported only by the representative of Bảo Đại.[76] John Foster's brother, Allen Dulles, who was director of the Central Intelligence Agency, then initiated a psychological warfare campaign which exaggerated anti-Catholic sentiment among the Viet Minh and distributed propaganda attributed to Viet Minh threatening an American attack on Hanoi with atomic bombs.[76][89][25]: 96–97
During the 300-day period, up to one million northerners, mainly minority Catholics, moved south, fearing persecution by the Communists.[25]: 96 [90] The exodus was coordinated by a U.S.-funded $93 million relocation program, which involved the French Navy and the US Seventh Fleet to ferry refugees.[91] The northern refugees gave the later Ngô Đình Diệm regime a strong anti-communist constituency.[92]: 238 Over 100,000 Viet Minh fighters went to the north for "regroupment", expecting to return south within two years.[56]: 98 The Viet Minh left roughly 5,000 to 10,000 cadres in the south as a base for future insurgency.[25]: 104 The last French soldiers left South Vietnam in April 1956[25]: 116 and the PRC also completed its withdrawal from North Vietnam.[53]: 14
Anti-Bảo Đại, pro-French representatives of the State of Vietnam national assembly, Saigon, 1955
Between 1953 and 1956, the North Vietnamese government instituted agrarian reforms, including "rent reduction" and "land reform", which resulted in political oppression. During land reform, North Vietnamese witnesses suggested a ratio of one execution for every 160 village residents, which extrapolates to 100,000 executions. Because the campaign was mainly in the Red River Delta area, 50,000 executions became accepted by scholars.[93]: 143 [94][95]: 569 [96] However, declassified documents from Vietnamese and Hungarian archives indicate executions were much lower, though likely greater than 13,500.[97] In 1956, leaders in Hanoi admitted to "excesses" in implementing this program and restored much of the land to the original owners.[25]: 99–100
The south, meanwhile, constituted the State of Vietnam, with Bảo Đại as Emperor, and Ngô Đình Diệm as prime minister. Neither the US, nor Diệm's State of Vietnam, signed anything at the Geneva Conference. The non-communist Vietnamese delegation objected strenuously to any division of Vietnam, but lost when the French accepted the proposal of Viet Minh delegate Phạm Văn Đồng,[98]: 134 who proposed Vietnam eventually be united by elections under the supervision of "local commissions".[98]: 119 The US countered with what became known as the "American Plan", with the support of South Vietnam and the UK.[98]: 140 It provided for unification elections under the supervision of the UN, but was rejected by the Soviet delegation.[98]: 140 The US said, "With respect to the statement made by the representative of the State of Vietnam, the United States reiterates its traditional position that peoples are entitled to determine their own future and that it will not join in any arrangement which would hinder this".[98]: 570–571
US President Eisenhower wrote in 1954:
I have never talked or corresponded with a person knowledgeable in Indochinese affairs who did not agree that had elections been held as of the time of the fighting, possibly 80% of the population would have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh as their leader rather than Chief of State Bảo Đại. Indeed, the lack of leadership and drive on the part of Bảo Đại was a factor in the feeling prevalent among Vietnamese that they had nothing to fight for.[99]
Ba Cut, commander of the Hòa Hảo religious movement, in Can Tho Military Court 1956
According to the Pentagon Papers, which commented on Eisenhower's observation, Diệm would have been a more popular candidate than Bảo Đại against Hồ, stating that "It is almost certain that by 1956 the proportion which might have voted for Ho - in a free election against Diem - would have been much smaller than 80%."[100] In 1957, independent observers from India, Poland, and Canada representing the International Control Commission (ICC) stated that fair elections were impossible, with the ICC reporting that neither South nor North Vietnam had honored the armistice agreement.[101]
From April to June 1955, Diệm eliminated political opposition in the south by launching operations against religious groups: the Cao Đài and Hòa Hảo of Ba Cụt. The campaign also attacked the Bình Xuyênorganized crime group, which was allied with members of the communist party secret police and had military elements. The group was defeated in April following a battle in Saigon. As broad-based opposition to his harsh tactics mounted, Diệm increasingly sought to blame the communists.[7]
In a referendum on the future of the State of Vietnam in October 1955, Diệm rigged the poll supervised by his brother Ngô Đình Nhu and was credited with 98% of the vote, including 133% in Saigon. His American advisors had recommended a more "modest" winning margin of "60 to 70 percent." Diệm, however, viewed the election as a test of authority.[92]: 224 He declared South Vietnam to be an independent state under the name Republic of Vietnam (ROV), with him as president.[25] Likewise, Ho Chi Minh and other communists won at least 99% of the vote in North Vietnamese "elections".[93]: 193–194, 202–203, 215–217
The domino theory, which argued that if a country fell to communism, all surrounding countries would follow, was first proposed by the Eisenhower administration.[81]: 19 John F. Kennedy, then a senator, said in a speech to the American Friends of Vietnam: "Burma, Thailand, India, Japan, the Philippines and obviously Laos and Cambodia are among those whose security would be threatened if the Red Tide of Communism overflowed into Vietnam."[102]
A devout Roman Catholic, Diệm was fervently anti-communist, nationalist, and socially conservative. Historian Luu Doan Huynh notes "Diệm represented narrow and extremist nationalism coupled with autocracy and nepotism."[81]: 200–201 Most Vietnamese were Buddhist, and alarmed by Diệm's actions, like his dedication of the country to the Virgin Mary.
In the summer of 1955, Diệm launched the "Denounce the Communists" campaign, during which suspected communists and other anti-government elements were arrested, imprisoned, tortured, or executed. He instituted the death penalty in August 1956 against activity deemed communist.[51] The North Vietnamese government claimed that, by November 1957, over 65,000 individuals were imprisoned and 2,148 killed in the process.[103] According to Gabriel Kolko, 40,000 political prisoners had been jailed by the end of 1958.[56]: 89 In October 1956, Diệm launched a land reform program limiting the size of rice farms per owner. 1.8m acres of farm land became available for purchase by landless people. By 1960, the process had stalled because many of Diem's biggest supporters were large landowners.[104]: 14–16
In May 1957, Diệm undertook a 10-day state visit to the US. President Eisenhower pledged his continued support, and a parade was held in Diệm's honor. But Secretary of State Dulles privately conceded Diệm had to be backed because they could find no better alternative.[92]: 230
Between 1954 and 1957, the Diệm government succeeded in preventing large-scale organized unrest in the countryside. In April 1957, insurgents launched an assassination campaign, referred to as "extermination of traitors".[105] 17 people were killed in the Châu Đốc massacre at a bar in July, and in September a district chief was killed with his family.[51] By early 1959, Diệm had come to regard the violence as an organized campaign and implemented Law 10/59, which made political violence punishable by death and property confiscation.[106] There had been division among former Viet Minh, whose main goal was to hold elections promised in the Geneva Accords, leading to "wildcat" activities separate from the other communists and anti-GVN activists. Douglas Pike estimated that insurgents carried out 2,000 abductions, and 1,700 assassinations of government officials, village chiefs, hospital workers and teachers from 1957 to 1960.[25]: 106 [51] Violence between insurgents and government forces increased drastically from 180 clashes in January 1960, to 545 clashes in September.[107]
In September 1960, COSVN, North Vietnam's southern headquarters, ordered a coordinated uprising in South Vietnam against the government and a third of the population was soon living in areas of communist control.[25]: 106–107 In December 1960, North Vietnam formally created the Viet Cong (VC) with the intent of uniting all anti-GVN insurgents, including non-communists. It was formed in Memot, Cambodia, and directed through COSVN.[53]: 55–58 The VC "placed heavy emphasis on the withdrawal of American advisors and influence, on land reform and liberalization of the GVN, on coalition government and the neutralization of Vietnam." The identities of the leaders of the organization were often kept secret.[51]
Support for the VC was driven by resentment of Diem's reversal of Viet Minh land reforms in the countryside. The Viet Minh had confiscated large private landholdings, reduced rents and debts, and leased communal lands, mostly to poorer peasants. Diem brought the landlords back, people who had been farming land for years had to return it to landlords and pay years of back rent. Marilyn B. Young wrote that "The divisions within villages reproduced those that had existed against the French: 75% support for the NLF, 20% trying to remain neutral and 5% firmly pro-government".[108]: 73
In March 1956, southern communist leader Lê Duẩn presented a plan to revive the insurgency entitled "The Road to the South" to the Politburo in Hanoi. However, as China and the Soviets opposed confrontation, his plan was rejected.[53]: 58 Despite this, the North Vietnamese leadership approved tentative measures to revive southern insurgency in December 1956.[50] Communist forces were under a single command structure set up in 1958.[109] In May 1958, North Vietnamese forces seized the transportation hub at Tchepone in Southern Laos near the demilitarized zone, between North and South Vietnam.[110]: 24
The North Vietnamese Communist Party approved a "people's war" on the South at a session in January 1959,[25]: 119–120 and, in May, Group 559 was established to maintain and upgrade the Ho Chi Minh trail, at this time a six-month mountain trek through Laos. On 28 July, North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces invaded Laos, fighting the Royal Lao Army all along the border.[111]: 26 About 500 of the "regroupees" of 1954 were sent south on the trail during its first year of operation.[112] The first arms delivery via the trail was completed in August 1959.[113] In April 1960, North Vietnam imposed universal military conscription for men. About 40,000 communist soldiers infiltrated the south from 1961 to 1963.[53]: 76
President Kennedy's news conference of 23 March 1961
In the 1960 U.S. presidential election, Senator John F. Kennedy defeated incumbent Vice President Richard Nixon. Although Eisenhower warned Kennedy about Laos and Vietnam, Europe and Latin America "loomed larger than Asia on his sights."[92]: 264 In June 1961, he bitterly disagreed with Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev when they met in Vienna to discuss key U.S.–Soviet issues. Only 16 months later, the Cuban Missile Crisis (October 1962) played out on television worldwide. It was the closest the Cold War came to nuclear war.
The Kennedy administration remained committed to the Cold War foreign policy inherited from the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. In 1961, the US had 50,000 troops based in South Korea, and Kennedy faced four crisis situations: the failure of the Bay of Pigs Invasion he had approved in April,[114] settlement negotiations between the pro-Western government of Laos and the Pathet Lao communist movement in May,[92]: 265 construction of the Berlin Wall in August, and the Cuban Missile Crisis in October. Kennedy believed another failure to stop communist expansion would irreparably damage US credibility. He was determined to "draw a line in the sand" and prevent a communist victory in Vietnam. He told James Reston of The New York Times after the Vienna summit with Khrushchev, "Now we have a problem making our power credible and Vietnam looks like the place."[115][116]
Kennedy's policy toward South Vietnam assumed Diệm and his forces had to defeat the guerrillas on their own. He was against the deployment of American combat troops and observed "to introduce U.S. forces in large numbers there today, while it might have an initially favorable military impact, would almost certainly lead to adverse political and, in the long run, adverse military consequences."[117] The quality of the South Vietnamese military, however, remained poor. Poor leadership, corruption, and political promotions weakened the ARVN. The frequency of guerrilla attacks rose as the insurgency gathered steam. While Hanoi's support for the VC played a role, South Vietnamese governmental incompetence was at the core of the crisis.[81]: 369
President Kennedy meeting with Secretary of Defense McNamara, in June 1962
One major issue Kennedy raised was whether the Soviet space and missile programs had surpassed those of the US. Although Kennedy stressed long-range missile parity with the Soviets, he was interested in using special forces for counterinsurgency warfare in Third World countries threatened by communist insurgencies. Although they were intended for use behind front lines after a conventional Soviet invasion of Europe, Kennedy believed guerrilla tactics employed by special forces, such as the Green Berets, would be effective in a "brush fire" war in Vietnam.
Kennedy advisors Maxwell Taylor and Walt Rostowrecommended US troops be sent to South Vietnam disguised as flood relief workers.[118] Kennedy rejected the idea but increased military assistance. In April 1962, John Kenneth Galbraith warned Kennedy of the "danger we shall replace the French as a colonial force in the area and bleed as the French did."[119] Eisenhower put 900 advisors in Vietnam, and by November 1963, Kennedy had put 16,000 military personnel there.[25]: 131
The Strategic Hamlet Program was initiated in late 1961. This joint U.S.–South Vietnamese program attempted to resettle the rural population into fortified villages. It was implemented in early 1962 and involved some forced relocation and segregation of rural South Vietnamese, into new communities where the peasantry would be isolated from the VC. It was hoped these new communities would provide security for the peasants and strengthen the tie between them and the central government. However, by November 1963 the program had waned, and it ended in 1964.[7]: 1070 In July 1962, 14 nations, including China, South Vietnam, the Soviet Union, North Vietnam, and the US, signed an agreement promising to respect Laos' neutrality.
The inept performance of the ARVN was exemplified by failed actions such as the Battle of Ấp Bắc on 2 January 1963, in which the VC won a battle against a much larger and better-equipped South Vietnamese force, many of whose officers seemed reluctant even to engage in combat.[120]: 201–206 The ARVN lost 83 soldiers and 5 US helicopters, serving to ferry troops shot down by VC forces, while the VC lost only 18 soldiers. The ARVN forces were led by Diệm's most trusted general, Huỳnh Văn Cao. Cao was a Catholic, promoted due to religion and fidelity rather than skill, and his main job was to preserve his forces to stave off coups. Policymakers in Washington began to conclude Diệm was incapable of defeating the communists and might even make a deal with Ho Chi Minh. He seemed concerned only with fending off coups and had become paranoid after attempts in 1960 and 1962, which he partly attributed to US encouragement. As Robert F. Kennedy noted, "Diệm wouldn't make even the slightest concessions. He was difficult to reason with..."[121] Historian James Gibson summed up the situation:
Strategic hamlets had failed... The South Vietnamese regime was incapable of winning the peasantry because of its class base among landlords. Indeed, there was no longer a 'regime' in the sense of a relatively stable political alliance and functioning bureaucracy. Instead, civil government and military operations had virtually ceased. The National Liberation Front had made great progress and was close to declaring provisional revolutionary governments in large areas.[122]
Discontent with Diệm's policies exploded in May 1963, following the Huế Phật Đản shootings of nine Buddhists protesting the ban on displaying the Buddhist flag on Vesak, Buddha's birthday. This resulted in mass protests -the Buddhist crisis- against discriminatory policies that gave privileges to Catholics over the Buddhist majority. Diệm's elder brother Ngô Đình Thục was the Archbishop of Huế and aggressively blurred the separation between church and state. Thuc's anniversary celebrations occurred shortly before Vesak had been bankrolled by the government, and Vatican flags were displayed prominently. There had been reports of Catholic paramilitaries demolishing Buddhist pagodas throughout Diệm's rule. Diệm refused to make concessions to the Buddhist majority or take responsibility for the deaths. On 21 August 1963, the ARVN Special Forces of Colonel Lê Quang Tung, loyal to Diệm's younger brother Ngô Đình Nhu, raided pagodas, causing widespread destruction and leaving a death toll into the hundreds.
ARVN forces capture a Viet Cong
US officials began discussing regime change during the middle of 1963. The United States Department of State wanted to encourage a coup, while the Pentagon favored Diệm. Chief among the proposed changes was removal of Diệm's younger brother Nhu, who controlled the secret police and special forces, and was seen as being behind the Buddhist repression and the architect of the Ngô family's rule. This proposal was conveyed to the US embassy in Saigon in Cable 243. The CIA contacted generals planning to remove Diệm, and told them the US would not oppose such a move, nor punish them by cutting off aid. Diệm was overthrown and then executed, along with his brother, on 2 November 1963. When Kennedy was informed, Maxwell Taylor remembered he "rushed from the room with a look of shock and dismay on his face."[92]: 326 Kennedy had not anticipated Diệm's murder. The U.S. ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, invited the coup leaders to the embassy and congratulated them. Lodge informed Kennedy that "the prospects now are for a shorter war".[92]: 327 Kennedy wrote Lodge a letter congratulating him for "a fine job".[123]
Following the coup, chaos ensued. Hanoi took advantage and increased its support for the VC. South Vietnam entered extreme political instability, as one military government toppled another in quick succession. Increasingly, each new regime was viewed by the communists as a puppet of the Americans; whatever the failings of Diệm, his credentials as a nationalist had been impeccable.[81]: 328 US advisors were embedded at every level of the South Vietnamese armed forces. They were however criticized for ignoring the political nature of the insurgency.[124] The Kennedy administration sought to refocus US efforts on pacification – which in this case was defined as countering the growing threat of insurgency[125][126] – and "winning the hearts and minds" of the population. Military leadership in Washington, however, was hostile to any role for U.S. advisors other than troop training.[127] General Paul Harkins, the commander of U.S. forces in South Vietnam, confidently predicted victory by Christmas 1963.[83]: 103 The CIA was less optimistic, however, warning that "the Viet Cong by and large retain de facto control of much of the countryside and have steadily increased the overall intensity of the effort".[128]
Kennedy was assassinated on 22 November 1963. Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson had not been heavily involved with policy toward Vietnam;[131][A 9] however, upon becoming president, he immediately focused it. On 24 November 1963, he said, "the battle against communism... must be joined... with strength and determination."[133] Johnson knew he had inherited a deteriorating situation in South Vietnam,[134] but adhered to the widely accepted domino argument for defending the South: Should they retreat or appease, either action would imperil other nations.[135] Findings from RAND's Viet Cong Motivation and Morale Project bolstered his confidence that an air war would weaken the insurgency. Some argue the policy of North Vietnam was not to topple other non-communist governments in South East Asia.[81]: 48
The military revolutionary council, meeting in lieu of a strong South Vietnamese leader, had 12 members. It was headed by General Dương Văn Minh, whom journalist Stanley Karnow, recalled as "a model of lethargy".[92]: 340 Lodge cabled home about Minh: "Will he be strong enough to get on top of things?" Minh's regime was overthrown in January 1964 by General Nguyễn Khánh.[92]: 341 There was persistent instability in the military: several coups—not all successful—occurred in a short period of time.
On 2 August 1964, USS Maddox, on an intelligence mission along North Vietnam's coast, fired upon and damaged torpedo boats approaching it in the Gulf of Tonkin.[56]: 124 A second attack was reported two days later on USS Turner Joy and Maddox. The circumstances were murky.[25]: 218–219 Johnson commented to Undersecretary of State George Ball that "those sailors out there may have been shooting at flying fish."[136] An NSA publication declassified in 2005 revealed there was no attack on 4 August.[137]
The second "attack" led to retaliatory airstrikes, and prompted Congress to approve the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution on 7 August 1964.[138]: 78 The resolution granted the president power "to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression" and Johnson relied on this as giving him authority to expand the war.[25]: 221 Johnson pledged he was not "committing American boys to fighting a war that I think ought to be fought by the boys of Asia to help protect their own land".[25]: 227
The National Security Council recommended a three-stage escalation of the bombing of North Vietnam. Following an attack on a U.S. Army base on 7 February 1965,[139] airstrikes were initiated, while Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin was on a state visit to North Vietnam. Operation Rolling Thunder and Operation Arc Light expanded aerial bombardment and ground support operations.[140] The bombing campaign, which lasted three years, was intended to force North Vietnam to cease its support for the VC by threatening to destroy North Vietnamese air defenses and infrastructure. It was additionally aimed at bolstering South Vietnamese morale.[141] Between March 1965 and November 1968, Rolling Thunder deluged the north with a million tons of missiles, rockets and bombs.[92]: 468
Bombing was not restricted to North Vietnam. Other aerial campaigns, targeted different parts of the VC and PAVN infrastructure. These included the Ho Chi Minh Trail through Laos and Cambodia. The ostensibly neutral Laos had become the scene of a civil war, pitting the Laotian government backed by the US, against the Pathet Lao and its North Vietnamese allies.
Massive aerial bombardment against the Pathet Lao and PAVN forces was carried out by the US to prevent the collapse of the Royal central government, and deny use of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Between 1964 and 1973, the U.S. dropped two million tons of bombs on Laos, nearly equal to the 2.1 million tons of bombs it dropped on Europe and Asia during World War II, making Laos the most heavily bombed country in history, relative to its population.[142]
The objective of stopping North Vietnam and the VC was never reached. The Chief of Staff of the United States Air ForceCurtis LeMay, however, had long advocated saturation bombing in Vietnam and wrote of the communists that "we're going to bomb them back into the Stone Age".[25]: 328
The 1964 offensive
ARVN Forces and a US Advisor inspect a downed helicopter, Battle of Dong Xoai, June 1965
Following the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, Hanoi anticipated the arrival of US troops and began expanding the VC, as well as sending increasing numbers of PAVN personnel southwards. They were outfitting the VC forces and standardizing their equipment with AK-47 rifles and other supplies, as well as forming the 9th Division.[25]: 223 [143] "From a strength of approximately 5,000 at the start of 1959 the Viet Cong's ranks grew to about 100,000 at the end of 1964... Between 1961 and 1964 the Army's strength rose from about 850,000 to nearly a million men."[124] U.S. troop numbers deployed to Vietnam during the same period were much lower: 2,000 in 1961, rising to 16,500 in 1964.[144] The use of captured equipment decreased, while greater numbers of ammunition and supplies were required to maintain regular units. Group 559 was tasked with expanding the Ho Chi Minh Trail, in light of the bombardment by US warplanes. The war had shifted into the final, conventional phase of Hanoi's three-stage protracted warfare model. The VC was now tasked with destroying the ARVN and capturing and holding areas; however, it was not yet strong enough to assault major towns and cities.
In December 1964, ARVN forces suffered heavy losses at the Battle of Bình Giã,[145] in a battle both sides viewed as a watershed. Previously, the VC had utilized hit-and-run guerrilla tactics. At Binh Gia, however, they defeated a strong ARVN force in a conventional battle and remained in the field for four days.[146]: 58 Tellingly, South Vietnamese forces were again defeated in June 1965 at the Battle of Đồng Xoài.[146]: 94
A Marine from 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines, moves a suspected Viet Cong during a search and clear operation held by the battalion 15 miles (24 km) west of Da Nang Air Base, 1965.
On 8 March 1965, 3,500 U.S. Marines were landed near Da Nang, South Vietnam.[25]: 246–247 This marked the beginning of the American ground war. U.S. public opinion overwhelmingly supported the deployment.[147] The Marines' initial assignment was defense of Da Nang Air Base. The first deployment was increased to nearly 200,000 by December.[81]: 349–351 U.S. military had long been schooled in offensive warfare. Regardless of political policies, U.S. commanders were institutionally and psychologically unsuited to a defensive mission.[81]: 349–351
General William Westmoreland informed Admiral U. S. Grant Sharp Jr., commander of U.S. Pacific forces, that the situation was critical,[81]: 349–351 "I am convinced that U.S. troops with their energy, mobility, and firepower can successfully take the fight to the NLF (Viet Cong)".[148] With this recommendation, Westmoreland was advocating an aggressive departure from America's defensive posture and the sidelining of the South Vietnamese. By ignoring ARVN units, the U.S. commitment became open-ended.[81]: 353 Westmoreland outlined a three-point plan to win the war:
Phase 1. Commitment of U.S. and allied forces necessary to halt the losing trend by the end of 1965.
Phase 2. U.S. and allied forces mount major offensive actions to seize the initiative to destroy guerrilla and organized enemy forces. This phase would end when the enemy had been worn down and driven back from major populated areas.
Phase 3. If the enemy persisted, a period of 12–18 months following Phase 2 would be required for final destruction of enemy forces remaining in remote base areas.[149]
The plan was approved by Johnson and marked a profound departure from the insistence that South Vietnam was responsible for defeating the VC. Westmoreland predicted victory by the end of 1967.[150] Johnson did not communicate this change in strategy to the media. Instead he emphasized continuity.[151] The change in policy depended on matching the North Vietnamese and VC in a contest of attrition and morale. The opponents were locked in a cycle of escalation.[81]: 353–354 Westmoreland and McNamara touted the body count system for gauging victory, a metric that would prove flawed.[152]
Peasants suspected of being Viet Cong under detention of U.S. Army, 1966
The American buildup transformed the South Vietnamese economy and had a profound effect on society. South Vietnam was inundated with manufactured goods. Washington encouraged its SEATO allies to contribute troops; Australia, New Zealand, Thailand and the Philippines[92]: 556 agreed to do so. South Korea would ask to join the Many Flags program in return for economic compensation. Major allies, however, notably NATO countries Canada and the UK, declined troop requests.[153]
The U.S. and its allies mounted complex search and destroy operations. In November 1965, the U.S. engaged in its first major battle with the PAVN, the Battle of Ia Drang.[154] The operation was the first large scale helicopter air assault by the U.S., and first to employ Boeing B-52 Stratofortress strategic bombers in support.[25]: 284–285 These tactics continued in 1966–67, however, the PAVN/VC insurgents remained elusive and demonstrated tactical flexibility. By 1967, the war had generated large-scale internal refugees, 2 million in South Vietnam, with 125,000 people evacuated and rendered homeless during Operation Masher alone,[155] which was the largest search and destroy operation to that point. Operation Masher would have negligible impact, however, as the PAVN/VC returned to the province just four months after it ended.[156]: 153–156 Despite major operations, which the VC and PAVN would typically evade, the war was characterized by smaller-unit contacts or engagements.[157] The VC and PAVN would initiate 90% of large firefights, and thus the PAVN/VC would retain strategic initiative despite overwhelming US force and fire-power deployment.[157] The PAVN and Viet Cong had developed strategies capable of countering US military doctrines and tactics: see NLF and PAVN battle tactics.
Meanwhile, the political situation in South Vietnam began to stabilize with the arrival of prime minister Air Marshal Nguyễn Cao Kỳ and figurehead chief of state, General Nguyễn Văn Thiệu, in mid-1965 at the head of a junta. In 1967, Thieu became president with Ky as his deputy, after rigged elections. Although they were nominally a civilian government, Kỳ was supposed to maintain real power through a behind-the-scenes military body. However, Thiệu outmanoeuvred and sidelined Kỳ. Thiệu was accused of murdering Kỳ loyalists through contrived military accidents. Thiệu remained president until 1975, having won a one-candidate election in 1971.[92]: 706
Johnson employed a "policy of minimum candor"[92]: 18 with the media. Military information officers sought to manage coverage by emphasizing stories that portrayed progress. This policy damaged the public trust in official pronouncements. As coverage of the war and the Pentagon diverged, a so-called credibility gap developed.[92]: 18 Despite Johnson and Westmoreland publicly proclaiming victory and Westmoreland stating the "end is coming into view",[158] internal reports in the Pentagon Papers indicate that VC forces retained strategic initiative and controlled their losses. VC attacks against static US positions accounted for 30% of engagements, VC/PAVN ambushes and encirclements for 23%, American ambushes against VC/PAVN forces for 9%, and American forces attacking Viet Cong emplacements only 5%.[157]
Types of Engagements, From Department of Defence Study 1967[157]
TYPE OF ENGAGEMENTS IN COMBAT NARRATIVES
Percentage of
Total Engagements
Notes
Hot Landing Zone. VC/PAVN Attacks U.S. Troops As They Deploy
13
Planned VC/PAVN Attacks
Are 66% Of All Engagements
Planned VC/PAVN Attack Against US Defensive Perimeter
30
VC/PAVN Ambushes or Encircles A Moving US Unit
23
Unplanned US Attacks On A VC/PAVN Defensive Perimeter,
Viet Cong before departing to participate in the Tet Offensive around Saigon-Gia DinhARVN forces assault a stronghold in the Mekong Delta.
In late 1967, the PAVN lured American forces into the hinterlands at Đắk Tô and at the Marine Khe Sanh combat base, where the U.S. fought The Hill Fights. These were part of a diversionary strategy meant to draw US forces towards the Central Highlands.[159] Preparations were underway for the Tet Offensive, with the intention of Văn Tiến Dũng forces to launch "direct attacks on the American and puppet nerve centers—Saigon, Huế, Danang, all the cities, towns and main bases..."[160] Le Duan sought to placate critics of the stalemate by planning a decisive victory.[161]: 90–94 He reasoned this could be achieved through sparking an uprising within the towns and cities,[161]: 148 along with mass defections among ARVN units, who were on leave during the truce period.[162]
The Tet Offensive began on 30 January 1968, as over 100 cities were attacked by over 85,000 VC/PAVN troops, including assaults on military installations, headquarters, and government buildings, including the U.S. Embassy in Saigon.[81]: 363–365 U.S. and South Vietnamese forces were shocked by the scale, intensity and deliberative planning, as infiltration of personnel and weapons into the cities was accomplished covertly;[160] the offensive constituted an intelligence failure on the scale of Pearl Harbor.[92]: 556 Most cities were recaptured within weeks, except the former imperial capital Huế, which PAVN/VC troops held on for 26 days.[163]: 495 They executed approximately 2,800 unarmed Huế civilians and foreigners they considered to be spies.[164][163]: 495 In the following Battle of Huế American forces employed massive firepower that left 80% of the city in ruins.[56]: 308–309 At Quảng Trị City, the ARVN Airborne Division, the 1st Division and a regiment of the US 1st Cavalry Division managed to hold out and overcome an assault intended to capture the city.[165][166]: 104 In Saigon, VC/PAVN fighters had captured areas in and around the city, attacking key installations before US and ARVN forces dislodged them after three weeks.[25]: 479 During one battle, Peter Arnett reported an infantry commander saying of the Battle of Bến Tre that "it became necessary to destroy the village in order to save it."[167][168]
The ruins of a section of Saigon, in the Cholon neighborhood, following fierce fighting between ARVN forces and Viet Cong Main Force battalions
During the first month of the offensive, 1,100 Americans and other allied troops, 2,100 ARVN and 14,000 civilians were killed.[169] After two months, nearly 5,000 ARVN and over 4,000 U.S. forces had been killed and 45,820 wounded.[169] The U.S. claimed 17,000 PAVN/VC had been killed and 15,000 wounded.[166]: 104 [165]: 82 A month later a second offensive known as the May Offensive was launched; it demonstrated the VC were still capable of carrying out orchestrated nationwide offensives.[25]: 488–489 Two months later a third offensive was launched, Phase III Offensive. PAVN records of their losses across all three offensives was 45,267 killed and 111,179 total casualties.[170][171] It had become the bloodiest year up to then. The failure to spark a general uprising and lack of defections among the ARVN units meant both war goals of Hanoi had fallen flat at enormous cost.[161]: 148–149
Prior to Tet, in November 1967, Westmoreland had spearheaded a public relations drive for the Johnson administration to bolster flagging public support.[172] In a speech to the National Press Club he said a point had been reached "where the end comes into view."[173] Thus, the public was shocked and confused when Westmoreland's predictions were trumped by the Tet Offensive.[172] Public approval of his performance dropped from 48% to 36%, and endorsement for the war fell from 40% to 26%."[92]: 546 The public and media began to turn against Johnson as the offensives contradicted claims of progress.[172]
At one point in 1968, Westmoreland considered the use of nuclear weapons in a contingency plan codenamed Fracture Jaw, which was abandoned when it became known to the White House.[174] Westmoreland requested 200,000 additional troops, which was leaked to the media, and the fallout combined with intelligence failures caused him to be removed from command in March 1968, succeeded by his deputy Creighton Abrams.[175]
On 10 May 1968, peace talks began between the US and North Vietnam in Paris. Negotiations stagnated for five months, until Johnson gave orders to halt the bombing of North Vietnam. Hanoi realized it could not achieve a "total victory" and employed a strategy known as "talking while fighting, fighting while talking", in which offensives would occur concurrently with negotiations.[176]
Johnson declined to run for re-election as his approval rating slumped from 48% to 36%.[25]: 486 His escalation of the war divided Americans, cost 30,000 American lives by that point and was regarded to have destroyed his presidency.[25]: 486 Refusal to send more troops was seen as Johnson's admission that the war was lost.[177] As McNamara said, "the dangerous illusion of victory by the United States was therefore dead."[81]: 367
Nixon began troop withdrawals in 1969. His plan to build up the ARVN so it could take over the defense of South Vietnam became known as "Vietnamization". As the PAVN/VC recovered from their 1968 losses and avoided contact, Abrams conducted operations aimed at disrupting logistics, with better use of firepower and more cooperation with the ARVN.[25]: 517 In October 1969, Nixon had ordered B-52s loaded with nuclear weapons to race to the border of Soviet airspace to convince the Soviet Union, in accord with the madman theory, he was capable of anything to end the Vietnam War.[179][180] Nixon had sought détente with the Soviet Union and rapprochement with China, which decreased tensions and led to nuclear arms reductions. However, the Soviets continued to supply the North Vietnamese.[181][182]
In September 1969, Ho Chi Minh died aged 79.[183] The failure of the 1968 Tet Offensive to spark a popular uprising in the south caused a shift in Hanoi's war strategy, and the Giáp-Chinh "Northern-First" faction regained control over military affairs from the Lê Duẩn-Hoàng Văn Thái "Southern-First" faction.[184]: 272–274 An unconventional victory was sidelined in favor of a conventional victory through conquest.[161]: 196–205 Large-scale offensives were rolled back in favor of small-unit and sapper attacks as well as targeting the pacification and Vietnamization strategy.[184] Following Tet, the PAVN had transformed from a light-infantry, limited mobility force into a high-mobile and mechanized combined arms force.[184]: 189 By 1970, over 70% of communist troops in the south were northerners, and southern-dominated VC units no longer existed.[185]
U.S. domestic controversies
The anti-war movement was gaining strength in the US. Nixon appealed to the "silent majority" who he said supported the war without showing it. But revelations of the 1968 My Lai Massacre,[25]: 518–521 in which a US Army unit raped and killed civilians, and the 1969 "Green Beret Affair", where eight Special Forces soldiers, were arrested for the murder[186] of a suspected double agent,[187] provoked national and international outrage.
In 1971, the Pentagon Papers were leaked to The New York Times. The top-secret history of US involvement in Vietnam, commissioned by the Department of Defense, detailed public deceptions on the part of the government. The Supreme Court ruled its publication was legal.[188]
Following the Tet Offensive and decreasing support among the US public, US forces began a period of morale collapse, and disobedience.[189]: 349–350 [190]: 166–175 At home, desertion rates quadrupled from 1966 levels.[191] Among the enlisted, only 2.5% chose infantry combat positions in 1969–70.[191]ROTC enrollment decreased from 191,749 in 1966 to 72,459 by 1971,[192] and reached a low of 33,220 in 1974,[193] depriving US forces of much-needed military leadership.
Open refusal to engage in patrols or carry out orders emerged, with a notable case of an entire company refusing orders to carry out operations.[194] Unit cohesion began to dissipate and focused on minimizing contact with the PAVN/VC.[190] A practice known as "sand-bagging" started, where units ordered to patrol would go into the country-side, find a site out of view from superiors and radio in false coordinates and unit reports.[156]: 407–411 Drug usage increased among US forces, 30% regularly used marijuana,[156]: 407 while a House subcommittee found 10% regularly used high-grade heroin.[191][25]: 526 From 1969 on, search-and-destroy operations became referred to as "search and avoid" operations, falsifying battle reports while avoiding guerrillas.[195] 900 fragging and suspected fragging incidents were investigated, most occurring between 1969 and 1971.[196]: 331 [156]: 407 In 1969, field-performance was characterized by lowered morale, lack of motivation, and poor leadership.[196]: 331 The significant decline in US morale was demonstrated by the Battle of FSB Mary Ann in March 1971, in which a sapper attack inflicted serious losses on the U.S. defenders.[196]: 357 Westmoreland, no longer in command but tasked with investigation of the failure, cited a dereliction of duty, lax defensive postures and lack of officers in charge.[196]: 357
On the collapse of morale, historian Shelby Stanton wrote:
In the last years of the Army's retreat, its remaining forces were relegated to static security. The American Army's decline was readily apparent in this final stage. Racial incidents, drug abuse, combat disobedience, and crime reflected growing idleness, resentment, and frustration... the fatal handicaps of faulty campaign strategy, incomplete wartime preparation, and the tardy, superficial attempts at Vietnamization. An entire American army was sacrificed on the battlefield of Vietnam.[196]: 366–368
ARVN taking the lead and U.S. ground force withdrawal
ARVN and US Special Forces, September 1968
Beginning in 1969, American troops were withdrawn from border areas where most of the fighting took place and redeployed along the coast and interior. US casualties in 1970 were less than half of 1969, after being relegated to less active combat.[197] While US forces were redeployed, the ARVN took over combat operations, with casualties double US casualties in 1969, and more than triple US ones in 1970.[198] In the post-Tet environment, membership in the South Vietnamese Regional Force and Popular Force militias grew, and they were now more capable of providing village security, which the Americans had not accomplished.[198]
In 1970, Nixon announced the withdrawal of an additional 150,000 American troops, reducing US numbers to 265,500.[197] By 1970, VC forces were no longer southern-majority, nearly 70% of units were northerners.[199] Between 1969 and 1971 the VC and some PAVN units had reverted to small unit tactics typical of 1967 and prior, instead of nationwide offensives.[161] In 1971, Australia and New Zealand withdrew their soldiers and US troops were further reduced to 196,700, with a deadline to remove another 45,000 troops by February 1972. The US reduced support troops, and in March 1971 the 5th Special Forces Group, the first American unit deployed to South Vietnam, withdrew.[200]: 240 [A 10]
An alleged Viet Cong captured during an attack on an American outpost near the Cambodian border is interrogated.
Prince Norodom Sihanouk had proclaimed Cambodia neutral since 1955,[203] but permitted the PAVN/VC to use the port of Sihanoukville and the Sihanouk Trail. In March 1969 Nixon launched a secret bombing campaign, called Operation Menu, against communist sanctuaries along the Cambodia/Vietnam border. Only five high-ranking congressional officials were informed.[A 11]
In March 1970, Sihanouk was deposed by his pro-American prime minister Lon Nol, who demanded North Vietnamese troops leave Cambodia or face military action.[204] Nol began rounding up Vietnamese civilians in Cambodia into internment camps and massacring them, provoking reactions from the North and South Vietnamese governments.[205] In April–May 1970, North Vietnam invaded Cambodia at the request of the Khmer Rouge, following negotiations with deputy leader Nuon Chea. Nguyen Co Thach recalls: "Nuon Chea has asked for help and we have liberated five provinces of Cambodia in ten days."[206] US and ARVN forces launched the Cambodian Campaign in May to attack PAVN/VC bases. A counter-offensive in 1971, as part of Operation Chenla II by the PAVN, would recapture most of the border areas and decimate most of Nol's forces.
The US incursion into Cambodia sparked nationwide U.S. protests as Nixon had promised to deescalate American involvement. Four students were killed by National Guardsmen in May 1970 during a protest at Kent State University, which provoked further public outrage. The reaction by the administration was seen as callous, reinvigorating the declining anti-war movement.[190]: 128–129 The US Air Force continued to bomb Cambodia in support of the Cambodian government as part of Operation Freedom Deal.
Building on the success of ARVN units in Cambodia, and further testing the Vietnamization program, the ARVN were tasked with Operation Lam Son 719 in February 1971, the first major ground operation to attack the Ho Chi Minh Trail, at the crossroad of Tchepone. This offensive was the first time the PAVN would field-test its combined arms force.[161] The first few days were a success, but momentum slowed after fierce resistance. Thiệu had halted the general advance, leaving PAVN armored divisions able to surround them.[207]
Thieu ordered air assault troops to capture Tchepone and withdraw, despite facing four-times larger numbers. During the withdrawal, the PAVN counterattack had forced a panicked rout. Half of the ARVN troops were either captured or killed, half of the ARVN/US support helicopters were downed and the operation was considered a fiasco, demonstrating operational deficiencies within the ARVN.[92]: 644–645 Nixon and Thieu had sought to use to showcase victory simply by capturing Tchepone, and it was spun off as an "operational success".[208][25]: 576–582
Easter Offensive and Paris Peace Accords, 1972
Soviet advisers inspecting the debris of a B-52 downed in the vicinity of Hanoi
Vietnamization was again tested by the Easter Offensive of 1972, a conventional PAVN invasion of South Vietnam. The PAVN overran the northern provinces and attacked from Cambodia, threatening to cut the country in half. US troop withdrawals continued, but American airpower responded, beginning Operation Linebacker, and the offensive was halted.[25]: 606–637 The US Navy also initiated Operation Pocket Money in May, an aerial mining campaign in Haiphong Harbor that prevented North Vietnam's allies from resupplying it with weapons and aid by sea.[209]
The war was central to the 1972 U.S. presidential election as Nixon's opponent, George McGovern, campaigned on immediate withdrawal. Nixon's Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, had continued secret negotiations with North Vietnam's Lê Đức Thọ and in October 1972 reached an agreement. Thiệu demanded changes to the peace accord upon its discovery, and when North Vietnam went public with the details, the Nixon administration claimed they were attempting to embarrass the president. The negotiations became deadlocked when Hanoi demanded changes. To show his support for South Vietnam and force Hanoi back to the negotiating table, Nixon ordered Operation Linebacker II, a bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong in December 1972.[25]: 649–663 Nixon pressured Thiệu to accept the agreement or face military action.[210]
On 15 January 1973, all US combat activities were suspended. Lê Đức Thọ and Henry Kissinger, along with the PRG Foreign Minister Nguyễn Thị Bình and a reluctant Thiệu, signed the Paris Peace Accords on 27 January 1973.[156]: 508–513 This ended direct U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War, created a ceasefire between North Vietnam/PRG and South Vietnam, guaranteed the territorial integrity of Vietnam under the Geneva Conference of 1954, called for elections or a political settlement between the PRG and South Vietnam, allowed 200,000 communist troops to remain in the south, and agreed to a POW exchange. There was a 60-day period for the withdrawal of US forces. "This article", noted Peter Church, "proved... to be the only one of the Paris Agreements which was fully carried out."[211] All US forces personnel were withdrawn by March 1973.[83]: 260
U.S. exit and final campaigns, 1973–1975
American POWs recently released from North Vietnamese prison camps, 1973
In the lead-up to the ceasefire on 28 January, both sides attempted to maximize land and population under their control in a campaign known as the War of the flags. Fighting continued after the ceasefire, without US participation, and throughout the year.[156]: 508–513 North Vietnam was allowed to continue supplying troops in the South but only to replace expended material. The Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Kissinger and Thọ, but Thọ declined it saying true peace did not yet exist.
On 15 March 1973, Nixon implied the US would intervene militarily if the North launched a full offensive, and Secretary of Defense Schlesinger re-affirmed this during his June confirmation hearings. Public and congressional reaction to Nixon's statement was unfavorable, prompting the Senate to pass the Case–Church Amendment to prohibit any intervention.[92]: 670–672
Northern leaders expected the ceasefire terms would favor their side, but Saigon, bolstered by a surge of US aid just before the ceasefire went into effect, began to roll them back. The North responded with a new strategy hammered out in meetings in Hanoi in March 1973, according to the memoirs of Trần Văn Trà.[92]: 672–674 With US bombings suspended, work on the Ho Chi Minh Trail and other logistical structures could proceed. Logistics would be upgraded until the North was in a position to launch a massive invasion of the South, projected for the 1975–76 dry season. Trà calculated this date would be Hanoi's last opportunity to strike, before Saigon's army could be fully trained.[92]: 672–674 The PAVN resumed offensive operations when the dry season began in 1973, and by January 1974 had recaptured territory it lost during the previous dry season.
Within South Vietnam, the departure of the US and the global recession after the 1973 oil crisis hurt an economy partly dependent on US financial support and troop presence. After clashes that left 55 ARVN soldiers dead, Thiệu announced on 4 January 1974, that the war had restarted and the Peace Accords were no longer in effect. There were over 25,000 South Vietnamese casualties during the ceasefire period.[212][25]: 683 Gerald Ford took over as US president in August 1974, and Congress cut financial aid to South Vietnam from $1 billion a year to $700 million. Congress voted in restrictions on funding to be phased in through 1975 and then total cutoff in 1976.[25]: 686
The success of the 1973–1974 dry season offensive inspired Trà to return to Hanoi in October 1974 and plead for a larger offensive the next dry season. This time, Trà could travel on a drivable highway with fueling stops, a vast change from when the Ho Chi Minh Trail was a dangerous mountain trek.[92]: 676 Giáp, the North Vietnamese defense minister, was reluctant to approve Trà's plan since a larger offensive might provoke US reaction and interfere with the big push planned for 1976. Trà appealed to Giáp's superior, Lê Duẩn, who approved it. Trà's plan called for a limited offensive from Cambodia into Phước Long Province. The strike was designed to solve logistical problems, gauge the reaction of South Vietnamese forces, and determine whether the US would return.[25]: 685–690 On 13 December 1974, PAVN forces attacked Phước Long. Phuoc Binh fell on 6 January 1975. Ford desperately asked Congress for funds to assist and re-supply the South before it was overrun.[213] Congress refused.[213] The fall of Phuoc Binh and lack of American response left the South Vietnamese elite demoralized.
The speed of this success led the Politburo to reassess its strategy. It decided operations in the Central Highlands would be turned over to General Văn Tiến Dũng and that Pleiku should be seized, if possible. Dũng said to Lê Duẩn: "Never have we had military and political conditions so perfect or a strategic advantage as great as we have now."[214] At the start of 1975, the South Vietnamese had three times as much artillery and twice as many tanks and armored vehicles as the PAVN. However, heightened oil prices meant many assets could not be leveraged. Moreover, the rushed nature of Vietnamization, intended to cover the US retreat, resulted in a lack of spare parts, ground-crew, and maintenance personnel, which rendered most of it inoperable.[189]: 362–366
On 10 March 1975, Dũng launched Campaign 275, a limited offensive into the Central Highlands, supported by tanks and heavy artillery. The target was Ban Ma Thuột; if the town could be taken, the provincial capital Pleiku and the road to the coast, would be exposed for a campaign in 1976. The ARVN proved incapable of resisting the onslaught, and its forces collapsed. Again, Hanoi was surprised by the speed of their success. Dung urged the Politburo to allow him to seize Pleiku immediately and turn his attention to Kon Tum. He argued that with two months of good weather until onset of the monsoon, it would be irresponsible not to take advantage.[7]
Thiệu, a former general, ordered the abandonment of the Central Highlands and less defensible positions in a rushed policy described as "light at the top, heavy at the bottom". While the bulk of ARVN forces attempted to flee, isolated units fought desperately. ARVN general Phu abandoned Pleiku and Kon Tum and retreated toward the coast, in what became known as the "convoy of tears".[25]: 693–694 On 20 March, Thiệu reversed himself and ordered Huế, Vietnam's third-largest city, be held at all costs, and then changed policy several times. As the PAVN launched their attack, panic set in, and ARVN resistance withered. On 22 March, the PAVN attacked Huế. Civilians flooded the airport and docks hoping for escape. As resistance in Huế collapsed, PAVN rockets rained down on Da Nang and its airport. By 28 March 35,000 PAVN troops were poised to attack the suburbs. By 30 March 100,000 leaderless ARVN troops surrendered as the PAVN marched through Da Nang. With the fall of the city, the defense of the Central Highlands and Northern provinces ended.[25]: 699–700
Final North Vietnamese offensive
Further information on the final North Vietnamese offensive: Ho Chi Minh Campaign
With the north half of the country under their control, the Politburo ordered Dũng to launch the final offensive against Saigon. The operational plan for the Ho Chi Minh Campaign called for Saigon's capture before 1 May. Hanoi wished to avoid the coming monsoon and prevent redeployment of ARVN forces defending the capital. PAVN forces, their morale boosted by their recent victories, rolled on, taking Nha Trang, Cam Ranh and Da Lat.[25]: 702–704
On 7 April, three PAVN divisions attacked Xuân Lộc, 40 miles (64 km) northeast of Saigon. For two weeks, fighting raged as the ARVN defenders made a last stand to try to block PAVN advance. On 21 April, however, the exhausted garrison was ordered to withdraw towards Saigon.[25]: 704–707 An embittered and tearful TThiệu resigned, declaring that the US had betrayed South Vietnam. In a scathing attack, he suggested Kissinger had tricked him into signing the Paris peace agreement, promising military aid that failed to materialize. Having transferred power to Trần Văn Hương on 21 April, he left for Taiwan.[25]: 714 After having appealed unsuccessfully to Congress for $722 million in emergency aid for South Vietnam, Ford gave a televised speech on 23 April, declaring an end to the War and US aid.[215][216]
By the end of April, the ARVN had collapsed except in the Mekong Delta. Refugees streamed southward, ahead of the main PAVN onslaught. By 27 April, 100,000 PAVN troops encircled Saigon. The city was defended by about 30,000 ARVN troops. To hasten a collapse and foment panic, the PAVN shelled Tan Son Nhut Airport and forced its closure. With the runways closed, large numbers of civilians had no way out.[25]: 716
Victorious PAVN troops at the Presidential Palace, Saigon
Chaos and panic broke out as South Vietnamese officials and civilians scrambled to leave. Martial law was declared. American helicopters began evacuating South Vietnamese, US and foreign nationals from Tan Son Nhut and the U.S. embassy compound. Operation Frequent Wind had been delayed until the last possible moment, because of Ambassador Graham Martin's belief Saigon could be held and a political settlement reached. Frequent Wind was the largest helicopter evacuation in history. It began on 29 April, in an atmosphere of desperation, as hysterical crowds of Vietnamese vied for limited space. Frequent Wind continued around the clock, as PAVN tanks breached defenses near Saigon. In the early morning of 30 April, the last US Marines evacuated the embassy by helicopter, as civilians swamped the perimeter and poured into the grounds.[25]: 718–720
On 30 April 1975, PAVN troops entered Saigon and overcame all resistance, capturing key buildings and installations.[1] Tanks from the 2nd Corps crashed through the gates of the Independence Palace and the VC flag was raised above it.[217] President Dương Văn Minh, who had succeeded Huong two days earlier, surrendered to Lieutenant colonel Bùi Văn Tùng, political commissar of the 203rd Tank Brigade.[218][219][220]: 95–96 Minh was then escorted to Radio Saigon to announce the surrender declaration.[221]: 85 The statement was on air at 2:30 pm.[220]
During the course of the war a large segment of Americans became opposed to U.S. involvement. In January 1967, only 32% of Americans thought the US had made a mistake in sending troops.[222] Public opinion steadily turned against the war following 1967 and by 1970 only a third believed the U.S. had not made a mistake by sending troops.[223][224]
Early opposition to US involvement drew its inspiration from the Geneva Conference of 1954. American support of Diệm in refusing elections was seen as thwarting the democracy America claimed to support. Kennedy, while senator, opposed involvement.[144] It is possible to specify groups who led the anti-war movement at its peak in the late 1960s and the reasons why. Many young people protested because they were being drafted, while others were against because the anti-war movement grew popular among the counterculture. Some advocates within the peace movement advocated a unilateral withdrawal of forces. Opposition to the war tended to unite groups opposed to U.S. anti-communism and imperialism,[225] and for those involved with the New Left. Others, such as Stephen Spiro, opposed the war based on the theory of Just War. Some wanted to show solidarity with the people of Vietnam, such as Norman Morrison emulating Thích Quảng Đức.
High-profile opposition to the war increasingly turned to mass protests to shift public opinion. Riots broke out at the 1968 Democratic National Convention.[25]: 514 After reports of American military abuses, such as the My Lai Massacre, brought attention and support to the anti-war movement, some veterans joined Vietnam Veterans Against the War. On 15 October 1969, the Vietnam Moratorium attracted millions of Americans.[226] The fatal shooting of four students at Kent State University in 1970 led to nationwide university protests.[227] Anti-war protests declined after the Paris Peace Accords and the end of the draft in January 1973, and the withdrawal of American troops.
China provided significant support for North Vietnam when the US started to intervene, including financial aid and the deployment of hundreds of thousands of military personnel in support roles. China said its military and economic aid to North Vietnam totaled $20 billion ($160 billion adjusted for 2022 prices) during the Vietnam War;[6] included were 5 million tons of food to North Vietnam (equivalent to a year's food production), accounting for 10–15% of their food supply by the 1970s.[6]
In the summer of 1962, Mao Zedong agreed to supply Hanoi with 90,000 rifles and guns free of charge, and starting in 1965, China began sending anti-aircraft units and engineering battalions, to repair the damage caused by American bombing. They helped man anti-aircraft batteries, rebuild roads and railroads, transport supplies, and perform other engineering works. This freed PAVN units for combat. China sent 320,000 troops and annual arms shipments worth $180 million.[228]: 135 China claims to have caused 38% of American air losses in the war.[6] China also began financing the Khmer Rouge as a counterweight to North Vietnam. China "armed and trained" the Khmer Rouge during the civil war, and continued to aid them afterward.[229]
Soviet anti-air instructors and North Vietnamese crewmen in the spring of 1965 at an anti-aircraft training center in Vietnam
The Soviet Union supplied North Vietnam with medical supplies, arms, tanks, planes, helicopters, artillery, anti-aircraft missiles and other military equipment. Soviet crews fired Soviet-made surface-to-air missiles at US aircraft in 1965.[230] Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russian officials acknowledged that the USSR had stationed up to 3,000 troops in Vietnam.[231]
According to Russian sources, between 1953 and 1991, the hardware donated by the Soviet Union included: 2,000 tanks; 1,700 APCs; 7,000 artillery guns; over 5,000 anti-aircraft guns; 158 surface-to-air missile launchers; and 120 helicopters. In total, the Soviets sent North Vietnam annual arms shipments worth $450 million.[232][25]: 364–371 From July 1965 to the end of 1974, fighting in Vietnam was observed by some 6,500 officers and generals, as well as more than 4,500 soldiers and sergeants of the Soviet Armed Forces, amounting to 11,000 military personnel.[233] The KGB helped develop the signals intelligence capabilities of the North Vietnamese.[234]
As South Vietnam was formally part of a military alliance with the US, Australia, New Zealand, France, the UK, Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines, the alliance was invoked during the war. The UK, France and Pakistan declined to participate, and South Korea, Taiwan, and Spain were non-treaty participants.
United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races
The ethnic minority peoples of South Vietnam, like the Montagnards in the Central Highlands, the Hindu and Muslim Cham, and the Buddhist Khmer Krom, were actively recruited in the war. There was a strategy of recruitment and favorable treatment of Montagnard tribes for the VC, as they were pivotal for control of infiltration routes.[235] Some groups split off and formed the United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races (FULRO) to fight for autonomy or independence. FULRO fought against the South Vietnamese and VC, later fighting against the unified Socialist Republic of Vietnam, after the fall of South Vietnam.
During the war, South Vietnamese president Diem began a program to settle ethnic Vietnamese Kinh on Montagnard lands in the Central Highlands region. This provoked a backlash from the Montagnards, some joining the VC as a result. The Cambodians under pro-China Sihanouk and pro-American Lon Nol, supported their fellow co-ethnic Khmer Krom in South Vietnam, following an anti-ethnic Vietnamese policy. Following Vietnamization, many Montagnard groups and fighters were incorporated into the South Vietnamese Rangers as border sentries.
Many war crimes took place, by both sides, including: rape, massacres of civilians, bombings of civilian targets, terrorism, torture, and murder of prisoners of war. Additional common crimes included theft, arson, and the destruction of property not warranted by military necessity.[236]
In 1966, the Russell Tribunal was organized by a number of public figures opposed to the war led by Bertrand Russell in an effort to apply the precepts of international law to the actions of the United States and its allies in Vietnam. The tribunal found the US and its allies guilty of acts of aggression, use of weapons forbidden by the laws of war, bombardment of targets of a purely civilian character, mistreatment of prisoners, and genocide. Though the tribunal's lack of juridical authority meant its findings were largely ignored by the United States and other governments, the hearings contributed to a growing body of evidence and documentation which established the factual basis for a counter-narrative to the United States' justifications for the war and inspired future hearings, tribunals and legal investigations.[237]
In 1968, the Vietnam War Crimes Working Group (VWCWG) was established by the Pentagontask force set up in the wake of the My Lai Massacre, to ascertain the veracity of emerging claims of US war crimes. Of the war crimes reported to military authorities, sworn statements by witnesses and status reports indicated 320 incidents had a factual basis.[238] The substantiated cases included seven massacres between 1967 and 1971 in which at least 137 civilians were killed; 78 further attacks targeting non-combatants resulting in at least 57 deaths, 56 wounded and 15 sexually assaulted; and 141 cases of US soldiers torturing civilian detainees, or prisoners of war with fists, sticks, bats, water or electric shock. Journalists since have documented overlooked and uninvestigated war crimes, involving every active army division,[238] including atrocities committed by Tiger Force.[239]R. J. Rummel estimated that American forces committed around 5,500 democidal killings between 1960 and 1972.[30]
US forces established free-fire zones to prevent VC fighters from sheltering in South Vietnamese villages.[240] Such practice, which involved the assumption that anyone appearing in the designated zones was an enemy combatant that could be freely targeted by weapons, was regarded by journalist Lewis Simons as "a severe violation of the laws of war".[241]Nick Turse argues that a relentless drive toward higher body counts, widespread use of free-fire zones, rules of engagement where civilians who ran from soldiers or helicopters could be viewed as VC and disdain for Vietnamese civilians, led to massive civilian casualties and war crimes inflicted by US troops.[242]: 251 One example cited by Turse is Operation Speedy Express, which was described by John Paul Vann as, in effect, "many Mỹ Lais".[242]: 251 A report by Newsweek magazine suggested that at least 5,000 civilians may have been killed during six months of the operation, and there were 748 recovered weapons and an official US military body count of 10,889 enemy combatants killed.[243]
Rummel estimated that 39,000 were killed by South Vietnam during the Diem-era in democide; for 1964–75, Rummel estimated 50,000 people were killed in democide. Thus, the total for 1954 to 1975 is about 80,000 deaths caused by South Vietnam.[30]Benjamin Valentino estimates 110,000–310,000 deaths as a "possible case" of "counter-guerrilla mass killings" by US and South Vietnamese forces.[244] The Phoenix Program, coordinated by the CIA and involving US and South Vietnamese security forces, was aimed at destroying the political infrastructure of the VC. The program killed 26,000 to 41,000 people, with an unknown number being innocent civilians.[156]: 341–343 [245][246][247]
Torture and ill-treatment were frequently applied by the South Vietnamese to POWs, as well as civilian prisoners.[248]: 77 During their visit to the Con Son Prison in 1970, US congressmen Augustus Hawkins and William R. Anderson witnessed detainees either confined in minute "tiger cages" or chained to their cells, and provided with poor-quality food. American doctors inspecting the prison found many inmates suffering symptoms resulting from forced immobility and torture.[248]: 77 During their visits to US detention facilities in 1968 and 1969, the International Red Cross recorded many cases of torture and inhumane treatment before the captives were handed over to South Vietnamese authorities.[248]: 78 Torture was conducted by the South Vietnamese government in collusion with the CIA.[249][250]
Ami Pedahzur has written that "the overall volume and lethality of Viet Cong terrorism rivals or exceeds all but a handful of terrorist campaigns waged over the last third of the twentieth century", based on the definition of terrorists as a non-state actor, and examining targeted killings and civilian deaths which are estimated at over 18,000 from 1966 to 1969.[252] The US Department of Defense estimates the VC/PAVN had conducted 36,000 murders and 58,000 kidnappings from 1967 to 1972, c. 1973.[253] Benjamin Valentino attributes 45,000–80,000 "terrorist mass killings" to the VC.[244] Statistics for 1968–1972 suggest "about 80 percent of the terrorist victims were ordinary civilians and only about 20 percent were government officials, policemen, members of the self-defence forces or pacification cadres."[19]: 273 VC tactics included frequent mortaring of civilians in refugee camps, and placing of mines on highways frequented by villagers taking goods to urban markets. Some mines were set only to go off after heavy vehicle passage, causing slaughter aboard packed civilian buses.[19]: 270–279
Notable VC atrocities include the massacre of over 3,000 unarmed civilians at Huế[254] during the Tet Offensive and the killing of 252 civilians during the Đắk Sơn massacre.[255] 155,000 refugees fleeing the final North Vietnamese Spring Offensive were reported to have been killed, or abducted, on the road to Tuy Hòa in 1975.[256] PAVN/VC troops killed 164,000 civilians in democide between 1954 and 1975 in South Vietnam.[30] North Vietnam was known for its abusive treatment of American POWs, most notably in Hỏa Lò Prison (the Hanoi Hilton), where torture was employed to extract confessions.[92]: 655
Women were active in a large variety of roles, making significant impacts and the war having significant impacts on them.[257][258][259] Several million Vietnamese women served in the military and in militias, particularly in the VC, with the slogan "when war comes, even the women must fight" being widely used.[260] These women made vital contributions on the Ho Chi Minh Trail, espionage, medical care, logistical and administrative work, and sometimes direct combat.[261][262] Women workers took on more roles in the economy and Vietnam saw an increase in women's rights.[263] In Vietnam and elsewhere, women emerged as leaders of anti-war peace campaigns and made significant contributions to war journalism.[264]
However, women still faced significant levels of discrimination during and were often targets of sexual violence and war crimes.[265] Post-war, some Vietnamese women veterans faced difficulty reintegrating into society and having their contributions recognised, as well as advances in women's rights failing to be sustained.[266][267] Portrayals of the war have been criticised for their depictions of women, both for overlooking the role women played and reducing Vietnamese women to racist stereotypes.[268][269] Women are at the forefront of campaigns to deal with the war's aftermath, such as the long-terms effect of Agent Orange use and the Lai Đại Hàn.[270][271][272]
The experience of African-American military personnel has received significant attention. The site "African-American Involvement in the Vietnam War" compiles examples,[273] as does the work of journalist Wallace Terry whose book Bloods: An Oral History of the Vietnam War by Black Veterans, includes observations about the impact on the black community and black servicemen. He notes: the higher proportion of combat casualties among African-American servicemen than other races, the shift toward and different attitudes of black military volunteers and conscripts, the discrimination encountered by black servicemen "on the battlefield in decorations, promotion and duty assignments", as well as having to endure "the racial insults, cross-burnings and Confederate flags of their white comrades"—and the experiences faced by black soldiers stateside, during the war and after withdrawal.[274]
Civil rights leaders protested the disproportionate casualties and overrepresentation in hazardous duty, experienced by African American servicemen, prompting reforms that were implemented beginning in 1967. As a result, by the war's completion in 1975, black casualties had declined to 13% of US combat deaths, approximately equal to percentage of draft-eligible black men, though still slightly higher than the 10% who served in the military.[275]
The PAVN/VC, although having inherited US, French, and Japanese weapons from World War II and the First Indochina War, were largely armed and supplied by China, the Soviet Union, and its Warsaw Pact allies. Some weapons—notably anti-personnel explosives, the K-50M, and "home-made" versions of the RPG-2—were manufactured in North Vietnam. By 1969 the US Army had identified 40 rifle/carbine types, 22 machine gun types, 17 types of mortar, 20 recoilless rifle or rocket launcher types, nine types of antitank weapons, and 14 anti-aircraft artillery weapons used by ground troops on all sides. Also in use, mostly by anti-communist forces, were 24 types of armored vehicles and self-propelled artillery, and 26 types of field artillery and rocket launchers.
The US dropped over 7 million tons of bombs on Indochina during the war, more than triple the 2.1 million tons it dropped on Europe and Asia during World War II, and more than ten times the amount during the Korean War. 500 thousand tons were dropped on Cambodia, 1 million tons on North Vietnam, and 4 million tons on South Vietnam. On a per person basis, the 2 million tons dropped on Laos make it the most heavily bombed country in history; The New York Times noted this was "nearly a ton for every person in Laos."[142] Due to the particularly heavy impact of cluster bombs, Laos was a strong advocate of the Convention on Cluster Munitions to ban the weapons, and was host to its first meeting in 2010.[276]
Former US Air Force official Earl Tilford recounted "repeated bombing runs of a lake in central Cambodia. The B-52s literally dropped their payloads in the lake." The Air Force ran many missions like this to secure additional funding during budget negotiations, so the tonnage expended does not directly correlate with the resulting damage.[277]
Estimates of casualties vary, with one source suggesting up to 3.8 million violent war deaths in Vietnam for 1955 to 2002.[279][280][281][4] A demographic study calculated 791,000–1,141,000 war-related deaths during the war for all of Vietnam, for military and civilians.[18] Between 195,000 and 430,000 South Vietnamese civilians died in the war.[19]: 450–453 [29] Extrapolating from a 1969 US intelligence report, Guenter Lewy estimated 65,000 North Vietnamese civilians died.[19]: 450–453 Estimates of civilian deaths caused by American bombing of North Vietnam range from 30,000[7]: 176, 617 to 182,000.[20] A 1975 US Senate subcommittee estimated 1.4 million South Vietnamese civilians casualties during the war, including 415,000 deaths.[242]: 12 The military of South Vietnam suffered an estimated 254,256 killed between 1960 and 1974, and additional deaths from 1954 to 1959 and in 1975.[31]: 275 Other estimates point to higher figures of 313,000 casualties.[85][44][18][45][46][47]
The official US Department of Defense figure for PAVN/VC killed in Vietnam from 1965 to 1974 was 950,765. Officials believed these body count figures need to be deflated by 30 percent. Guenter Lewy asserts that one-third of the reported "enemy" killed may have been civilians, concluding that the actual number of deaths of PAVN/VC military forces was probably closer to 444,000.[19]: 450–453
According to figures released by the Vietnamese government there were 849,018 confirmed military deaths on the PAVN/VC side.[22][23] The Vietnamese government released its estimate of war deaths for the more lengthy period of 1955 to 1975. This figure includes battle deaths of Vietnamese soldiers in the Laotian and Cambodian Civil Wars, in which the PAVN was a major participant. Non-combat deaths account for 30-40% of these.[22] However, the figures do not include deaths of South Vietnamese and allied soldiers.[43] These do not include the estimated 300,000–500,000 PAVN/VC missing in action. Vietnamese government figures estimate 1.1 million dead and 300,000 missing from 1945 to 1979, with approximately 849,000 dead and 232,000 missing from 1960 to 1975.[21]
US reports of "enemy KIA", referred to as body count, were thought to have been subject to "falsification and glorification", and a true estimate of PAVN/VC combat deaths is difficult to assess, as US victories were assessed by having a "greater kill ratio".[282][283] It was difficult to distinguish between civilians and military personnel in the VC, as many were part-time guerrillas or impressed laborers who did not wear uniforms[284][285] and civilians killed were sometimes written off as enemy killed, because high enemy casualties was directly tied to promotions and commendation.[184]: 649–650 [286][287]
Between 275,000[46] and 310,000[47] Cambodians were estimated to have died, including between 50,000 and 150,000 combatants and civilians from US bombings.[288] 20,000–62,000 Laotians died,[44] and 58,281 U.S. military personnel were killed,[33] of which 1,584 are still listed as missing as of March 2021[update].[289]
On 2 July 1976, North and South Vietnam were merged to form the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.[290] Despite speculation that the victorious North Vietnamese would, in Nixon's words, "massacre the civilians there [South Vietnam] by the millions," no mass executions took place.[291][A 12]
Vietnamese refugees fleeing Vietnam, 1984
However many South Vietnamese were sent to re-education camps where they endured torture, starvation, and disease while being forced to perform hard labor.[294][295] According to Amnesty International, this figure varied depending on different observers: "..."50,000 to 80,000" (Le Monde, April 1978), "150,000" (Reuters from Bien Hoa, November 1977), "150,000 to 200,000" (The Washington Post, December 1978), and "300,000" (Agence France Presse from Hanoi, February 1978)."[296] Such variations are because "Some estimates may include not only detainees but also people sent from the cities to the countryside." According to a native observer, 443,360 people had to register for a period in re-education camps in Saigon alone, and while some were released after a few days, others stayed for more than a decade.[297] Between 1975 and 1980, more than 1 million northerners migrated south, to regions formerly in the Republic of Vietnam, while, as part of the New Economic Zones program, around 750,000 to over 1 million southerners were moved mostly to mountainous forested areas.[298][299]Gabriel García Márquez, a Nobel Prize winning writer, described South Vietnam as a "False paradise" after the war, when he visited in 1980:
The cost of this delirium was stupefying: 360,000 people mutilated, a million widows, 500,000 prostitutes, 500,000 drug addicts, a million tuberculous and more than a million soldiers of the old regime, impossible to rehabilitate into a new society. Ten percent of the population of Ho Chi Minh City was suffering from serious venereal diseases when the war ended, and there were 4 million illiterates throughout the South.[300]
The US used its security council veto to block Vietnam's UN recognition three times, an obstacle to it receiving international aid.[301]
The relationship between Vietnam and Democratic Kampuchea (Cambodia) escalated after the end of the war. In response to the Khmer Rouge taking over Phu Quoc and Tho Chu, and the belief they were responsible for the disappearance of 500 Vietnamese natives on Tho Chu, Vietnam launched a counterattack to take back these islands.[305] After failed attempts to negotiate, Vietnam invaded Democratic Kampuchea in 1978 and ousted the Khmer Rouge, who were being supported by China, in the Cambodian–Vietnamese War. In response, China invaded Vietnam in 1979. The two countries fought a border war: the Sino-Vietnamese War. From 1978 to 1979, some 450,000 ethnic Chinese left Vietnam by boat as refugees or were deported.
The Pathet Lao overthrew the monarchy of Laos in December 1975, establishing the Lao People's Democratic Republic. The change in regime was "quite peaceful, a sort of Asiatic 'velvet revolution'"—although 30,000 former officials were sent to reeducation camps, often enduring harsh conditions.[95]: 575–576
Unexploded ordnance
Unexploded ordnance, mostly from US bombing, continues to kill people, and has rendered much land hazardous and impossible to cultivate. Ordnance has killed 42,000 people since the war ended.[306][307] In Laos, 80 million bombs failed to explode and still remain. Unexploded ordnance has killed or injured over 20,000 Laotians since the war and about 50 people are killed or maimed annually.[308][309] It is estimated the explosives buried will not be removed entirely for centuries.[161]: 317
Over 3 million people left Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in the Indochina refugee crisis after 1975. Most Asian countries were unwilling to accept them, many of whom fled by boat and were known as boat people.[310] Between 1975 and 1998, an estimated 1.2 million refugees from Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries resettled in the US, while Canada, Australia, and France resettled over 500,000, China accepted 250,000 people.[311] Laos experienced the largest refugee flight proportionally, 300,000 out of a population of 3 million crossed the border into Thailand. Included among their ranks were "about 90%" of Laos' "intellectuals, technicians, and officials."[95]: 575 An estimated 200,000 to 400,000 Vietnamese boat people died at sea, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.[312]
A young Marine private waits on the beach during the Marine landing, Da Nang, 3 August 1965
Failure of US goals is often placed at different institutions and levels. Some have suggested it was due to political failures of leadership.[313] Others point to a failure of military doctrine. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara stated that "the achievement of a military victory by U.S. forces in Vietnam was indeed a dangerous illusion."[81]: 368 The inability to bring Hanoi to the bargaining table by bombing illustrated another US miscalculation, and the limitations of military abilities in achieving political goals.[92]: 17 Army Chief of StaffHarold Keith Johnson noted, "if anything came out of Vietnam, it was that air power couldn't do the job."[314] General William Westmoreland admitted bombing had been ineffective, saying he doubted "that the North Vietnamese would have relented."[314] Kissinger wrote in a memo to President Ford that "in terms of military tactics ... our armed forces are not suited to this kind of war. Even the Special Forces who had been designed for it could not prevail."[315] Hanoi had persistently sought unification since the Geneva Accords, and the effects of US bombing had negligible impact on North Vietnam's goals.[161]: 1–10 US bombing mobilized people throughout North Vietnam and international support, due to the perception of a superpower attempting to bomb a significantly smaller, agrarian society into submission.[161]: 48–52
In the post-war era, Americans struggled to absorb the lessons of the military intervention. President Ronald Reagan coined the term "Vietnam Syndrome" to describe the reluctance of the American public and politicians to support military interventions abroad. US polling in 1978 revealed nearly 72% of Americans believed the war was "fundamentally wrong and immoral."[224]: 10 Six months after the beginning of Operation Rolling Thunder, Gallup, Inc. found 60% of Americans did not believe that sending troops to Vietnam was a mistake in September 1965, and only 24% believed it was. Subsequent polling did not find that a plurality of Americans believed that sending troops was a mistake until October 1967, and did not find a majority believing it was until August 1968, during the third phase of the Tet Offensive. Thereafter, Gallup found majorities believing sending troops was a mistake through the signing of the Peace Accords in January 1973, when 60% believed sending troops was a mistake, and retrospective polls by Gallup between 1990 and 2000, found 69-74% of Americans believed sending troops was a mistake.[316] The Vietnam War POW/MIA issue, concerning the fate of US service personnel listed as missing in action, persisted for years afterwards. The costs loom large in American consciousness; a 1990 poll showed the public incorrectly believed more Americans died in Vietnam than World War II.[317]
Financial cost
US expenditures in South Vietnam (1953–74) Direct costs only[318]
Military costs
Military aid
Economic aid
Total
Total (2015 dollars)
$111 billion
$16 billion
$7 billion
$135 billion
$1 trillion
Between 1953 and 1975, the US was estimated to have spent $168 billion on the war (equivalent to $1.7 trillion in 2023).[319] This resulted in a large budget deficit. Other figures point to $139 billion from 1965 to 1974 (not inflation-adjusted), 10 times all education spending in the US, and 50 times more than housing and community development spending within that period.[320] It was stated that war-spending could have paid off every mortgage in the US, with money leftover.[320] As of 2013[update], the US government pays Vietnam veterans and their families more than $22 billion a year in war-related claims.[321][322]
A marine gets his wounds treated during operations in Huế City, in 1968
More than 3 million Americans served in the war, 1.5 million of whom saw combat.[323] James Westheider wrote that "At the height of American involvement in 1968, for example, 543,000 American military personnel were stationed in Vietnam, but only 80,000 were considered combat troops."[324] Conscription in the US existed since World War II, but ended in 1973.[325][326]
58,220 American soldiers were killed,[A 7] more than 150,000 wounded, and at least 21,000 permanently disabled.[327] The average age of US troops killed was 23.[328] According to Dale Kueter, "Of those killed in combat, 86% were white, 13% were black..."[329] Approximately 830,000 veterans, 15%, suffered posttraumatic stress disorder.[327] This unprecedented number was because the military had routinely provided heavy psychoactive drugs to servicemen, which left them unable to process trauma.[330] Drug use, racial tensions, and the growing incidence of fragging—attempting to kill unpopular officers with grenades or other weapons—created problems for the military and impacted its capability to undertake operations.[331]: 44–47 125,000 Americans left for Canada to avoid the draft,[332] and approximately 50,000 servicemen deserted.[333] In 1977, President Jimmy Carter granted an unconditional pardon to all Vietnam-era draft evaders with Proclamation 4483.[334]
The war called into question army doctrine. Marine general Victor H. Krulak criticized Westmoreland's attrition strategy, calling it "wasteful of American lives... with small likelihood of a successful outcome."[314] Doubts surfaced about the ability of the military to train foreign forces. There was found to be considerable flaws and dishonesty by commanders, due to promotions being tied to the body count system touted by Westmoreland and McNamara.[152] Secretary of Defense McNamara wrote to President Johnson his doubts: "The picture of the world's greatest superpower killing or seriously injuring 1,000 noncombatants a week, while trying to pound a tiny backward nation into submission on an issue whose merits are hotly disputed, is not a pretty one."[335]
One of the most controversial aspects of the US military effort, was the widespread use of chemical defoliants between 1961 and 1971. 20 million gallons of toxic herbicides (like Agent Orange) were sprayed on 6 million acres of forests and crops by the air force.[63] They were used to defoliate large parts of the countryside to prevent the Viet Cong from being able to hide weaponry and encampments under the foliage, and deprive them of food. Defoliation was used to clear sensitive areas, including base perimeters and possible ambush sites along roads and canals. More than 20% of South Vietnam's forests and 3% of its cultivated land was sprayed at least once. 90% of herbicide use was directed at forest defoliation.[19]: 263 The chemicals used continue to change the landscape, cause diseases and birth defects, and poison the food chain.[336][337] US military records have listed figures including the destruction of 20% of the jungles of South Vietnam and 20-36% of the mangrove forests.[62] The environmental destruction caused was described by Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme, lawyers, historians and other academics as an ecocide.[64][338][60][339][61][340]
Agent Orange and similar chemical substances used by the US have caused many deaths and injuries in the intervening years, including among the US Air Force crews that handled them. Scientific reports have concluded that refugees exposed to chemical sprays while in South Vietnam continued to experience pain in the eyes and skin as well as gastrointestinal upsets. In one study, 92% of participants suffered incessant fatigue; others reported monstrous births.[341] Analysis of studies on the association between Agent Orange and birth defects, have found a statistically significant correlation such that having a parent who was exposed to Agent Orange at any point, will increase one's likelihood of possessing or acting as a genetic carrier of birth defects.[342] The most common deformity appears to be spina bifida. There is substantial evidence that birth defects carry on for three generations or more.[343] In 2012, the US and Vietnam began a cooperative cleaning toxic chemicals on Danang International Airport, marking the first time Washington has been involved in cleaning up Agent Orange in Vietnam.[344]
Handicapped children in Vietnam, most of them victims of Agent Orange, 2004
Vietnamese victims affected by Agent Orange attempted a class action lawsuit against Dow Chemical and other US chemical manufacturers, but a US District Court dismissed their case.[345] They appealed, but the dismissal was cemented in 2008 by an appeals court.[346] As of 2006[update], the Vietnamese government estimated there were over 4,000,000 victims of dioxin poisoning in Vietnam, although the US government denies any conclusive scientific links between Agent Orange and Vietnamese victims of dioxin poisoning. In some areas of southern Vietnam, dioxin levels remain at over 100 times the accepted international standard.[347] On 22 August 2024, the Paris Court of Appeals is expected to rule on the lawsuit filed by Tran To Nga against 14 US chemical corporations that supplied Agent Orange for the US military.[348]
Stone plaque with photo of the "Thương tiếc" (Mourning Soldier) statue, originally, installed at the Republic of Vietnam National Military Cemetery. The original statue was demolished in April 1975.
The war has featured extensively in television, film, video games, music and literature. In Vietnam, a notable film set during Operation Linebacker II was Girl from Hanoi (1974) depicting war-time life. Another notable work was the diary of Đặng Thùy Trâm, a North Vietnamese doctor who enlisted in the Southern battlefield, and was killed aged 27 by US forces near Quảng Ngãi. Her diaries were published in Vietnam as Đặng Thùy Trâm's Diary (Last Night I Dreamed of Peace), where it became a bestseller and was made into a film Don't Burn. In Vietnam, the diary has been compared to The Diary of Anne Frank, and both are used in literary education.[351]
Myths play a role in the historiography of the war, and have become part of the culture of the United States. Discussion of myth has focused on US experiences, but changing myths of war have played a role in Vietnamese and Australian historiography. Scholarship has focused on "myth-busting",[353]: 373 attacking orthodox and revisionist schools of American historiography, and challenging myths about American society and soldiery in the war.[353]: 373
Kuzmarov in The Myth of the Addicted Army: Vietnam and the Modern War on Drugs challenges the popular and Hollywood narrative that US soldiers were heavy drug users,[354] in particular the notion that the My Lai massacre was caused by drug use.[353]: 373 According to Kuzmarov, Nixon is primarily responsible for creating the drug myth.[353]: 374 Michael Allen in Until The Last Man Comes Home accuses Nixon of mythmaking, by exploiting the plight of the National League of POW/MIA Families to allow the government to appear caring, as the war was increasingly considered lost.[353]: 376 Allen's analysis ties the position of potential missing Americans, or prisoners into post-war politics and presidential elections, including the Swift boat controversy.[353]: 376–377
^ abDue to the early presence of US troops in Vietnam, the start date of the Vietnam War is a matter of debate. In 1998, after a high-level review by the Department of Defense (DoD) and through the efforts of Richard B. Fitzgibbon's family, the start date of the Vietnam War according to the US government was officially changed to 1 November 1955.[48] US government reports currently cite 1 November 1955 as the commencement date of the "Vietnam Conflict", because this date marked when the US Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in Indochina (deployed to Southeast Asia under President Truman) was reorganized into country-specific units and MAAG Vietnam was established.[49]: 20 Other start dates include when Hanoi authorized Viet Cong forces in South Vietnam to begin a low-level insurgency in December 1956,[50] whereas some view 26 September 1959, when the first battle occurred between the Viet Cong and the South Vietnamese army, as the start date.[51]
^According to Hanoi's official history, the Viet Cong was a branch of the People's Army of Vietnam.[2]
^Upper figure initial estimate, later thought to be inflated by at least 30% (lower figure)[18][19]: 450–453
^ abcThe figures of 58,220 and 303,644 for US deaths and wounded come from the Department of Defense Statistical Information Analysis Division (SIAD), Defense Manpower Data Center, as well as from a Department of Veterans fact sheet dated May 2010; the total is 153,303 WIA excluding 150,341 persons not requiring hospital care[57] the CRS (Congressional Research Service) Report for Congress, American War and Military Operations Casualties: Lists and Statistics, dated 26 February 2010,[58] and the book Crucible Vietnam: Memoir of an Infantry Lieutenant.[49]: 65, 107, 154, 217 Some other sources give different figures (e.g. the 2005/2006 documentary Heart of Darkness: The Vietnam War Chronicles 1945–1975 cited elsewhere in this article gives a figure of 58,159 US deaths,[59] and the 2007 book Vietnam Sons gives a figure of 58,226)[citation needed]
^Prior to this, the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Indochina (with an authorized strength of 128 men) was set up in September 1950 with a mission to oversee the use and distribution of US military equipment by the French and their allies.
^Shortly after the assassination of Kennedy, when McGeorge Bundy called Johnson on the phone, Johnson responded: "Goddammit, Bundy. I've told you that when I want you I'll call you."[132]
^A study by Jacqueline Desbarats and Karl D. Jackson estimated that 65,000 South Vietnamese were executed for political reasons between 1975 and 1983, based on a survey of 615 Vietnamese refugees who claimed to have personally witnessed 47 executions. However, "their methodology was reviewed and criticized as invalid by authors Gareth Porter and James Roberts." Sixteen of the 47 names used to extrapolate this "bloodbath" were duplicates; this extremely high duplication rate (34%) strongly suggests Desbarats and Jackson were drawing from a small number of total executions. Rather than arguing that this duplication rate proves there were very few executions in post-war Vietnam, Porter and Roberts suggest it is an artifact of the self-selected nature of the participants in the Desbarats-Jackson study, as the authors followed subjects' recommendations on other refugees to interview.[292] Nevertheless, there exist unverified reports of mass executions.[293]
References
The references for this article are grouped in three sections.
Citations: references for the in-line, numbered superscript references contained within the article.
Main sources: the main works used to build the content of the article, but not referenced as in-line citations.
^ abcdefghijklmnTucker, Spencer C (2011). The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social, and Military History. ABC-CLIO. ISBN978-1-85109-960-3.
^Blackburn, Robert M. (1994). Mercenaries and Lyndon Johnson's "More Flage": The Hiring of Korean, Filipino, and Thai Soldiers in the Vietnam War. McFarland. ISBN0-89950-931-2.
^ abcMoyar, Mark. "Triumph Regained: The Vietnam War, 1965–1968." Encounter Books, December 2022. Chapter 17 index: "Communists provided further corroboration of the proximity of their casualty figures to American figures in a postwar disclosure of total losses from 1960 to 1975. During that period, they stated, they lost 849,018 killed plus approximately 232,000 missing and 463,000 wounded. Casualties fluctuated considerably from year to year, but a degree of accuracy can be inferred from the fact that 500,000 was 59 percent of the 849,018 total and that 59 percent of the war's days had passed by the time of Fallaci's conversation with Giap. The killed in action figure comes from "Special Subject 4: The Work of Locating and Recovering the Remains of Martyrs From Now Until 2020 And Later Years," downloaded from the Vietnamese government website datafile on 1 December 2017. The above figures on missing and wounded were calculated using Hanoi's declared casualty ratios for the period of 1945 to 1979, during which time the Communists incurred 1.1 million killed, 300,000 missing, and 600,000 wounded. Ho Khang, ed, Lich Su Khang Chien Chong My, Cuu Nuoc 1954–1975, Tap VIII: Toan Thang (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Chinh Tri Quoc Gia, 2008), 463."
^James F. Dunnigan; Albert A. Nofi (2000). Dirty Little Secrets of the Vietnam War: Military Information You're Not Supposed to Know. Macmillan. ISBN978-0-312-25282-3.
^ abThayer, Thomas C. (1985). War Without Fronts: The American Experience in Vietnam. Westview Press. ISBN978-0-8133-7132-0.
^ abcdRummel, R. J. (1997), "Vietnam Democide", Freedom, Democracy, Peace; Power, Democide, and War, University of Hawaii System, archived from the original(GIF) on 13 March 2023 {{citation}}: Unknown parameter |loc= ignored (help)
^ abcClarke, Jeffrey J. (1988). United States Army in Vietnam: Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965–1973. Center of Military History, United States Army. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam suffered 254,256 recorded combat deaths between 1960 and 1974, with the highest number of recorded deaths being in 1972, with 39,587 combat deaths
^ abcHeuveline, Patrick (2001). "The Demographic Analysis of Mortality Crises: The Case of Cambodia, 1970–1979". Forced Migration and Mortality. National Academies Press. pp. 102–104, 120, 124. ISBN978-0-309-07334-9. As best as can now be estimated, over two million Cambodians died during the 1970s because of the political events of the decade, the vast majority of them during the mere four years of the 'Khmer Rouge' regime.... Subsequent reevaluations of the demographic data situated the death toll for the [civil war] in the order of 300,000 or less.
^ abcSliwinski, Marek (1995). Le Génocide Khmer Rouge: Une Analyse Démographique [The Khmer Rouge genocide: A demographic analysis]. L'Harmattan. pp. 42–43, 48. ISBN978-2-7384-3525-5.
^Li, Xiaobing (2010). Voices from the Vietnam War: Stories from American, Asian, and Russian Veterans. University Press of Kentucky. p. 85. ISBN978-0-8131-7386-3.
^ abZierler, David (2011). The invention of ecocide: agent orange, Vietnam, and the scientists who changed the way we think about the environment. Athens, Georgia: Univ. of Georgia Press. ISBN978-0-8203-3827-9.
^Meaker, Scott S.F. (2015). Unforgettable Vietnam War: The American War in Vietnam – War in the Jungle. ISBN978-1-312-93158-9.
^Burns, Robert (27 January 2018). "Grim reminders of a war in Vietnam, a generation later". Concord Monitor. Archived from the original on 28 January 2018. Retrieved 28 February 2019. It's been more than for 40-plus years, the war that Americans simply call Vietnam but the Vietnamese refer to as their Resistance War Against America.
^ abcKinzer, Stephen (2013). The Brothers: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and Their Secret World War. Macmillan. pp. 195–196. ISBN978-1-4299-5352-8.
^Dommen, Arthur J. (2001). The Indochinese Experience of the French and the Americans. Indiana University Press. p. 340. ISBN978-0-253-33854-9.
^Vu, Tuong (25 May 2007). "Newly released documents on the land reform". Vietnam Studies Group. Archived from the original on 20 April 2011. Retrieved 15 July 2016. There is no reason to expect, and no evidence that I have seen to demonstrate, that the actual executions were less than planned; in fact the executions perhaps exceeded the plan if we consider two following factors. First, this decree was issued in 1953 for the rent and interest reduction campaign that preceded the far more radical land redistribution and party rectification campaigns (or waves) that followed during 1954–1956. Second, the decree was meant to apply to free areas (under the control of the Viet Minh government), not to the areas under French control that would be liberated in 1954–1955 and that would experience a far more violent struggle. Thus the number of 13,500 executed people seems to be a low-end estimate of the real number. This is corroborated by Edwin Moise in his recent paper "Land Reform in North Vietnam, 1953–1956" presented at the 18th Annual Conference on SE Asian Studies, Center for SE Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley (February 2001). In this paper Moise (7–9) modified his earlier estimate in his 1983 book (which was 5,000) and accepted an estimate close to 15,000 executions. Moise made the case based on Hungarian reports provided by Balazs, but the document I cited above offers more direct evidence for his revised estimate. This document also suggests that the total number should be adjusted up some more, taking into consideration the later radical phase of the campaign, the unauthorized killings at the local level, and the suicides following arrest and torture (the central government bore less direct responsibility for these cases, however). cf. Szalontai, Balazs (November 2005). "Political and Economic Crisis in North Vietnam, 1955–56". Cold War History. 5 (4): 395–426. doi:10.1080/14682740500284630. S2CID153956945. cf. Vu, Tuong (2010). Paths to Development in Asia: South Korea, Vietnam, China, and Indonesia. Cambridge University Press. p. 103. ISBN978-1-139-48901-0. Clearly Vietnamese socialism followed a moderate path relative to China.... Yet the Vietnamese 'land reform' campaign... testified that Vietnamese communists could be as radical and murderous as their comrades elsewhere.
^Woodruff 2005, p. 6 states: "The elections were not held. South Vietnam, which had not signed the Geneva Accords, did not believe the Communists in North Vietnam would allow a fair election. In January 1957, the International Control Commission (ICC), comprising observers from India, Poland, and Canada, agreed with this perception, reporting that neither South nor North Vietnam had honored the armistice agreement. With the French gone, a return to the traditional power struggle between north and south had begun again."
^Galbraith, John Kenneth (1971). "Memorandum to President Kennedy from John Kenneth Galbraith on Vietnam, 4 April 1962". The Pentagon Papers (Gravel Edition), Volume 2. Boston: Beacon Press. pp. 669–671.
^Blaufarb, Douglas S. (1977). The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance, 1950 to the Present. Free Press. p. 119. ISBN978-0-02-903700-3.
^Warner, Roger (1996). Shooting at the Moon The story of America's clandestine war in Laos. Steerforth Press. ISBN978-1-883642-36-5.
^Karnow 1997, pp. 336–339. Johnson viewed many members that he inherited from Kennedy's cabinet with distrust because he had never penetrated their circle during Kennedy's presidency; to Johnson's mind, those like W. Averell Harriman and Dean Acheson spoke a different language.
^VanDeMark, Brian (1995). Into the Quagmire. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 13.
^Karnow 1997, p. 339. Before a small group, including Henry Cabot Lodge, Johnson also said, "We should stop playing cops and robbers [a reference to Diệm's failed leadership] and get back to... winning the war... tell the generals in Saigon that Lyndon Johnson intends to stand by our word... [to] win the contest against the externally directed and supported Communist conspiracy."
^Karnow 1997, p. 339: "At a place called Hoa Phu, for example, the strategic hamlet built during the previous summer now looked like it had been hit by a hurricane.... Speaking through an interpreter, a local guard explained to me that a handful of Viet Cong agents had entered the hamlet one night and told the peasants to tear it down and return to their native villages. The peasants complied without question."
^Hunt, Michael (2016). The World Transformed – 1945 to the Present. New York: Oxford. pp. 169–171. ISBN978-0-19-937102-0.
^Kutler, Stanley I. (1996). Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War. Charles Scribner's Sons. p. 249. ISBN978-0-13-276932-7.
^Vietnam War After Action Reports. BACM Research. p. 84.
^ abKahin, George; Lewis, John W. (1967). The United States in Vietnam: An analysis in depth of the history of America's involvement in Vietnam. Delta Books.
^Moyar, Mark (2006). Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954–1965. Cambridge University Press. p. 339. ISBN978-0-521-86911-9.
^ abMcNeill, Ian (1993). To Long Tan: The Australian Army and the Vietnam War 1950–1966. Allen & Unwin. ISBN978-1-86373-282-6.
^Ward, Geoffrey C.; Burns, Ken (5 September 2017). The Vietnam War: An Intimate History. Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. p. 125. ISBN978-1-5247-3310-0. By the end of the year, more than 125,000 civilians in the province had lost their homes...
^ abcdefgWard, Geoffrey C.; Burns, Ken (2017). The Vietnam War: An Intimate History. Alfred A. Knopf. ISBN978-0-307-70025-4.
^ abcdefghiNguyen, Lien-Hang T. (2012). Hanoi's War: An International History of the War for Peace in Vietnam. Univ of North Carolina Press. ISBN978-1-4696-2835-6.
^ abAnkony, Robert C. (2009). Lurps: A Ranger's Diary of Tet, Khe Sanh, A Shau, and Quang Tri. Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group. ISBN978-0-7618-3281-2.
^ abTriều, Họ Trung (5 June 2017). "Lực lượng chính trị và đấu tranh chính trị ở thị xã Nha Trang trong cuộc Tổng tiến công và nổi dậy Tết Mậu Thân 1968". Hue University Journal of Science: Social Sciences and Humanities. 126 (6). doi:10.26459/hujos-ssh.v126i6.3770 (inactive 1 November 2024). ISSN2588-1213.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: DOI inactive as of November 2024 (link)
^Eyraud, Henri (March 1987). "Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States, and the Modern Historical Experience. By Kolko Gabriel. [New York: Pantheon Books, 1985. 628 pp.]". The China Quarterly. 109: 135. doi:10.1017/s0305741000017653. ISSN0305-7410. S2CID154919829.
^ abcWitz (1994). The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War. Cornell University Press. pp. 1–2. ISBN978-0-8014-8209-0.
^Berman, Larry (1991). Lyndon Johnson's War. W.W. Norton. p. 116.
^Sorley, Lewis (1999). A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam. Harvest. pp. 11–6. ISBN0-15-601309-6.
^Johns, Andrew (2010). Vietnam's Second Front: Domestic Politics, the Republican Party, and the War. University Press of Kentucky. p. 198. ISBN978-0-8131-7369-6.
^Van Ness, Peter (December 1986). "Richard Nixon, the Vietnam War, and the American Accommodation with China: A Review Article". Contemporary Southeast Asia. 8 (3): 231–245. JSTOR25797906.
^"Ho Chi Minh Dies of Heart Attack in Hanoi". The Times. 4 September 1969. p. 1.
^ abcdCurrey, Cecil B. (2005). Victory at Any Cost: The Genius of Viet Nam's Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap. Potomac Books, Inc. p. 272. ISBN978-1-57488-742-6.
^Kiernan, Ben (February 2017). Viet Nam: A History from Earliest Times to the Present. Oxford University Press. p. 447.
^ abcdeStanton, Shelby L. (2007). The Rise and Fall of an American Army: U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1963–1973. Random House Publishing Group. ISBN978-0-307-41734-3.
^Kaminsky, Arnold P.; Long, Roger D. (2016). Nationalism and Imperialism in South and Southeast Asia: Essays Presented to Damodar R.SarDesai. Routledge. ISBN978-1-351-99742-3.
^Solis, Gary D. (2010). The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War. Cambridge University Press. pp. 301–303. ISBN978-1-139-48711-5.
^Lewis M. Simons. "Free Fire Zones". Crimes of War. Archived from the original on 19 October 2016. Retrieved 5 October 2016.
^ abcTurse, Nick (2013). Kill Anything That Moves: The Real American War in Vietnam. Metropolitan Books. ISBN978-0-8050-8691-1.
^Kevin Buckley (19 June 1972). "Pacification's Deadly Price". Newsweek. pp. 42–43. Archived from the original on 10 May 2012. Retrieved 30 October 2015.
^Wiesner, Louis (1988). Victims and Survivors: Displaced Persons and Other War Victims in Viet-Nam, 1954–1975. Greenwood Press. pp. 318–319. ISBN978-0-313-26306-4.
^Werner, Jayne (1981). "Women, Socialism, and the Economy of Wartime North Vietnam". Studies in Comparative Communism. 16: 165–90. doi:10.1016/0039-3592(81)90005-3.
^Appy, Christian (1993). Working-class War: American Combat Soldiers and Vietnam. The University of North Carolina Press. ISBN978-0-8078-6011-3.
^"Disarmament". The United Nations Office at Geneva. United Nations. November 2011. Archived from the original on 21 September 2013. Retrieved 20 September 2013.
^"Vietnam War U.S. Military Fatal Casualty Statistics, Electronic Records Reference Report". U.S. National Archives. 30 April 2019. DCAS Vietnam Conflict Extract File record counts by CASUALTY CATEGORY (as of April 29, 2008). Retrieved 2 August 2021. (generated from the Vietnam Conflict Extract Data File of the Defense Casualty Analysis System (DCAS) Extract Files (as of 29 April 2008))
^Aman, Mohammed M. (April 1993). "General H. Norman Schwarzkopf: The Autobiography: It Doesn't Take a Hero; H. Norman Schwarzkopf with Peter Petre". Digest of Middle East Studies. 2 (2): 90–94. doi:10.1111/j.1949-3606.1993.tb00951.x. ISSN1060-4367.
^Elliot, Duong Van Mai (2010). "The End of the War". RAND in Southeast Asia: A History of the Vietnam War Era. RAND Corporation. pp. 499, 512–513. ISBN978-0-8330-4754-0.
^Elliot, Duong Van Mai (2010). "The End of the War". RAND in Southeast Asia: A History of the Vietnam War Era. RAND Corporation. pp. 512–513. ISBN978-0-8330-4754-0. cf. Porter, Gareth; Roberts, James (Summer 1988). "Creating a Bloodbath by Statistical Manipulation: A Review of A Methodology for Estimating Political Executions in Vietnam, 1975–1983, Jacqueline Desbarats; Karl D. Jackson". Pacific Affairs. 61 (2): 303–310. doi:10.2307/2759306. JSTOR2759306.
^Desbarats, Jacqueline (1987). Repression in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Executions and Population Relocation. Indochina report ; no. 11. Singapore: Executive Publications.
^The Documentation Center of Cambodia has mapped some 23,745 mass graves containing approximately 1.3 million suspected victims of execution; execution is believed to account for roughly 60% of the full death toll. See: Seybolt, Taylor B.; Aronson, Jay D.; Fischoff, Baruch (2013). Counting Civilian Casualties: An Introduction to Recording and Estimating Nonmilitary Deaths in Conflict. Oxford University Press. p. 238. ISBN978-0-19-997731-4.
^Ben Kiernan cites a range of 1.671 to 1.871 million excess deaths under the Khmer Rouge. See Kiernan, Ben (December 2003). "The Demography of Genocide in Southeast Asia: The Death Tolls in Cambodia, 1975–79, and East Timor, 1975–80". Critical Asian Studies. 35 (4): 585–597. doi:10.1080/1467271032000147041. S2CID143971159.
^Farrell, Epsey Cooke (1998). The Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the law of the sea: an analysis of Vietnamese behavior within the emerging international oceans regime. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. ISBN90-411-0473-9.
^Robinson, William (1998). Terms of refuge: the Indochinese exodus & the international response. Zed Books. p. 127. ISBN978-1-85649-610-0.
^Nghia, M. Vo (2006). The Vietnamese Boat People, 1954 and 1975–1992. McFarland & Company. ISBN978-0-7864-2345-3.
^Lippman, Thomas W. (9 April 1995). "McNamara Writes Vietnam Mea Culpa". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 28 December 2019. Retrieved 28 March 2020. As recounted by McNamara... the war could and should have been avoided and should have been halted at several key junctures, one as early as 1963. According to McNamara, he and other senior advisers to President Lyndon B. Johnson failed to head it off through ignorance, inattention, flawed thinking, political expediency and lack of courage.
^Combat Area Casualty File, November 1993. (The CACF is the basis for the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, i.e. The Wall), Center for Electronic Records, National Archives, Washington, DC
^Kueter, Dale (2007). Vietnam Sons: For Some, the War Never Ended. AuthorHouse. ISBN978-1-4259-6931-8.
^Roberts 2005, p. 380 In his 234-page judgment, the judge observed: "Despite the fact that Congress and the President were fully advised of a substantial belief that the herbicide spraying in Vietnam was a violation of international law, they acted on their view that it was not a violation at the time."
^Administration, US Department of Veterans Affairs, Veterans Health. "VA.gov | Veterans Affairs". www.publichealth.va.gov. Retrieved 10 September 2023.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
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^Kuzmarov, Jeremy (2009). The Myth of the Addicted Army: Vietnam and the Modern War on Drugs. Univ of Massachusetts Press. pp. 3–4. ISBN978-1-55849-705-4.
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