United Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc.
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued October 10, 1990 Decided March 21, 1991
Full case name	International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers Of America, UAW, et al. vs. Johnson Controls, Inc.
Docket no.	89-1215
Citations	499 U.S. 187 (more) 111 S. Ct. 1196; 113 L. Ed. 2d 158
Argument	Oral argument
Opinion announcement	Opinion announcement
Case history
Prior	680 F. Supp. 309 (E.D. Wis. 1988); affirmed, 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989); cert. granted, 494 U.S. 1055 (1990).
Holding
Title VII, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, forbids sex-specific fetal-protection policies, as incapability of becoming pregnant is not a "bona fide occupational qualification."
Court membership
Chief Justice William Rehnquist Associate Justices Byron White · Thurgood Marshall Harry Blackmun · John P. Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor · Antonin Scalia Anthony Kennedy · David Souter
Case opinions
Majority	Blackmun, joined by Marshall, Stevens, O'Connor, Souter
Concurrence	White (in part and in judgment), joined by Rehnquist, Kennedy
Concurrence	Scalia (in judgment)
Laws applied
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978

United Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991), was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States establishing that private sector policies prohibiting women from knowingly working in potentially hazardous occupations are discriminatory and in violation of Title VII and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978.^[1] The case revolved around Johnson Controls' policy of excluding fertile women from working in battery manufacturing jobs because batteries contain high amounts of lead, which entails health risks to people's reproductive systems (both men and women) and fetuses. At the time the case was heard, it was considered one of the most important sex-discrimination cases since the passage of Title VII.^[2]

The majority opinion by Justice Blackmun held that that Title VII prohibits gender–specific fetal protection policies. Hence based on that statute, the Court decided against Johnson Controls by concluding that the company’s fetal protection policy contravened Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the PDA; and the company's gender-specific rule was biased and inequitable because it permitted fertile men, but not fertile women, to decide whether to work in jobs subjected to lead exposure while manufacturing batteries. The court rejected Johnson Controls' argument that their policy fell under the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ) defense because the protection of employees' fetuses was not an essential part of the business's operation.^{[3][4][5][6][7][8]}

• Grover, Susan, Faculty Publications. Paper 179. "The Employer's Fetal Injury Quandary After Johnson Controls" (Free PDF download). Kentucky Law Journal. 81. College of William & Mary Law School: 639.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)

• Text of United Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991) is available from: Google Scholar Justia Library of Congress Oyez (oral argument audio)