Kuban Campaign (1711)

Kuban Campaign
Part of the Russo-Ottoman War(1710-1711) and Great Northern War
Date3 July – 6 September 1711
Location
Kuban
Result Russian-Kalmyk-Cırcassian victory[1][2]
Belligerents
Tsardom of Russia Tsardom of Russia
Kalmyk Khanate
Kabardia (East Circassia)		 Crimean Khanate
Nogai Horde
Commanders and leaders
Tsardom of Russia P. M. Apraksin
Chakdorjap		 Nureddin-Sultan
Strength
34,362[3] 30,000+
4,000+[4]
Casualties and losses
Insignificant[1] 16,300+ killed
22,000 captured[4]

The Kuban Campaign took place between the Russian-Kalmyk forces and Crimean-Nogai Tatars with the goal of diverting significant Tatar forces and accomplishing other goals, from 3 July to 6 September 1711.[5]

Prelude

The campaign intended to distract the Crimean Tatar forces. However, modern research suggests that the campaign in Kuban was an independent offensive. This offensive was aimed at countering Tatar incursions into Azov and cutting possible Kuban Host support for the main Tatar forces of Crimea. Additionally to show and extend Russian control over the steppe south of Azov and to link Peter's domains with his Circassian allies of St. Petersburg.[5][6] Russian count P. M. Apraksin gathered 13,888 troops for the campaign, Kalmyk forces joined in which made up the total of 34,362 troops against Tatars.[7]

Campaign

On 3 July, 1711, Apraksin headed to Kuban with his combined forces. On 5 August, Apraksin arrived to Azov and station there for 10 days to replenish supplies and get rest for army. On 14 August, army resumed the march. Apraksin wasn't aware that the peace treaty was already signed and the Purth Campaign ended when he was in Azov, but became aware of the treaty in mid-September, although continued his army's operations until then against Ottomans and Tatars. Whether this is was the case or the Kuban Campaign was continued as a form of retaliation for what had happened in Moldavia is disputed. Regardless, the Kuban valley had large number of livestock and limited defences, making it a perfect target. Contemporary Ottoman sources state the fortifications were half-destroyed and guarded by insignificant numbers of forces, artillery was extremely limited. The strength of the Kuban garrison consisted of 10,000 renegade Cossacks and staroobrydny, with total strength of 23,000, which was poorly-trained.[8]

On 26 August, Apraksin separated his forces in two columns. Vanguard contingent was commanded by Colonel Ivan Lyvov and consisted of 18,460 troops, moved forward to prevent the concentration of enemy forces following a series of skirmishes with the Nogais. The only major Tatar concentration was vanquished on 29th near the Kuban River, 5,000 Tatars drowned in the river, nearly 22,000 Tatars fell into captivity, including women and children. Kalmyks wiped out Nureddin-Sultan's forces, killing 11,300 Tatars.[4]

Apraksin marched northeast along the river and then back to Azov through the Kuban Steppe after devastation of Tatars. In early September, Apraksin received the news about 4,000 Nogais returning from their raid, which were ambushed by Kalmyks and defeated, freeing several thousand Russian captives. On 6 September, Apraksin was attacked by 7,000 troops led by Nureddin-Sultan, which were also defeated. Apraksin was later informed of the Russian defeat at Pruth, so he ended his campaign in haste.[4]

Aftermath

On 29 December, Apraksin reached Kazan, which he governed. Apraksin's campaign in Kuban might've been the first successful military endeavour, carried out on such a scale by the Tsardom of Russia against Pontic nomads.[4] Russian forces preformed the best during Kuban campaign, winning every battle and skirmish against the enemy. Discipline was high, battle orders were executed in order and the casualties were insignificant.[1] Despite the fact that Russia both in war and the peace lost at Pruth in 1711, a successful campaign conducted in Kuban same year marked a turning point in the history of the Pontic steppes.[2]

References

  1. ^ a b c Russia marches South: army reform and battlefield performance in Russia’s Southern campaigns, 1695-1739. Russia marches South: army reform and battlefield performance in Russia’s Southern campaigns, 1695-1739 p. 162.
  2. ^ a b "14 - A borderline state of mind: the closing of the Don steppe frontier (1708–1739)". 12 January 2010. Retrieved 24 January 2025.
  3. ^ Russia marches South: army reform and battlefield performance in Russia’s Southern campaigns, 1695-1739. Russia marches South: army reform and battlefield performance in Russia’s Southern campaigns, 1695-1739 p. 160.
  4. ^ a b c d e Russia marches South: army reform and battlefield performance in Russia’s Southern campaigns, 1695-1739. Russia marches South: army reform and battlefield performance in Russia’s Southern campaigns, 1695-1739 p. 157.
  5. ^ a b Russia marches South: army reform and battlefield performance in Russia’s Southern campaigns, 1695-1739. Russia marches South: army reform and battlefield performance in Russia’s Southern campaigns, 1695-1739 p. 157.
  6. ^ Russia marches South: army reform and battlefield performance in Russia’s Southern campaigns, 1695-1739. Russia marches South: army reform and battlefield performance in Russia’s Southern campaigns, 1695-1739 p. 158.
  7. ^ Russia marches South: army reform and battlefield performance in Russia’s Southern campaigns, 1695-1739. Russia marches South: army reform and battlefield performance in Russia’s Southern campaigns, 1695-1739 p. 159-160.
  8. ^ Russia marches South: army reform and battlefield performance in Russia’s Southern campaigns, 1695-1739. Russia marches South: army reform and battlefield performance in Russia’s Southern campaigns, 1695-1739 p. 160.