The State of Israel and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq maintain a close informal relationship, but do not have formal diplomatic missions in each other's territory. Their ties are rooted in Israel's historically strong support for the Kurdish people and their long-running desire for self-determination and national independence in Kurdistan.[1] In 1992, shortly after Iraq lost the Gulf War, the Kurdistan Region was recognized as an autonomous entity and began governing a portion of Iraqi Kurdistan, marking a significant development in the Iraqi–Kurdish conflict. The Iraqi government and the Kurdish government have differing policies with regard to the entry of Israeli citizens into their territory: Kurdish authorities accept Israeli passports at Erbil and Sulaymaniyah, and Israelis are entitled to regular freedom of movement throughout the Kurdistan Region; but Iraqi authorities do not accept Israeli passports, and Israelis are forbidden from entering Iraq proper. Residents of the Kurdistan Region are bound by the Iraqi passport, which prohibits all travel to Israel. This is because Iraq, which has been a party to the Arab–Israeli conflict since Israel's founding in 1948, does not recognize Israeli sovereignty.
In light of Israel's conflict with the Arab countries, the Kurdistan Region has declared that there is no cause for animosity between Kurds and Israelis.[2] In 2017, the Israeli government openly voiced support for the establishment of an independent Kurdish state.[3] Relations between the two sides have been met with antisemitism and anti-Kurdish sentiment from the Arab League, Iran, and Turkey.[4][5]
History
The earliest attested interaction between Israel and Iraqi Kurdistan was in 1931, when the future director of Israel's Mossad, Reuven Shiloah, visited Kurdistan in disguise as a Hebrew teacher and journalist. During his stay, he forged contacts and developed the foundation for an Israeli relationship with the non-Arab communities in the region.[6]
Due to its existence as one of the few non-Arab states in the Middle East alongside Iran and Turkey, Israel formulated the "periphery doctrine", which expressed that it needed to focus on the development of strategic relations with non-Arabs in the region. Among the groups in the policy were the Kurds, who not only were the largest non-Arab population in the region, but also resided over a strategic territory in the Arab-majority state of Iraq, which had taken part in the 1948 Arab–Israeli War. In 1959, the Kurdish leader Mustafa Barzani sent Kamuran Alî Bedirxan to Geneva, Switzerland, where he met with the erstwhile Israeli foreign minister Golda Meir who promised unconditional Israeli support for an independent Kurdistan.[9] Israel began aiding the Kurdish Peshmerga against the Iraqi state during the First Iraqi–Kurdish War, which lasted from 1961 to 1970 and resulted in the signing of the Iraqi–Kurdish Autonomy Agreement. Despite the signing of the treaty between Iraq and the Kurds, the Iraqi–Kurdish conflict escalated shortly afterwards due to the resumption of Arabization campaigns against the Kurds.
While initially hesitant about an Israeli presence in Kurdistan,[11] Iran's SAVAK intelligence agency was successfully convinced by Israel to assist the Kurds in 1961, and Israel was allowed to use Iranian territory as a conduit for its activities, which included the transportation of weapons and food. Israeli support for Kurdish forces in Iraq remained largely secretive and the existence of any relationship between the two sides was reportedly denied by Israel to the United States.[12] Israel and Iran also helped to form the Kurdish intelligence agency Parastin, which engaged in various espionage operations against the Iraqi military. Bedirxan met with Israeli officials again in 1964, and Israeli Prime MinisterDavid Ben-Gurion authorized Mossad to supply money and anti-aircraft weapons to the Kurds in Iraq. In May 1965, deputy-director of Mossad David Kimche and Israeli military chiefTzvi Tzur visited Kurdistan, where they met with Barzani in the town of Haji Omeran. The Israelis agreed to provide a large supply of weapons and funding to the Kurds, and delivered the promised resources by winter of that year. Israel also helped Peshmerga troops improve their tactics and training, and played a significant role in the capture of Mount Handrin, where the Peshmerga inflicted thousands of casualties on the Iraqi military.[13] Barzani is known to have personally visited Israel twice in 1968 and 1973.[14]
The Iranian–Israeli–Kurdish alliance continued until the 1975 Algiers Agreement was signed between Iran and Iraq following heavy clashes between the two states over the Shatt al-Arab. Among the conditions of the treaty was Iran's agreement to end its support for the Kurds in Iraq. Iran's fulfillment of this condition resulted in friction in its relationship with Israel.[7] The Israelis wanted to continue supporting the Kurds and had spent the preceding years pressuring the United States to increase its military assistance as a means to do so.[16] Israel considered Iran's signing of the agreement to be a betrayal,[17] and believed Iran would use the plight of the Kurds as a bargaining chip in its negotiations with Iraq.[18] In response to the treaty, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin stated, "The Shah sold out the Kurds".[17]
From the Kurdish perspective, relying on Israel was a way to pull the United States into the conflict. However, while Barzani supported the Israeli assistance, Jalal Talabani and Ahmed Barzani were against it.[9]
After the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon pushed for the expansion of relations with Iraqi Kurds and for the establishment of "a significant presence on the ground" in Kurdistan; this plan was dubbed "Plan B"[a] by Israel. In June 2004, Seymour Hersh wrote an article for The New Yorker wherein he claimed that Israel was supporting the Kurds militarily to counteract Iranian proxy groups and that Israeli intelligence operatives were present in Iraq's Kurdistan Region. While a CIA official acknowledged this claim, other American officials as well as Israeli and Kurdish officials denied it.[23] In 2005, Yedioth Ahronoth reported that Kurdistan had received a large amount of Israeli-manufactured equipment and that Motorola Israel and Magal Security Systems was training the Peshmerga while employing former Israeli soldiers. That same year, the President of the Kurdistan Region, Masoud Barzani, stated that: "“[E]stablishing relations between the Kurds and Israel is not a crime since many Arab countries have ties with the Jewish state". In 2006, Israel condemned the BBC for reportedly filming Israeli forces training the Peshmerga.[24] In 2008, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan leader Jalal Talabani met with Israeli Defense MinisterEhud Barak, prompting severe criticism from Arab-Iraqi leaders.[24]
The Foreign Minister of the Kurdistan Region, Falah Mustafa Bakir, stated in 2010 that: "We have no problems with Israel. They have not harmed us. We can't be hating them just because Arabs hate them."[2]
Relations since 2014
In June 2014, Israel accepted independently-sold Kurdish oil at an Ashkelon port despite protests and criticism from Iraq.[25] Israeli officials stated that the country was keen on strengthening ties with the Kurdistan Region to broaden its options for energy supplies.[26] On selling oil to Israel, the government of the Kurdistan Region stated that the revenue was needed for its fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.[25] In the same month, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that the Kurds in Iraq are a "fighting people who have proven political commitment and political moderation, and they are worthy of their own political independence."[27] In September 2014, Netanyahu further commented that Israel "supports the legitimate efforts of the Kurdish people to achieve their own state."[28] After the 2017 Kurdistan Region independence referendum resulted in a 93 percent pro-independence vote, Iraqi forces retook a large portion of Kurdish-held territories. In response, Netanyahu stated that Israelis had a "deep natural longstanding sympathy" for the Kurds.[29]
In 2017, almost half of the oil extracted from Kurdish oil fields was exported to Israel; Israeli buyers of Kurdish oil are mostly private companies who receive an average of approximately 300,000 barrels of oil daily.[30]
Humanitarian aid
Assistance from Israeli NGOs to Kurdistan in the 2010s
Following the Northern Iraq offensive against Kurdish forces by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the Israeli non-governmental organization IsraAid, alongside the American Jewish Committee, announced its provision of urgent assistance to Christians, Yazidis and other non-Muslim minorities who had fled to the Kurdistan Region for safety.[31] In October 2014, IsraAid agency provided humanitarian supplies to refugees within the Kurdistan Region who had fled the ISIL campaign. IsraAid provided supplies to 1,000 families in the city of Duhok in winter of that year, including beds, infant supplies and blankets. The IsraAid assistance was provided in collaboration with the CanadianONEXONE humanitarian foundation, and was coordinated with authorities in Iraqi Kurdistan. The founding director of IsraAid Shahar Zahavi told Arutz Sheva that the Israeli humanitarian team was warmly received by the residents and refugees of the Kurdistan Region.[32] By early 2015, IsraAid trucks provided 3,000 relief items to Dohuk to aid refugees.[33]
Abramson, Scott (2018), "A Historical Inquiry into Early Kurdish-Israeli Contacts: The antecedents of an alliance", The Journal of the Middle East and Africa, 9 (4): 379–399, doi:10.1080/21520844.2018.1548920, S2CID150134620
Bishku, Michael B. (2018), Israel and the Kurds: A Pragmatic Relationship in Middle Eastern Politics, vol. 41, Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies
Mamikonian, Sargis (2005), Israel and the Kurds (1949-1990), vol. 9, Iran & the Caucasus, pp. 381–399
Minasian, Sergey (2007). "The Israeli-Kurdish relations". 21st Century. 1.
Reisinezhad, Arash (2018), The Shah of Iran, the Iraqi Kurds, and the Lebanese Shia, p. 357, ISBN9783319899466
Romano, David; Rojhilat, Shivan (2018), Danilovich, Alex (ed.), "Israel's periphery doctrine and the Kurds", Federalism, Secession, and International Recognition Regime: Iraqi Kurdistan, Routledge
^Yinon, Oded (February 1982). Beck, Yoram (ed.). "אסטראטגיה לישראל בשנות השמונים" [A Strategy for Israel in the 1980s]. Kivunim (in Hebrew). 14: 49–59.
