In March 1918, Harmon went to France with F Troop, 2nd Cavalry.[2] The 2nd Cavalry was the only Cavalry unit to go overseas during World War I, and B, D, F, and H Troops became the last horse-mounted U.S. Cavalry units to ever engage an enemy in combat.[3] Harmon served in the Baccarat Sector, at Camp du Valdahon, the St. Mihiel Offensive, and the Meuse-Argonne Offensive.[2][1] He served in France and Belgium after the war, and returned to the U.S. in June 1919 to become a student at the Fort Riley, Kansas Cavalry School.[2][1]
Between the wars
In August 1921, Harmon was assigned to West Point as an instructor in Mechanical Drawing, and his additional duties included backfield coach for the football team, and coach of the school's first lacrosse team.[2] In the summer of 1924 he went to France with three other officers to compete in the modern pentathlon in that year's summer Olympic Games.[2] Harmon placed fifth in shooting, 37th in swimming, 27th in fencing, 32nd in equestrian, and 26th in the cross country run.[4] He finished tied for 31st overall (out of 38 contestants), and athletes from Sweden claimed the first three places.[5]
The United States entered World War II shortly after Harmon's promotion in December 1941, after the Japaneseattack on Pearl Harbor. For seven months, from July 1942 until February 1943, Harmon commanded the 2nd Armored Division and trained the division for eventual overseas service. During this time he was promoted twice, to brigadier general (AUS) on March 13, 1942, and to major general barely five months later, on August 9.[8]
During the fighting, Harmon had opportunity to observe Major General Lloyd Fredendall, commander of II Corps, as well as his superior, the British Lieutenant GeneralKenneth Anderson, commander of the British First Army. Anderson was in overall control of the Allied front in eastern Algeria, commanding British, American, and French forces. Harmon noticed that the two generals rarely saw each other, and failed to properly coordinate and integrate forces under their command. Fredendall was barely on speaking terms with his 1st Armored Division commander, Major General Orlando Ward, who had repeatedly complained to his superiors of the dangers of separating his division into weaker combat commands for use in various sectors of the front. Harmon also noticed that Fredendall rarely left his command headquarters, a huge fortified bunker constructed a full 70 miles behind the front lines (the bunker took two hundred U.S. Army engineers three weeks to excavate, using hundreds of pounds of explosive to blast rooms out of solid rock).[9] Allied forces were bereft of air support during critical attacks, and were frequently positioned by the senior command in positions where they could not offer mutual support to each other. Subordinates would later recall their utter confusion at being handed conflicting orders, not knowing which general to obey–Anderson, or Fredendall. While interviewing field commanders, Harmon received an earful of criticism over what many Allied officers viewed as a cowardly, confused, and out-of-touch command. Noting that Fredendall seemed out-of-touch (and, at one point, intoxicated), he requested and received permission to go to the front and intervene where necessary to shore up Allied defenses.[11]
While Harmon attributed the lion's share of the blame for the reversal to Fredendall, he also began to question Anderson's leadership abilities with respect to a large command. Anderson was partly to blame for the weakness of II Corps in southern area of the front. When Fredendall asked to retire to a defensible line after the initial assault in order to regroup his forces, Anderson rejected the request, allowing German panzer forces to overrun many of the American positions in the south. Anderson also weakened II Corps by parceling out portions of the 1st Armored Division into various combat commands sent to other sectors over the vehement objections of its commander, Major General Ward.[12]
Major General Harmon had been in Thala on the Algerian border, witnessing the stubborn resistance of the British Nickforce, which held the vital road leading into the Kasserine Pass against the heavy pressure of the German 10th Panzer Division, which was under Rommel's direct command.[10] Commanding the British Nickforce was BrigadierCameron Nicholson, an effective combat leader who kept his remaining forces steady under relentless German hammering. When the U.S. 9th Infantry Division's attached artillery arrived in Thala after a four-day, 800-mile march, it seemed like a godsend to Harmon. Inexplicably, the 9th was ordered by Anderson to abandon Thala to the enemy and head for the village of Le Kef, 50 miles away, to defend against an expected German attack. Nicholson pleaded with the American artillery commander, Brigadier GeneralStafford LeRoy Irwin, to ignore Anderson's order and stay.[10] Harmon agreed with Nicholson and commanded, "Irwin, you stay right here!"[10] The 9th's artillery stayed, and with its 48 guns raining a whole year's worth of a (peacetime) allotment of shells,[citation needed] stopped the advancing Germans in their tracks. Unable to retreat under the withering fire, the Afrika Korps finally withdrew after dark.[10] With the defeat at Thala, GeneralfeldmarschallErwin Rommel decided to end his offensive.
After Rommel had finally been halted at Thala, Harmon returned to Fredendall's headquarters and was incredulous to find Fredendall expecting to pick up where he had left off. Harmon's reports on Fredendall's conduct during and after the battle (in an interview with Major General George S. Patton, Fredendall's replacement, Harmon called Fredendall "cowardly") played a key role in Fredendall's removal from command of II Corps and reassignment to a training command in the United States.[13] Offered the command of II Corps in Fredendall's place, Harmon declined, as it would appear to others that Harmon was motivated by personal gain. Instead, in March, General Eisenhower appointed Patton, a colleague and friend of Harmon's, to replace Fredendall. Harmon later accepted command of the 1st Armored Division after the relief of Major General Ward in April.
Major General Ernest N. Harmon, pictured here sometime in 1944.
Harmon led the 1st Armored Division throughout the rest of the Tunisian campaign, which eventually came to an end in mid-May 1943, with the surrender of almost 250,000 German and Italian soldiers, who subsequently became prisoners of war (POWs).
Italy
The division did not participate in the Allied invasion of Sicily (Operation Husky), although his old command, the 2nd Armored Division, now led by Major General Hugh Gaffey, did.
Harmon went on to lead the 1st Armored Division in the Italian Campaign, leading the division in terrain unsuitable for the employment of armor, until July 1944 when he returned to the United States. During the Italian campaign he and his division played a significant role in the Battle of Anzio.
During World War II, Harmon participated in a total of nine campaigns – two in North Africa, three in Italy, and four in France and Germany.
Post war
Harmon remained in command of XXII Corps until it was deactivated in January 1946, shortly after his permanent rank was promoted from lieutenant colonel to colonel on December 28, 1945,[8] when he took command of VI Corps. He helped organize the initial post-war government of Allied-occupied Germany, including the organization of the U.S. Constabulary, which was formed from the units of VI Corps. As commander of the Constabulary, Harmon harshly criticized the inclusion of African-American soldiers in the occupation of Germany, stating publicly in 1947 that the deployment of African American soldiers to Europe had been "America's stupidest mistake."[14]
He was interim commander of the Third Army from January to March 1947. He then served as deputy commander of Army Ground Forces before retiring from the U.S. Army in 1948, after a military career spanning over three decades and service in two world wars, with the permanent rank of major general,.[8]
^ abAndrews, Peter, A Place to be Lousy In, American Heritage Magazine (December 1991), Volume 42, Issue 8, pp. 100–109
^ abcdeMurphy, Brian John (April 2006). "Facing the Fox". America in WWII Magazine: 28–35. Archived from the original on September 28, 2007. Retrieved December 23, 2007.
^Calhoun, Mark T., Defeat at Kasserine: American Armor Doctrine, Training, and Battle Command in Northwest Africa, World War II, Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS (2003), pp. 73–75
^Höhn, Maria (December 2008). "We Will Never Go Back to the Old Way Again": Germany in the African-American Debate on Civil Rights". Central European History. 41 (4): 605–637. doi:10.1017/S0008938908000861. S2CID146767368.
^Nationaal Archief, Archive 2.02.32, Dossier 375, Registry Number 756 (Awarded by Royal Decree no. 46 of 18 January 1947)
^Empric, Bruce E. (2024), Uncommon Allies: U.S. Army Recipients of Soviet Military Decorations in World War II, Teufelsberg Press, p. 40, ISBN979-8-3444-6807-5
Bibliography
B. Dale, Matthew (2014). Professional Military Development Of Major General Ernest N. Harmon. Pickle Partners Publishing. ISBN9781782897248.
Taaffe, Stephen R. (2013). Marshall and His Generals: U.S. Army Commanders in World War II. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas. ISBN978-0-7006-1942-9. OCLC840162019.
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