The Roemer model of political competition is a game between political parties in which each party announces a multidimensional policy vector. Since Nash equilibria do not normally exist when the policy space is multidimensional, John Roemer introduced the concept of party-unanimity Nash equilibrium (PUNE), which can be considered an application of the concept of Nash equilibrium to political competition. It is also a generalization of the Wittman model of political competition.
In American federal elections, races for U.S. Senate tend to be more competitive than those for U.S. House of Representatives.[4] Even in wave election years, the vast majority of U.S. House members keep their seats, with little pressure from the opposing party.[5] Competition in U.S. House races has been in decline since at least the 1960s.[6]
^ abAlfano, Maria Rosaria; Baraldi, Anna Laura; Cantabene, Claudia (2013). "The role of political competition in the link between electoral systems and corruption: The Italian case". The Journal of Socio-Economics. 47: 1โ10. doi:10.1016/j.socec.2013.07.005.
^Nice, David (1984). "Competitiveness in house and senate elections with identical constituencies". Political Behavior. 6 (1): 95โ102. doi:10.1007/BF00988231. S2CID154349012.