This is the order of battle for the Guadalcanal Campaign, called Operation Watchtower, the first major Allied offensive in the Pacific Theater of Operations in World War II. The campaign lasted from the initial American landings on 7 August 1942 until the final Japanese evacuation on 9 February 1943, a period of six months, far longer than was expected by Allied planners.
Forces of the US Army began arriving to relieve the exhausted Marines on 13 October. On 8 December Vandegrift was replaced by Major General Alexander M. Patch, US Army, who was named commander of the XIV Army Corps on 2 January 1943. Patch declared the island secure on 9 February.
The high command of the Imperial Japanese Army did not take initially the Allied effort on Guadalcanal seriously and committed units piecemeal throughout the fall of 1942. Over the course of the campaign, the Japanese subjected two entire infantry divisions to massive attrition on the island.
The 1st Marine Division's struggle to take Guadalcanal achieved legendary status: the heat and mud, the malaria and dysentery, the giant tropical insects and the fanatical, often suicidal, resistance of the Japanese combined to create an immense amount of sheer suffering. Today, the unit's insignia features the word "Guadalcanal" superimposed on a large red numeral 1. Three future commandants of the Marine Corps fought on "The Canal": Alexander A. Vandegrift, Clifton B. Cates and Lemuel C. Shepherd. Vandegrift was awarded the Medal of Honor the following year in recognition of his courage and extraordinary leadership during the Corps's four-month struggle.
Why does the mere mention of the southwest Pacific cause the men who fought there to shudder? Why does so genteel an author as Herman Wouk, whipped into a white-lipped rage at the mere thought of Guadalcanal, write that it "was and remains 'that fucking island'"? Why was combat there considered — correctly – worse than Stalingrad?
— William Manchester, Goodbye, Darkness: A Memoir of the Pacific War (1980), p. 79
In addition to the action on the ground, the United States Navy and Imperial Japanese Navy fought several vicious and costly surface engagements at night in the waters of Savo Sound. Two nights after the initial landings, the US Navy experienced the worst open-water defeat in its history at the Battle of Savo Island. By the time the Japanese had given up on Guadalcanal, they had lost 2 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers and 7 destroyers; Allied losses included 5 heavy cruisers (one of which was Australian), 2 light cruisers and a destroyer. Each side had an admiral killed in combat. After the war, the area was renamed Ironbottom Sound in reference to the number of ships sunk there.
Since the Solomons lie in the Southern Pacific, the landings of 7 August 1942 on Guadalcanal were the responsibility of the South Pacific Fleet, led by Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley from his headquarters at Nouméa, New Caledonia.[1] Adm. Ghormley's pessimism, inadequate staff work and unwillingness to visit the front led Adm. Nimitz to replace him with the much more aggressive and hands-on Vice Admiral William F. Halsey on 18 October 1942.[2]
Operational command
Operational command of the invasion was assigned to Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher. He also had direct command of the covering force, designated Task Force 61, where he flew his flag aboard fleet carrier Saratoga. The amphibious forces, Task Force 62, were led by Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner aboard attack transport McCawley.
Bitter disputes between Vice Adm. Fletcher and Rear Adm. Turner arose during both the planning and execution of the invasion. At issue was how long Fletcher's aircraft carriers would stay in the vicinity of Guadalcanal to provide air cover for Turner's support vessels in Savo Sound. The matter came to a head on D+1 (8 August), after two days of assaults by bombers from the Japanese base at Rabaul. These attacks convinced Fletcher that his crucial aircraft carriers could not be risked in the waters of the Solomons any longer and his task force departed the area that evening. Unsettled by the removal of air cover and rattled on the morning of D+2 by the discovery that his cruiser screen had been decimated at the Battle of Savo Island, Turner ordered his vulnerable, and still half-full, cargo ships back to Nouméa around sundown 9 August. The Marine Corps forces ashore were thus left without air cover or the planned level of food and ammunition. This suboptimal outcome was at least partially attributable to the decision to vest both overall mission command and carrier task force command in the same individual (Vice Adm. Fletcher).
1st Battalion: Lt. Col. William E. Maxwell (to 30 Aug)[j]; Maj. Donald W. Fuller (to 13 Oct); Maj. William K. Enright
2nd Battalion: Lt. Col. Harold E. Rosecrans (to 11 Sep); Capt. Joseph J. Dudkowski (1-17, 25-30 Sep); Lt. Col. Walker A. Reaves (18-24 Sep); Maj. David S. McDougal (1-8 Oct); Maj. William J. Piper (8-11 Oct); Maj. Lewis W. Walt
3rd Battalion: Lt. Col. Frederick C. Biebush (to 22 Sep); Maj. Robert O. Bowen
^Relieved by Vandegrift for poor performance; never held another combat command, but was promoted to major general and commanded the 2nd Marine Division after the war.
Morison, Samuel Eliot (1949). Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions, May 1942 – August 1942. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. IV. Boston: Little, Brown and Co.
Morison, Samuel Eliot (1948). The Struggle for Guadalcanal, August 1942 – February 1943. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. V. Boston: Little, Brown and Co.
Stille, Mark (2015). Guadalcanal, 1942–43: America's first victory on the road to Tokyo. Oxford: Osprey.