Sikh-Rohilkhand War

Sikh-Rohilkhand War
Part of Decline of the Mughal Empire
DateJanuary 1764 – 1799
Location
Belligerents
Dal Khalsa
Kingdom of Bharatpur
Kingdom of Rohilkhand
Commanders and leaders
Jassa Singh Ahluwalia
baghel Singh
Tara Singh Ghaiba
Jassa Singh Ramgarhia
Najib ad-Dawlah
Zabita Khan

Background

On January 14, 1764, the Sikhs seized Sirhind and spent a month establishing their control over the area. By mid-February, they crossed the Yamuna River at Buriya Ghat and entered the Upper Ganga Doab region. This group, called the Budha Dal, remained active while the Taruna Dal had already returned to Punjab after the fall of Sirhind. Led by Jassa Singh Ahluwalia and accompanied by notable leaders such as Khushhal Singh, Baghel Singh, and Karora Singh, a cavalry force of around 40,000 raided towns like Saharanpur, Shamli, Kandhla, Muzaffarnagar, and Moradabad. This was the first significant Sikh advance beyond the Yamuna since Banda Bahadur’s campaigns, targeting areas traditionally inhabited by Sayyid families. They looted enormous wealth in the form of coins, gold, and jewels, ravaged the land, and captured prisoners for ransom. Disturbed by these events, Najib-ud-Daulah swiftly gathered his troops to confront the Sikhs,[1]

In February 1764, Najib-ud-Daulah paid a sum of eleven lakh rupees as a form of extortion to the Sikhs. This happened shortly after he defeated and killed Suraj Mal, which left him concerned about retaliation from Suraj Mal’s son, Jawahar Singh, and the Jat community, who were actively preparing to avenge the loss. Facing multiple challenges, Najib-ud-Daulah was further troubled by the arrival of the Sikhs and decided to resolve the situation by offering them money. The Sikhs accepted the payment and, by early March, returned to Punjab as they were already preparing to confront threats in Lahore. This marked the start of their biannual incursions into these territories.[2]

Tahmas Khan Miskin, a soldier in Najib-ud-Daulah’s army during these events, recounted the incidents. He noted that the Sikhs had established their control over the Sarhind district within a year. Following this, around 40,000 Sikh horsemen crossed the Yamuna River, looting and creating disturbances in the regions of Saharanpur and Meerut. Nawab Najib Khan spent a couple of months chasing the Sikhs, moving wherever reports of their activities emerged, and often succeeded in defeating them. However, the Sikhs avoided direct confrontations and kept retreating, forcing him to pursue them constantly. Their unpredictable and elusive tactics made it difficult to counter them effectively,[3]

Under Najib-ad-Dwalah

In December 1763, Suraj Mal, the famous Jat Raja of Bharatpur, was killed in a battle with Najib-ud-Daulah. His son, Jawahir Singh, and the whole Jat community wanted to take revenge for his death. Over the next year, Jawahar Singh prepared for war, even hiring the Marathas and Sikhs to help. This worried Najib, so he sent Meghraj, his messenger, to Ahmad Shah Abdali in Kandhar asking for help. Since the Sikhs had blocked the main route through Lahore, Meghraj took a longer path through Jammu in September-October. Najib also tried to make peace with Jawahir Singh, but Jawahar Singh refused, wanting revenge for his father. In early November, Jawahar Singh marched to Delhi and laid siege to Najib’s forces there. This left Najib’s lands, like Saharanpur, Meerut, and Bijnor, unprotected, giving the Sikhs a chance to attack. The Budha Dal, led by Jassa Singh Ahluwalia, crossed the Jamuna at Buriya Ghat and entered the Ganga Doab. They quickly captured the area, looting villages, even those far away at the foot of the hills. While Najib was trapped in Delhi, Hafiz Rahmat Khan, with 6,000 men, didn’t fight the Sikhs strongly and withdrew. This invasion is remembered as one of the most destructive attacks in the region.

In November 1764, Jawahir Singh laid siege to Najib-ud-Daulah's forces in Delhi. However, the siege was delayed due to Jawahir's ally, Malhar Rao, not fully supporting him and leaning toward Najib. As a result, Jawahir turned to the Sikhs, who were raiding the Ganga Doab, for help. After negotiations, he promised them a large sum of money and enlisted 12-15,000 Sikhs. They arrived in early January 1765 at Barari Ghat, 20 km from Delhi, where Jawahir met them. However, their relationship soured when the Sikhs insulted his attendants, and during the meeting, they declared that Jawahir had joined the Khalsa and sought revenge for his father’s death. Despite the disrespect, Jawahir, desperate for their assistance, agreed to join forces. The Sikhs formed trenches on the north side of the city while Jawahir and Malhar Rao fought from the east, and the Sikhs also cut off the supply lines to the city from the west. Fighting continued for 20 days, with some of Najib’s soldiers, including 1,000 under Bhola Singh, fighting for him. The conflict outside Delhi is vividly described by the eyewitness Nur-ud-din, who recalls the Sikhs using hit-and-run tactics, hiding behind ruined buildings near the river, and fighting Najib’s forces with muskets. Several skirmishes took place, and a Sikh in silver armor was killed. After a month of constant fighting, Najib’s forces would come out at sunset to engage the Sikhs, who fought until nightfall. On January 9, 1765, it was reported that Jawahir Singh had defeated Najib-ud-Daulah and taken control of the city. Trapped in the fort, Najib sought help from the Marathas to escape. On January 25, 1765, a major battle took place near the Horse Market and Sabzimandi between Najib and the Sikhs, aided by the Jats. Although many were killed or wounded, the outcome was inconclusive. In February 1765, the Sikhs suddenly withdrew from Delhi without informing Jawahir Singh, as they learned that Ahmad Shah Abdali was advancing toward the city, and they returned to Punjab.[4]

Sikhs Plunder Najib’s Land, October 1765

Ahmad Shah Abdali returned to Kunjpura near Karnal in March 1765. During the summer, the Sikhs focused on gathering their harvests. By July, the monsoon had started, and the floods made the rivers and streams difficult to cross. They spent the next two months securing their positions, and by September, as the rainy season ended, they gathered at Amritsar. The Sikhs then decided to invade Najib-ud-daulah's land, as he was the representative of Ahmad Shah in Delhi. They marched towards Najib’s territory, passing through Sarhind, and split into two groups. The Taruna Dal crossed the Jamuna River at Buriya Ghat and entered the Saharanpur district, while the Budha Dal, led by Jassa Singh Ahluwalia and other leaders, attacked Najib’s land north of Delhi. At the same time, Najib was engaged in quelling revolts in Bhiwani and Rohtak, and he had successfully gained control of Narnaul. When he heard that the Sikhs were causing trouble in his land, he moved towards them with his army. He met the threat with the skill expected from a top general of the time. The Raja of Bhatner and Amar Singh, the grandson of Alha Singh, also joined Najib to fight against the Sikhs. On November 3, 1765, Najib wrote a letter to Emperor Shah Alam II, describing the Sikhs’ raids and his defensive actions. He explained that the Sikhs had advanced as far as Panipat and Satalak, planning to march to Shahjahanabad, but after he sent forward his tent to Mahaldar Khan’s garden and gathered new and old troops, the Sikhs saw they couldn’t continue their attack. After plundering nearby villages, they retreated. The Sikhs also planned to return after the Chak festival. Najib expressed his frustration about how hard it was to defeat them, and he hoped for divine help and the Emperor’s support. He assured the Emperor that he would not neglect his duty and had gathered his forces to strike fear into the Sikhs and protect his lands.[5]

The Battle Between the Sikhs and Najib near Shamli, December 1765

After ravaging Najib's lands, the Sikhs returned to Amritsar, and after celebrating Diwali, they went back to the Ganga Doab to continue looting Najib’s villages. Najib had anticipated this and had been preparing for their return. He marched to stop them and met the Sikhs near Shamli, about 20 kilometers east of Kamal. Nur-ud-din, Najib’s biographer, described the battle vividly. Each day there were small skirmishes, but one day a major battle occurred. It lasted all day, and when night fell, the Sikhs took shelter in nearby sugar-cane fields, shooting their matchlocks at Najib’s troops. The fighting continued for three more hours until the Sikhs withdrew to rest. The next morning, Najib prepared his forces, with different commanders leading his right wing, left wing, vanguard, and rearguard, while his artillery followed. As they advanced, the Sikhs surrounded them, and the battle began again an hour after dawn. The fighting raged until noon, when the path was blocked by a dry nullah, and some of Najib’s carts had trouble crossing it. At this moment, the Sikhs attacked, especially the division led by Zabitah Khan, and many soldiers from both sides were wounded. The Sikhs tried to keep the Rohillas (Najib’s soldiers) engaged in battle to delay them, hoping to set up their camp on the move and cross the river. But Najib pressed forward, and many of Zabitah Khan's men were killed in the clash. The battle continued fiercely until late afternoon. The Sikhs, who had placed their baggage near the Jamuna River, planned to delay the Rohillas so they could cross the river and save their belongings. Najib’s soldiers asked for permission to charge at the Sikhs to push them back, or else they would be overwhelmed. Najib replied that they just needed to be patient, as the Sikhs were near their camp, and once they defeated them, they could take their belongings and stop them from further plundering. A tough fight took place between the Sikhs and Najib’s rearguard, with the Sikhs attacking fiercely and shouting "Wah Guru, Wah Guru!" Najib himself then joined the battle with his personal forces, and when the Sikhs saw his flag, they moved further away and continued firing their matchlocks. Najib attacked the Sikhs, pushing them off a small hill. By nightfall, Najib stayed where he was, while the Sikhs crossed the river with their baggage in the darkness. By morning, there was no sign of the Sikhs anywhere.[6]

Sikh Plunder and Najib’s Pursuit

After the Marathas' defeat at Dholpur, Jawahar Singh planned to advance towards Malhar Rao Holkar, who was already in a weakened condition and encamped beyond the Chambal River. However, his Sikh allies refused to march through an area that was dry and barren, without grass or water, especially under the harsh heat of the sun. As a result, the Sikhs decided to turn back and return to their homeland. Jawahir Singh escorted them as far as Sarai Khwajah, ensuring they crossed into their territory at Ghat Tilpat, before heading back to Palwal. His primary concern was defending his own realm from the destruction caused by the retreating Sikh forces. In this strategic movement, Jawahir Singh placed the Sikhs in the center of his army, surrounded on both sides by the Gosains and Samru's forces, with some generals stationed ahead of the Sikhs. This formation ensured that the Sikhs were pushed out of his territory. After this, the Sikhs continued their march towards Delhi and began plundering Najib-ud-daulah’s lands.

Upon their approach to Delhi, Afzal Khan, the agent of Najib-ud-daulah, announced on April 15th that no one from the city should venture out to visit Kalka Devi. The following day, he began strengthening the city's defenses and sent scouts to monitor the movements of the Sikhs. Afzal Khan, along with Yaqub Ali Khan, stationed themselves at the Delhi Gate to protect the city. On April 17th, news arrived that the Sikhs, who had come from Okhlaghat, had looted rice and sugar in the Patparganj market and were encamped at Masuri. Some of the Sikh cavalry advanced to Bain of Shaikh Muhammad, where they looted camels and bullocks. Afzal Khan’s cavalry ambushed them, killing one Sikh and forcing the rest to flee.

The Sikhs then moved along the east bank of the Jamuna River, raiding areas like Kutana, Jhunjhuna, and Budhana. At this time, Najib-ud-daulah had arrived near Delhi. Upon hearing of the Sikhs’ plundering activities, he declared that the Sikhs, laden with loot from their battles with Malhar Rao and Jawahir Singh, were now vulnerable. He decided it was the right moment to attack.

That night, Najib crossed the river at Ghat Kutana and learned by morning that the Sikhs were encamped about 10 kilometers away. Leaving his camp behind, Najib quickly set out to pursue them. The Sikhs, unaware of Najib’s approach, had left their camp to plunder nearby villages. Upon hearing the sounds of riders and drums, the Sikhs hurried back to their camp in confusion. Najib’s forces, marching swiftly, soon arrived, and the battle began. The Sikhs, caught off guard, tried to regroup but were overwhelmed by the Rohillas, part of Najib’s army, who reached the Sikh camp. Unable to defend themselves properly, the Sikhs were forced to retreat, and large amounts of their plunder, including camels, horses, and ponies, were captured by Najib’s forces. Najib drove the Sikhs away, pushing them for about 15 kilometers to the area near Kandhala, south-east of Panipat. Many Sikhs were wounded in the fighting, and some were killed. Eventually, the Sikhs crossed the Jamuna and retreated toward their own lands.[7]

The Sikhs continued to raid areas to the west of the Jamuna, causing further trouble for Najib-ud-daulah. Though Najib pursued them, he found the Sikhs hard to defeat. During these confrontations, Amar Singh of Patiala, who had been a major ally of Najib-ud-daulah, assisted him in dealing with the Sikhs. However, the Sikhs’ harassment of Raja Amar Singh caused him significant difficulties.[8]

The Sikhs' Rampage in Najib's Territory, May 1767

On May 11, 1767, Ahmad Shah Abdali gave permission for Najib-ud-daulah to leave the banks of the Sutlej River due to his poor health. Just as this decision was made, news arrived that the Sikhs, who had managed to avoid the Durrani troops by slipping past their camp a week earlier, had now entered Najib's territory. They first attacked the Sarhind area right under Abdali's nose. Afterward, they left their families and belongings in the Bhatinda-Hissar region’s Rohi jungle and crossed the Jamuna River at Buriya Ghat. The Sikhs then raided Najib's districts of Saharanpur, Ambetah, and Nanautah, before focusing on the Barah Sadat settlement, which was a group of twelve Sayyid villages around Miranpur in Muzaffarnagar district. Their next target was Meerut.

G.R.C. Williams quotes a contemporary’s diary regarding this Sikh invasion: "Indeed, even I lost some property during this time; it was the very month of Shams-ud-din’s wedding, and Sheikh Allah Yar Khan, the son of Muhammad Khan, was martyred by the hands of the Sikhs."

Upon hearing about the destruction caused by the Sikhs, Najib quickly sought help from Ahmad Shah. In response, the Durrani ruler sent Jahan Khan to punish the Sikhs. Jahan Khan, accompanied by Najib's son Zabitah Khan, made rapid progress and covered a distance of around 300 kilometers to reach Meerut in just three days. The Sikhs were warned of Jahan Khan’s arrival about an hour and a half before he reached them. Most of the Sikhs quickly fled back across the Jamuna River, leaving behind those who were caught and killed. Their looted goods were seized. Another group of Sikhs had made their way to the Ganga River, but upon hearing that they were being pursued by Afghan and Rohilla forces, they too rushed back toward the Jamuna. The Afghans overtook them between Shamli and Kairanah, two significant towns in the western part of Muzaffarnagar district. The Sikh leader was killed, Baghel Singh was injured, and the majority of the Sikhs were either killed or forced to flee. The remaining survivors escaped. Eventually, the Afghan forces returned to their base after seven days of pursuing the Sikhs.[9]

Invasion into the Ganga Doab, December 1767-January 1768

In December 1767, the Sikhs once again shifted their focus to Najib-ud-daulah’s territory across the Jamuna River. With Ahmad Shah Abdali away, the Sikhs seized the opportunity to take revenge on Najib-ud-daulah, whom they held responsible for the death and suffering of many of their people. On December 19th, they arrived near the outskirts of Delhi. Najib-ud-daulah, aware of the approaching threat, immediately took measures to defend the capital. He issued orders to his officers, including Yaqub Ali Khan, and to local officials like amils and faujdars, instructing them to protect the city from the impending invasion.

After crossing the Jamuna, the Sikhs began their raids, plundering the countryside and sparing few towns. One of the major casualties was Nanautah, which had just begun to rebuild from earlier attacks. The Sikhs’ destructive campaign left a trail of devastation in its wake. Meanwhile, Najib-ud-daulah, who had been stationed at his headquarters, decided to take action. He moved out and reached Kandhalah, located just beyond the north-western border of the Meerut district. From there, he rapidly advanced toward Muzaffarnagar in an attempt to drive the Sikhs back. His quick movements forced the Sikhs to retreat to Nanautah, where they made a determined stand against his forces.

However, the Sikhs were eventually defeated, and Najib’s forces pushed them northward toward Islamnagar, a Pathan settlement in the Nakur tehsil of Saharanpur district. In Islamnagar, the Sikhs regrouped and again put up a strong resistance. A fierce battle ensued, but despite their efforts, they were unable to hold their ground. The Sikhs were pushed further back, continuing their fight as they retreated.

One contemporary chronicler, who witnessed the invasion, expressed deep sorrow over the destruction caused by the Sikhs. He lamented the loss of his five homes, which were completely destroyed in the raids. His treasured library was burned to the ground, and every personal possession, from the smallest items to larger household goods, was either taken or destroyed. Not a single pot or pan was spared from the invaders' scrutiny.

On January 13th, 1768, a report from Bourpur, near Berar (Jalalabad), detailed the ongoing skirmishes. It described how the Sikhs were operating in small, scattered groups, making it difficult for Najib’s forces to engage them directly. The Sikhs had positioned a party along the Jalalabad road to intercept convoys of grain, causing trouble for the supply lines. A detachment of Afghan soldiers was dispatched to protect the convoys, and after a brief but intense skirmish, the convoy was successfully brought to safety. Despite this, the Sikhs continued to pose a significant threat.

Najib-ud-daulah quickly prepared for battle, ordering his artillery to be set up. As the battle began, Najib, mounted on an elephant, positioned himself behind the artillery. His first line of defense, which bore the brunt of the fighting, fought bravely and held their ground. However, the Sikhs launched a clever feint, throwing the Afghan artillery line into confusion and advancing with great speed. At this critical moment, Sayyid Muhammad Khan and a selected group of Afghan troops arrived to provide reinforcements, and the Sikhs were forced to retreat, suffering significant losses.

By the end of the day, Najib-ud-daulah called off the battle, ordering his troops to stand prepared for any further Sikh movements. Before dawn the next day, the Sikhs renewed their assault with even greater intensity. At the same time, news arrived that a convoy of grain from Daul had been intercepted and seized by the Sikhs. This forced Najib to reconsider his position, and he decided to move his camp closer to Jalalabad, where there was a large supply of grain. This move was intended to secure the provisions, avoid further disruptions, and strengthen the morale of his soldiers.

Despite these efforts, the Sikhs remained a persistent threat. They operated in small, mobile groups, making them difficult to catch. Several notable Sikh leaders were killed or wounded during the ongoing battles. Eventually, the Sikhs retreated to Saharanpur and then withdrew by Raj Ghat. Although this marked a victory for Najib-ud-daulah, it was clear that his power was waning. The rising strength of the Sikhs would soon overwhelm the declining Afghan influence in the region.

As the years passed, raids from the Punjab became increasingly frequent and regular. The people of the Ganga Doab, worn out from the constant invasions, stopped resisting the Sikhs’ raids. They reluctantly accepted their fate. Border chieftains in the area began to regularly collect "blackmail" from the local villages. This system, known as "rakhi" or sometimes euphemistically "kombu" (meaning 'blanket money'), became well-established. Each chieftain controlled a specific area, or "patti," and villagers were expected to pay a set amount, usually two to five rupees per person. Typically, two or three horsemen would collect these payments, but more soldiers were never far behind, ensuring compliance. If villagers were slow to pay, mounted troops would quickly appear to enforce the collection, and refusal to pay would often result in severe consequences, including violence. This system became a harsh reality for the people of the region, as the Sikhs continued to dominate the area with their raids.[10]

Najib-ud-daulah's Weakness and Decision to Retreat

Najib-ud-daulah became so overwhelmed by his inability to deal with the Sikhs that he seriously considered escaping his political troubles by either making a pilgrimage to Mecca or retreating to an isolated place. He openly acknowledged his defeat in a letter to the Queen-Mother of Shah Alam II, admitting that he could no longer protect the royal family or the city of Delhi from the Sikhs. In this letter, Najib confessed that despite his previous loyalty to the Timurids and his past efforts to protect the royal domains, he was now powerless against the Sikhs. He mentioned that the Sikhs had already gained significant strength and were encouraging various tribes to rise against him, making it clear that he could no longer ensure his own safety, let alone that of the royal family.

He proposed to the Queen-Mother that, if she agreed, he would escort the royal family to safety, possibly to a more secure location or directly to the Emperor. He assured her that he would continue to support her as long as he had the strength to do so, but once his power was exhausted, he would help escort her to the Emperor’s presence. He insisted that he did not want to be remembered as one who failed in his duties during a time of crisis.

Later, about six months afterward, Najib-ud-daulah reiterated his inability to protect the royal family in a letter to the Emperor. In his letter, he once again expressed his loyalty to the royal family but acknowledged that he no longer had the capacity to offer the protection they required. He suggested that the Emperor himself should come to defend his honor and his capital, as Najib was unable to do so anymore due to his own weaknesses.

Najib's sudden abandonment of Delhi deeply disturbed the Emperor. The Emperor's frustration was reflected in a letter, as it became clear that the situation had worsened with Najib’s departure. On the other hand, the Sikhs, emboldened by this turn of events, began to see themselves as powerful enough to decide the future of the empire. They even offered to escort Shah Alam to Delhi, believing they could play the role of king-makers. However, there was no consensus among the Sikh leaders, as each one of them wanted to assume the role of the king-maker. The Emperor, however, rejected their offer and refused to submit to their demands. This is evident in a letter the Emperor wrote to Sardar Jassa Singh Ahluwalia[11]

Under Zabita Khan

Sikh Raids in the Upper Doab (1773)

In the winter of 1773, a large group of Sikhs, led by Karam Singh Shahid, launched an invasion into the upper Doab region. They successfully captured and plundered a significant area that was under the control of Zabita Khan. Zabita Khan, who was paralyzed, stayed confined within his stronghold at Ghausgarh and did not attempt to defend his territory. One of the first places the Sikhs attacked was Nanautah, which they raided on December 11, 1773. The local annalist, documenting the misfortune of the town, noted that during the raid, the Sikhs took away fifteen maunds (a traditional unit of weight) of grain, along with various other goods.[12]

The Sikhs then proceeded to attack Jalalabad. According to Ratan Singh, the Sikhs' attention was drawn to Jalalabad due to a complaint made by a Brahman. He alleged that his daughter, who had recently been married, had been forcibly taken by Sayyid Hasan Khan, the local chief. In retaliation, the Sikhs attacked the entire village. Those who resisted them were executed by beheading, while others who showed submission by holding grass in their mouths were spared. Sayyid Hasan Khan, the chief, was captured, tied to a cot, and then set on fire after being wrapped in straw. The chief's ally, a Hindu named Kalal, who had aided him by informing him about the attractive girls in the village, was hanged. In a symbolic act of justice, the Brahman's daughter was returned to her husband, and the food she had prepared was distributed among the prominent Brahmans of her husband's village. Additionally, the Sikhs gave the husband a generous sum of money to ensure that the wife would be treated well in the future.[13]

The Sikh Campaign of 1775

The Sikhs assembled their forces near Karnal, organizing them into three major divisions under the leadership of Rae Singh Bhangi, Tara Singh Ghaiba, and Baghel Singh. On April 22, 1775, they crossed the Jamuna River near Kunjpura using the Begi Ghat. Zabita Khan, overwhelmed by fear, abandoned his position at Garhi Duhtar (also known as Garhi Mian Bhai Khan) and retreated to his fort at Ghausgarh. The first to face the Sikh forces were the Turkomans of Lakhnauti, located east of the Jamuna. The Sikhs then moved on to Gangoh, where they demanded and collected a tribute of 60,000 rupees from the residents. A smaller Sikh contingent then reached Ambehta, where they asked for 5,000 rupees. Although the local faujdar could only collect 2,000 rupees, the Sikhs accepted the sum and left the area. Their next stop was Nanauta, where a significant portion of the town was set on fire, and its destruction was noted in historical records. The Sikhs then laid siege to Deoband. The local officer, Taza Beg Khan, resisted the siege by closing the town gates. Lacking sufficient artillery, the Sikhs resorted to mining, eventually breaking into the town. Angered by the prolonged resistance, they brutally executed Taza Beg Khan by setting him on fire.

Despite the fall of their leader, the Afghan residents of Deoband fiercely resisted the advancing Sikhs, engaging them in intense street fighting that continued for 14 days. Despite their best efforts, the Afghans ultimately had to surrender, and the town was forced to pay a tribute of 12,000 rupees as a form of submission. Following the conquest, Deoband was placed under the control of Rae Singh Bhangi, a prominent Sikh leader, who imposed an annual tribute of 600 rupees on the town’s residents. In a notable episode during this period, a young boy named Qalandar Bakhsh was captured by Rae Singh and converted to Sikhism, a common practice at the time. However, after his conversion, Qalandar’s family managed to secure his release by paying a significant ransom. With Deoband under control, the Sikhs moved toward Ghausgarh, a fortified stronghold belonging to Zabita Khan. Realizing the futility of resisting the powerful Sikh forces, Zabita Khan negotiated peace with the Sikhs, agreeing to pay a tribute of 50,000 rupees and forming an alliance with them against Emperor Shah Alam II. This opportunity allowed Zabita Khan to sever his ties with the Mughal court and declare his independence, further consolidating his power. Accompanied by Zabita Khan, the Sikhs marched southward toward Delhi, raiding and plundering numerous villages along the way, including Miranpur and Kaithora. As they advanced, they struck terror into nearby towns, including Shamli, Kairana, Kandhla, and Meerut, all of which were looted and left in ruins. The Sikhs then crossed the Jamuna River at Kutana Ghat and continued their march, drawing closer to Delhi. This advance caused widespread panic among the city’s inhabitants, who were alarmed by the proximity of the invaders. In response, the residents of Delhi urgently called for intervention, fearing that the Sikhs might soon attack the capital itself.[14]

The Sikhs’ campaign lasted over three months, during which they caused significant destruction. On July 15, 1775, they set fire to areas like Paharganj and Jaisinghpura in Delhi. Imperial forces resisted but suffered casualties, as did the Sikhs. Zabita Khan extended his raids as far south as Khurja, leaving the region devastated. However, the tide turned when Najaf Khan confronted Zabita Khan and the Sikh forces at Meerut, defeating them. The Sikhs were forced to retreat, recrossing the Jamuna between Sonepat and Panipat on July 24, 1775.

Conflict Between Zabita Khan, the Sikhs, and the Mughal Empire (May-September 1777)

In 1777, Zabita Khan, a Mughal noble, aligned himself with the Sikhs in opposition to the Mughal Emperor Shah Alam II. After fleeing from Delhi, Zabita Khan became increasingly defiant, refusing to return the lands he had taken or pay the required tribute. Encouraged by Abdul Ahad, an advisor to the Emperor, the Mughal court resolved to confront Zabita militarily. Before taking action, the Emperor offered Zabita a chance to negotiate. Zabita visited the Mughal camp at Loni, near Delhi, between April 13 and April 27, but no agreement was reached. The Emperor permitted Zabita to leave without harm, and on April 28, the Mughal forces advanced toward Ghausgarh, Zabita's stronghold.

Najaf Khan, a prominent Mughal general, was assigned command of the campaign. He replaced Zabita Khan as Mir Bakhshi and received the title of Amir-ul-Umara. Ghausgarh was strategically defended by three forts arranged in a triangular formation. Lohari, located to the east, was a settlement of Mirdhi Pathans; Thana Bhawan, to the west, was another stronghold; and Jalalabad, a settlement of Orakzai Pathans, formed the northern point. Ghausgarh itself, a Umarkhel Pathan colony, lay in the center of this triangle.

As the Mughal army approached Ghausgarh, Zabita Khan sought assistance from the Sikhs. His envoy, Munshi Mansukh Rae, successfully persuaded a contingent of 7,000 Sikh horsemen to join his forces, bolstering his 15,000-strong Rohilla troops. The combined forces prepared to resist the Mughal advance.

An initial skirmish occurred about 24 km from Ghausgarh between the imperial advance guard, supported by Maratha forces, and Sikh scouts. Outnumbered, the Sikhs withdrew to their camp, later regrouping with additional forces. Najaf Khan responded quickly, mobilizing his troops and advancing to confront the enemy. The ensuing clash forced the Rohilla-Sikh forces to retreat after an hour of fighting.

By May 23, the Emperor’s army reached Raepur, 8 km south of Ghausgarh, and set up camp. The next day, several minor engagements occurred as Mughal troops attempted to occupy positions near their camp but faced resistance from Rohilla and Sikh forces. Later that day, a larger battle took place. Zabita Khan, leading around 9,000 troops, launched attacks on various positions within the Mughal camp. The imperial artillery repelled these advances, and Zabita eventually retreated to Ghausgarh. The battle resulted in losses of 250 men on the Mughal side and 400 on the Rohilla-Sikh side.

Over the next two weeks, Najaf Khan reorganized his forces and launched several assaults on the fortifications at Lohari, Thana Bhawan, and other nearby positions. Despite using artillery and attempting ambushes, the imperial forces faced strong resistance and suffered significant losses in some engagements. The Sikhs and Rohillas effectively defended their positions, frustrating Najaf Khan’s attempts to secure a decisive victory.

A major battle on June 23 saw intense fighting between the two sides but again ended inconclusively. Some accounts suggest internal divisions within the Mughal camp, with Najaf Khan facing interference from Abdul Ahad, who held significant influence over the Emperor. This rivalry reportedly hindered the coordination of the imperial forces.[15]

Despite Najaf Khan's efforts, the campaign failed to achieve a decisive outcome. The resistance of the Sikh-Rohilla alliance and the internal challenges within the Mughal ranks highlighted the complexity of the conflict.[16]

Zabita Khan Converts to Sikhism as Dharam Singh (September 1777)

Najaf Khan grew increasingly frustrated after four failed attempts over 16 days to defeat Zabita Khan's forces. He accused Abdul Ahad of deliberately holding back reinforcements that could have turned the battle in favor of the imperial army. Abdul Ahad responded by blaming Najaf Khan for leading the army into unnecessary bloodshed. The Emperor supported Abdul Ahad, causing Najaf Khan to withdraw to his tent in anger.

During the rainy season, the Krishni River near the Mughal camp overflowed, creating difficult conditions for the imperial soldiers, who struggled with discomfort and supply shortages. On the night of July 22, 1777, during heavy rains, the Sikhs crossed the flooded river and launched a surprise attack on the Mughal camp, coming dangerously close to the Emperor’s tents. However, they were pushed back by the guards' musket fire. The Emperor moved his camp 3 kilometers closer to Jalalabad to avoid further risks.

The Sikhs and Rohillas then disrupted the Mughal army’s supply lines. On August 3, the Sikhs attacked a convoy transporting grain from Delhi. In response, the Emperor sent Bagha Rao to protect the convoy and tasked Najaf Quli and Latafat Ali with attacking the Sikh camp near Thana Bhawan. Both missions succeeded, and the Sikhs relocated farther north near Jalalabad.

Najaf Khan, meanwhile, attempted to persuade Zabita Khan’s allies to defect. While the Sikhs remained loyal, the Rohilla leaders Dilawar Ali and Qalandar Ali from Jalalabad agreed to support the imperial army during the final assault.

By the end of the rainy season, Najaf Khan began preparing for a larger campaign. Reinforcements arrived, including Afrasiyab Khan from Aligarh and Daud Beg Khan from Agra, bringing additional troops and resources. The final offensive began on September 14, 1777, with Afrasiyab leading the vanguard of 10,000 soldiers.

The main attack focused on the trenches at Jalalabad while other Mughal forces distracted the Rohillas elsewhere. Zabita Khan arrived from Ghausgarh to defend his position, but the Jalalabad chiefs betrayed him by guiding the Mughal army through the defenses and turning their artillery on Zabita's troops. Despite desperate resistance, the Rohillas were overwhelmed by the Mughal army's superior numbers. Only the Sikh forces at Thana Bhawan managed to hold their position.

Zabita Khan suffered a complete defeat and fled to the Sikh camp, where he found refuge. His camp, wealth, family, including his son Ghulam Qadir, and the families of his officers were captured by the victors. Zabita Khan and his Sikh allies retreated across the Yamuna River into Karnal. Left with nothing, Zabita sought the Sikhs’ protection and publicly converted to Sikhism, adopting the name Dharam Singh to solidify their alliance.

This event gave rise to a saying in the Saharanpur region: "Ek Guru ka do chela, Adha Sikh adha Rohilla" ("One disciple of the Guru was half Sikh and half Rohilla.")

The victory marked the collapse of the Rohilla power established by Najib-ud-daulah. Three years earlier, another branch of the family had been defeated by Shuja-ud-daulah of Oudh with British support, leading to the annexation of Rohilkhand. Zabita Khan’s defeat further diminished Rohilla influence in the upper Ganga Doab.[17]

The Sikhs Enter Rohilkhand and Clash with the British (December 1778)

After crossing the Doab, the Sikhs reached the banks of the Ganga River, which served as the boundary to Rohilkhand. The river crossings were guarded by British troops stationed at Daranagar, about 10 kilometers south of Bijnor. On December 5, 1778, a group of 800 Sikhs appeared at Jai Ghat, a ferry point near Daranagar. The British jamadar stationed there resisted until his ammunition ran out, resulting in six casualties among his men. Despite this, the Sikhs successfully crossed the river, plundering and burning several villages in the Najibabad district.

The next day, December 6, another Sikh group attacked the ferry at Nagal, located 12 kilometers northwest of Najibabad. They were met with resistance by Lieutenant Knowels, who had been joined by the surviving forces from Jai Ghat the night before. Though Knowels managed to repel the Sikhs temporarily, he was injured by a gunshot to the thigh. The Sikhs then moved to Byee Ghat, where additional guards, reinforced by Lieutenant Namara, tried to stop them. Despite this, the Sikhs managed to cross the river and ravaged the surrounding areas.

In response, Lieutenant-Colonel Muir, commanding officer at Daranagar, dispatched a battalion of Company sepoys under Captain Landeg, supported by a cavalry unit from the Nawab of Rohilkhand and a single artillery gun, to pursue and expel the Sikhs from Rohilkhand. Anticipating more Sikh forces gathering along the Ganga to cross into Rohilkhand, Muir requested reinforcements, bringing in eight companies from the 22nd Battalion. Nawab Faizullah Khan also contributed 700 horsemen under Risaldar Muhammad Umar Khan to assist in the operation.

These combined preparations forced the Sikhs to retreat from Rohilkhand. They then shifted their focus back to the Doab, resuming their campaign of destruction in the region. The fear of the Sikhs was so pervasive that no imperial officer dared confront them. The Mughal administration was so weakened that the local population, recognizing the futility of resistance, passively accepted their fate under Sikh dominance.[18]

Sikh Devastation Around Delhi (January–April 1779)

As the new year began, the Sikhs launched a campaign of destruction around Delhi, plundering towns and villages near the imperial capital. The daily reports of these raids alarmed Emperor Shah Alam II. At this time, Najaf Khan, the Empire's first minister, was engaged in a campaign against the Raja of Alwar. Negotiations for peace with the Raja, led by his agent Khoshali Ram Bohra, were hindered by the intrigues of Abdul Ahad, who was present in the imperial camp. The Emperor issued urgent orders for Najaf Khan to quickly conclude peace with the Raja and return to Delhi to counter the Sikh incursions. Najaf Khan struck a deal with the Raja, accepting a tribute of eight lakh rupees, of which three lakhs were paid immediately, and the remainder in monthly installments. Najaf Khan also promised to defend the Raja's territory against future invasions. Upon his return to Delhi, Najaf Khan attempted to negotiate with the Sikhs for a peaceful resolution. Recognizing that Abdul Ahad's scheming would prevent any successful military action against them, Najaf Khan appealed to the Sikhs' sense of honor and religious principles. He urged them to stop ravaging crownlands, particularly in the Meerut district between the Jamuna and Ganga rivers. The Sikhs agreed to his request and promised to spare the region. Najaf Khan then sought to secure an alliance with Zabita Khan, a former ally of the Sikhs. Offering assurances of safety, Najaf Khan restored to Zabita his family, lands, and the Saharanpur district. To strengthen their relationship, Zabita Khan proposed a marriage alliance, offering his daughter's hand to Najaf Khan. Preparations for the wedding began as Zabita Khan returned to Ghausgarh. However, Zabita Khan's decision to align with Najaf Khan without consulting his Sikh allies proved to be a critical mistake. The Sikhs, feeling betrayed, turned against Zabita Khan. They began to ravage his territories once again, as they had done in the past. Abdul Ahad seized this opportunity to fuel Sikh resentment against both Zabita Khan and Najaf Khan. Driven by jealousy and personal rivalry with Najaf Khan, Abdul Ahad worked to undermine him, even at the cost of the Empire’s stability. Despite Najaf Khan's growing prestige due to his victories at Alwar and Ghausgarh, Abdul Ahad's actions created further divisions and instability within the Mughal administration.[19]

Sikh Advancements and Mughal Responses (January–February 1784)

In early 1784, the Delhi government had too much trust in Zabita Khan and Zain-ul-Abidin's ability to control the rising Sikh attacks. In January, a large force of about 20,000 Sikh cavalry gathered near Buriya on the banks of the Jamuna River, which alarmed the British officer at Bareilly. He reported to the Governor-General on January 8, warning that the Sikhs might try to enter Rohilkhand between the Ganga crossings at Daranagar and Hardwar. The Governor-General believed, however, that the forces at Bareilly and Fatehgarh were strong enough to stop any Sikh movements into Oudh. As a precaution, additional reinforcements were sent to support the brigades at Allahabad. By late January, a much larger Sikh force, with 30,000 horsemen and infantry, crossed the Jamuna River and set up camp at Sultanpur, north of Saharanpur. Led by Jassa Singh Ramgarhia and Karam Singh, the Sikhs moved toward Sarsawa by January 30. In response, Zabita Khan, based at Ghausgarh, sent a battalion led by Qutbi Ranghar and Nahar Singh Gujar with five cannons to try to stop the Sikhs near Pikhani. However, the Sikhs demanded a tribute of ₹50,000 to withdraw, and Zabita Khan's representatives could do little to change their mind. By February 4, the Sikhs had moved to Shikarpur, then Nirpura, and later set up camp at Naula, where they looted, killed local people, and used the crops to feed their horses. Toward the end of February, they advanced to Sardhana, the headquarters of Begum Samru, and then to Barnawa. This series of movements caused much concern in Delhi, prompting Abdul Ahad Khan to order Zafaryab Khan, stationed at Serai Rohilla, to stay in place and not march toward Sardhana. The Delhi court responded by strengthening the city's defenses, deploying two Najib Battalion companies and two cannons to protect the Kashmiri Gate, signaling their growing fear of the Sikh forces.[20]

Sikh Incursion and Plunder of Chandausi, January–February 1785

In the early months of 1785, the Sikhs, led by Baghel Singh, Gurdit Singh, and Jassa Singh Ramgarhia, launched a large-scale raid into northern India. Their force, numbering around 30,000, crossed the Jamuna and swept across the upper Doab with overwhelming force, targeting towns along their route. The Barha Sayyid towns, including Miranpur, bore the brunt of their wrath, with the area experiencing widespread plundering and destruction. Zabita Khan, the ruler of the region, was unable to stop the advancing Sikhs and retreated to Ghausgarh, leaving the local population vulnerable. By January 13, the Sikhs destroyed villages in the Sayyid-controlled areas, including Barsi and Mahmudpur. They then targeted Moradabad, but a timely message informed them that Chandausi was unprotected. The chief of Chandausi, Banne Khan, had fled to a nearby village, leaving the town defenseless. The Sikhs seized the opportunity, entering Chandausi on January 14 and setting fire to the houses and markets, looting goods worth lakhs of rupees. After two days of plundering, they left on January 15 and camped at Bhawanipur. On January 15, a separate group of Gujars, led by Bhim Singh Gujar, also plundered villages in Oudh, further compounding the instability in the region. By January 16, Raja Jagan Nath, an ally of the British, arrived at Rasauli with a subsidiary force, reportedly intending to assault the Sikhs. However, the Sikhs, overloaded with booty, decided to retreat across the Ganga rather than engage the British forces. On January 17, the Sikhs crossed the river and established camp. The British, who were marching along the left bank, opened fire, and a brief exchange of musketry ensued. The Sikhs attempted to secure their mules and camels, which had been sent across the river to gather supplies, but these were captured by the British. By January 19, the Sikhs began to pack their loot and prepared to return home. They marched through the region, with Baghel Singh and Jassa Singh contemplating further raids, but internal disagreements and the arrival of reinforcements from their allies, Karam Singh and others, postponed their plans. By January 23, they had reached Miranpur, where they engaged in talks with Mahadji Sindhia's agents regarding a potential peace agreement. However, the Sikhs remained focused on securing their loot before moving toward Bareilly for more plundering. The Sikhs continued their advance through the Ganga region, encamping on January 27 at Sabalgarh Fort. They made plans to cross the Ganga into Rohilkhand, but news arrived that Zabita Khan had died, and the British army, led by Raja Jagan Nath, was closing in on them. Despite skirmishes and artillery exchanges, the Sikhs eventually retreated from the Ganga and began marching back home by the end of January. In early February, with the region heavily under British control and the threat of further skirmishes looming, the Sikhs decided to consolidate their gains and return home. The constant raids, though financially beneficial, had taken a toll on trade in the region, particularly in Rohilkhand, which suffered due to the instability caused by the repeated invasions.[21]

Later conflict

Ghulam Kadir, the son of Zabita Khan, was a rebellious ruler. He once rebelled against his father and sought refuge with Mahadji Sindhia. After his father's death, Ghulam Qadir imprisoned his mother to take his father’s wealth and forced his uncles to give him their property. He refused to pay the Emperor’s taxes and wanted the high offices his father and grandfather held. In a violent act, he attacked the Emperor, threw him to the ground, and blinded him. As a result, Mahadji Sindhia arrested and executed him in 1789.

When it came to the Sikhs, Ghulam Qadir promised to pay them the tribute owed by his father, but he never did. The Sikhs waited for two years before attacking his territory in 1787. Ghulam Qadir made a partial payment, but the Sikhs were not satisfied. He later joined the Marathas and Rohillas in attacking Sikh lands but was persuaded to leave after receiving a bribe from the chief minister of Patiala, Diwan Nanumal.

Meanwhile, Ghulam Qadir’s younger brother, Bhambu Khan, and their mother fled to Sikh territory to escape Mahadji Sindhia’s pursuit. They were given shelter by Jassa Singh Ramgarhia, who also provided them with land to live on. Even though Mahadji Sindhia, the Nawab of Oudh, and the British tried to capture them, Jassa Singh refused to hand them over. Bhambu Khan later joined the British in their war against Sindhia and Bhonsle.[22]

References

  1. ^ Hari Ram Gupta (October 2001). The Sikh Commonwealth: The Rise and Fall of the Sikh Misls. Munshilal Manoharlal Publishers. p. 33. ISBN 81-215-0165-2.
  2. ^ Ganda Singh 1990, p. 293.
  3. ^ Hari Ram Gupta (October 2001). The Sikh Commonwealth: The Rise and Fall of the Sikh Misls. Munshilal Manoharlal Publishers. p. 33. ISBN 81-215-0165-2.
  4. ^ Gupta, Hari Ram. History of the Sikhs, Vol. III: Sikh Domination of the Mughal Empire, 1764-1803. Munshilal Manoharlal. ISBN 978-81-215-0213-9. Accessed 14 January 2025. Page 328.
  5. ^ Gupta, Hari Ram. History of the Sikhs, Vol. III: Sikh Domination of the Mughal Empire, 1764-1803. Munshilal Manoharlal. ISBN 978-81-215-0213-9. Accessed 14 January 2025.
  6. ^ Gupta, Hari Ram. History of the Sikhs, Vol. III: Sikh Domination of the Mughal Empire, 1764-1803. Munshilal Manoharlal. ISBN 978-81-215-0213-9. Accessed 14 January 2025.
  7. ^ Singh, Khushwant (11 October 2004). A History of the Sikhs: 1469–1838 (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press. p. 162. ISBN 978-0-19-567308-1. Retrieved 2 January 2023.
  8. ^ Gupta, Hari Ram. History of the Sikhs, Vol. III: Sikh Domination of the Mughal Empire, 1764-1803. Munshilal Manoharlal. ISBN 978-81-215-0213-9. Accessed 14 January 2025.
  9. ^ Gupta, Hari Ram. History of the Sikhs, Vol. III: Sikh Domination of the Mughal Empire, 1764-1803. Munshilal Manoharlal. ISBN 978-81-215-0213-9. Accessed 14 January 2025.
  10. ^ Gupta, Hari Ram. History of the Sikhs, Vol. III: Sikh Domination of the Mughal Empire, 1764-1803. Munshilal Manoharlal. ISBN 978-81-215-0213-9. Accessed 14 January 2025.
  11. ^ Gupta, Hari Ram. History of the Sikhs, Vol. III: Sikh Domination of the Mughal Empire, 1764-1803. Munshilal Manoharlal. ISBN 978-81-215-0213-9. Accessed 14 January 2025.
  12. ^ Gupta 1999, p. 124.
  13. ^ Gupta 1999, p. 125.
  14. ^ Hari Ram Gupta (October 2001). The Sikh Commonwealth: The Rise and Fall of the Sikh Misls. Munshilal Manoharlal Publishers. p. 55. ISBN 81-215-0165-2.
  15. ^ Gupta, Hari Ram. History of the Sikhs, Vol. III: Sikh Domination of the Mughal Empire, 1764-1803. Munshilal Manoharlal. ISBN 978-81-215-0213-9. Accessed 14 January 2025.
  16. ^ Gupta, Hari Ram. History of the Sikhs, Vol. III: Sikh Domination of the Mughal Empire, 1764-1803. Munshilal Manoharlal. ISBN 978-81-215-0213-9. Accessed 14 January 2025.
  17. ^ Gupta, Hari Ram. History of the Sikhs, Vol. III: Sikh Domination of the Mughal Empire, 1764-1803. Munshilal Manoharlal. ISBN 978-81-215-0213-9. Accessed 14 January 2025.
  18. ^ Gupta, Hari Ram. History of the Sikhs, Vol. III: Sikh Domination of the Mughal Empire, 1764-1803. Munshilal Manoharlal. ISBN 978-81-215-0213-9. Accessed 14 January 2025.
  19. ^ Gupta, Hari Ram. History of the Sikhs, Vol. III: Sikh Domination of the Mughal Empire, 1764-1803. Munshilal Manoharlal. ISBN 978-81-215-0213-9. Accessed 14 January 2025.
  20. ^ Hari Ram Gupta (October 2001). The Sikh Commonwealth: The Rise and Fall of the Sikh Misls. Munshilal Manoharlal Publishers. p. 284. ISBN 81-215-0165-2.
  21. ^ Hari Ram Gupta (October 2001). The Sikh Commonwealth: The Rise and Fall of the Sikh Misls. Munshilal Manoharlal Publishers. p. 285. ISBN 81-215-0165-2.
  22. ^ Hari Ram Gupta (October 2001). The Sikh Commonwealth: The Rise and Fall of the Sikh Misls. Munshilal Manoharlal Publishers. p. 288. ISBN 81-215-0165-2.