Visconti Prasca attended the Turin Army War School, then was attached to the Army General Staff on 20 October 1919.[1] In January 1920 he went to Germany as a member of the Inter-Allied Commission for Upper Silesia. In 1921 he returned to Italy, where on 21 April 1921 he left the general staff and began duty in the Ministry of War.[1] This duty ended when he was attached to the Army Council on 26 October 1922.[1]
On 3 March 1924, Visconti Prasca became military attaché at the Embassy of the Kingdom of Italy in Belgrade[1] in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, which was renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1928. He remained there for six years, during which time he was promoted to colonnello (English: colonel) on either 26 December 1926[1] or 9 June 1927,[2] according to different sources. Prime Minister of ItalyBenito Mussolini developed a special regard for him, reflected in notes made in 1931 by General Pietro Gacchera.[4] Visconti Prasca was recalled to Italy on 20 April 1930[1] after the Government of Yugoslavia bluntly accused him of espionage.[5] He returned briefly to the general staff while awaiting orders, then assumed command of the 36th Infantry Regiment on 1 October 1930.[1] He relinquished command of the regiment on 16 January 1933, when he was attached to the Army of Bologna,[1] in which he led the military administration of the city of Bologna, Italy.
On 10 October 1933, Visconti Prasca was appointed to the office of the Chief of the Army General Staff,[1] General Pietro Badoglio. That same month, he published a book on military strategy under the title Guerra decisiva (English: Decisive War), in which he developed the theory of what was known in Germany as blitzkrieg (English: lightning war),[6] Mussolini himself read the book, which may have decisively influenced many of the events that led to the outbreak of the Second Italo-Ethiopian War of 1935–1936. In April 1934, as an envoy of Badoglio, Visconti Prasca made a reconnaissance visit to the Colony of Eritrea. After his return to Italy, he drew up a report which helped to organize the operational plans for the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, which were implemented in 1935.[7]
Visconti Prasca received a promotion to generale di brigata (English: brigadier general) for "exceptional merit" on 18 October 1934,[1][2] but Badoglio decided to remove him from his general staff duties in 1934, as he was suspected of disclosing a secret agreement that Badoglio had concluded with the French general Maurice Gamelin. According to one source, Visconti Prasca was assigned to the general staff "for special duties" as of 18 October 1934, serving in this capacity until 11 September 1935.[2] On 12 December 1934, Visconti Prasca took command of the Italian expeditionary corps in the Territory of the Saar Basin,[1][2] occupied under a League of Nations mandate, in a move related to a League of Nations requirement for the supervision of local elections there. He served in the Saar either until January 1935[2] or 5 March 1935,[1] according to different sources.
Either in January 1935[8] or on 11 July 1935,[1] according to different sources, Visconti Prasca became an honorary adjutant to KingVictor Emmanuel III.[1] Sources differ on his subsequent assignments, claiming both that on 16 September 1935[8] he either assumed command[8] or became deputy commander[2] of the 5th Infantry Division "Cosseria" and that he was attached to the Ministry of War on 18 October 1935[1] before becoming deputy commander of the division at a later date.[1] He remained in command of the division until 20 July 1937.[1]
Sources again differ on his assignments later in the 1930s. Some claim that he became military attaché at the Italian embassy Paris on 20 July 1937, another that he assumed command of the 2nd Cavalry Division "Emanuele Filiberto Testa di Ferro" in December 1937[8] and did not become military attaché at Paris until 1938.[9] On 9 September 1937 he was promoted to the rank of generale di divisione (divisional general), with seniority from 1 July 1937,[1][2] and on 31 March 1938, by royal decree, he was granted the title of conti (English: count).[1][2] Once he became the military attaché he followed the deterioration of relations between Italy and France after Nazi Germany occupied Czechoslovakia in September 1938. He was still in Paris when World War II began with the German invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939. Always considered a Francophile, he declared a few months after the outbreak of the war that it was inevitable that the Allies would defeat Germany.[10]
Visconti Prasca was recalled to Italy on 15 December 1939, when he was appointed to the Ministry of War for "special duties."[1][2] Sources differ on his next assignments: Some claim he detached from his Ministry of War duties on 1 March 1940 and then was placed at the disposal of the army chief of staff until 5 June 1940,[1][2] while another claims that for short time in early 1940 he commanded III Army Corps[10] on the Italian border with France[11] as Italy made preparations to enter the war on the side of the Axis powers. Sources also disagree on the date of his promotion to the rank of army corps general (Italian: generale di corpo d'armata), giving it as 15 October 1939, with seniority from 1 July 1939,[2] as 1 June 1940,[8] and as 15 October 1940.[2]
On 10 June 1940, Italy entered World War II, invading France during the Battle of France in a campaign that resulted in France's capitulation and an Italian armistice with France that went into effect on 25 June 1940. On 1 July 1940, Visconti Prasca became commander-in-chief in Albania.[1][2] According to one source, he also became a generale designato (English: general designate)[1] that day, although another source claims this did not take place until 9 November 1940.[2]
During July 1940, Mussolini, pushed by Ciano, decided to attack a neutral country without consulting with Nazi Germany first in order to compensate for Marshal of ItalyRodolfo Graziani's hesitance to invade Egypt from Libya and to compete with the military successes of the German Wehrmacht. He selected the Kingdom of Greece as the target in the belief that the Greeks lacked a desire for war and that an Italian conquest of Greece would be easy.[14]
The Italian Army General Staff proceeded to organize an invasion plan, which was known as "Esigenza G" or "Emergenza G."[15] Following an order from Mussolini, General Geloso drew up the initial operational plan after his return from Albania. It provided for the invasion of the Epirus region using an Italian force of 11 divisions, two cavalry regiments, and a grenadier regiment, but also required the Bulgarian Army to attack Western Thrace, forcing part of the Greek forces to withdraw from the Epirus front.[16] The next plan provided for the use of 20 Italian divisions[16] and their logistical support, all of which would already be in Albania before the start of hostilities.[16] On 11 August 1940[17] Ciano summoned Visconti Prasca to Rome, where Ciano informed him of the decision to invade the Chameria region,[11] as well as the Ionian Islands,[17] instructing him to prepare for the start of operations before the end of August 1940.
Visconti Prasca returned to Tirana, Albania, where he worked for a long time to draw up a plan for the invasion of Greece, which presupposed the use of four divisione binaria (English: double divisions), i.e. divisions composed of only two infantry regiments each, which would carry out an attack along a front of approximately 60 miles (97 km). On 13 October 1940, Mussolini made the official decision[18] to attack Greece and conveyed it to Badoglio during a summit meeting attended by Mussolini, Badoglio, Ciano, and Francesco Giacomoni di San. Savino, with the date for the start of military operations set for 26 October 1940.[18] On 14 October 1940,[19] Badoglio, after learning of Ciano's meeting with Visconti Prasca, ordered Visconti Prasca to obey only the orders that came from the Italian Army General Staff.[19]
The start of military operations was postponed from 26 to 28 October 1940, but on 28 October 1940,[18] as the winter season approached, the Italian troops launched their attack[18] along the steep and dangerous mountainous terrain that formed the Epirus front, encountering little resistance during their advance, with the result that Visconti Prasca sent a telegram to Rome to report Italian forces were advancing at a "rapid pace." However, due to the adverse weather conditions, as well as the beginning of Greek Army counterattacks ordered by the chief of the general staff of the Greek Army, Alexandros Papagos, the Italian advance was halted on 8 November 1940.[20]
Visconti Prasca's personal assurances that the initial forces under his command would prove sufficient, and that the Italian invasion would meet feeble Greek resistance, had helped to convince Mussolini to launch the invasion and was one of the factors leading to the disaster.[21] Overly confident in Greek weakness and the perfection of his invasion plan, Visconti Pracsa had done little to prepare his troops for combat and failed to ensure their logistical support, even neglecting such basic requirements as the provision of mules to carry supplies through the mountains, leaving the Italians not only in danger of failing to conquer Greek territory but of losing territory in Albania.[22] Mussolini, outraged at Visconti Prasca's handling of the invasion, removed him from command of the troops on 8 November 1940, the same day the initial Italian advance halted, replacing him with General Ubaldo Soddu. Upon arriving in Albania, Soddu deemed the initial attack a failure and ordered Italian forces to shift immediately to a defensive stance.[20] On 9 November 1940, Visconti Prasca became commander of the 11th Army,[1][2] which was created that day by a merger of the Higher Forces Command Albania (XXVI Army Corps), VI Army Corps, and VIII Army Corps (formerly the Chameria Army Corps), deployed along the southern sector of the front along a belt stretching from the Pindus mountain range to the Ionian Sea. He criticized Soddu′s defensive provisions, and on 16 November 1940 was relieved of command of the 11th Army.[1][2]
Visconti Prasca returned to Italy, where he was placed at the disposal of the Ministry of War. On 10 December 1940, he was transferred to the reserve and retired from the army.[2]
After his return to Italy in October 1945, Visconti Prasca published his autobiography under the title Io ho aggredito la Grecia (English: I Attacked Greece) (Rizzoli, 1946), a contrived effort on his part for personal rehabilitation in which he tried to diminish his personal responsibility for the defeat of the Italian army on the Greek front and justify his personal errors in command.[21] On several occasions after the war he tried unsuccessfully to return to active duty, asking the President of Italy, Luigi Einaudi, to reconsider his appeal against the decision to retire him in 1940, but he never returned to active service.
Personal life
Visconti Prasca was married to Angelica Zoppi, the sister of generale designato (English: general designate) and SenatorOctavio Zoppi.[2]
Commander of the Order of the Crown of Italy (Royal Decree of 13 January 1924)
Grand Officer of the Order of the Crown of Italy (2 May 1935)
Visconti Prasca received his first Bronze Medal of Military Valor for his actions in 1912 during the Italo-Turkish War, the citation reading, "Responsible for conveying orders and briefings to the various military units, despite being slightly wounded at the start of the fighting, he continued his work with courage and bravery throughout the day. Merkeb, January 27, 1912."
His second award of the Bronze Medal for Military Valor was for his actions from 1915 to 1917 on the Italian front during World War I, the citation reading, "During more than two years of war, in a number of different situations, he carried out daring reconnaissance missions along the front, while as an officer he relayed orders between the different military units, displaying determination and ignorance of danger. Medio Izontso, May 1915 - September 1917."
^ abCervi, Mario (1965). Storia della guerra di Grecia. Rizzoli.
^Luttwak, Edward (21 May 2020). "Not Uniquely Incompetent". London Review of Books. Vol. 42, no. 10. London: London Review of Books. Retrieved 24 February 2024.
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Cervi, Mario (1965). Storia della guerra di Grecia (in Italian). Milan: Rizzoli Editore.
Gin, Emilio (2012) [1947]. L'ora segnata dal destino: gli alleati e Mussolini da Monaco all'intervento. Settembre 1938-Giugno 1940 (in Italian). Rome: Edizioni Nuova Cultura. ISBN88-6134-831-9.
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Knox, McGregor (1982). Mussolini Unleashed, 1939–1941: Politics and Strategy in Fascist Italy's Last War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN0-521-33835-2.
Montanari, Mario (1980). La campagna di Grecia (in Italian). Rome: Ufficio Storico dello Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito.
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Visconti-Prasca, Sebastiano (1947). Io ho aggredito la Grecia (in Italian). Milan: Rizzoli Editore.
Trionfi, Maria (2014). Il diario dell'attesa: storia di una famiglia 1943-1945 (in Italian). Milan: Biblioteka Edizioni. ISBN88-98801-03-3.
Vento, Andrea (2010). In silenzio gioite e soffrite: storia dei servizi segreti italiani dal Risorgimento alla Guerra Fredda (in Italian). Milan: Il Saggiatore. ISBN88-428-1604-3.
Minniti, Fortunato (March 1994). "Oltre Adua. Lo sviluppo e la scelta della strategia operativa per la guerra contro l'Etiopia". Società di Storia Militare Quaderno 1993 (in Italian). Rome: Gruppo Editoriale Internazionale: 85–142. ISBN88-8011-043-8.
