In a June 1999 communique, U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki said "our heavy forces are too heavy and our light forces lack staying power." He called for heavy units to be "more strategically deployable, and more agile with a smaller footprint, and light forces must be more lethal, survivable, and tactically mobile."[1]
In remarks at Association of the United States Army meeting in October, Shinseki laid out his vision for a lighter, more transportable force. He called for a mid-weight unit that would strike a balance between heavy armor and infantry. Shinseki said such a unit would be especially capable for operations short of war. The Army was to do this by investing in an interim fleet that would herald the way to a much more advanced subsequent generation of vehicles (later called Future Combat Systems Manned Ground Vehicles).[2]
Shinseki said one of his goals was to reduce the service's logistics footprint, which makes up 90 percent of its lift requirement. He expected to make this possible by building future fighting vehicles on a common chassis and using mutually compatible ammunition. He proposed that these vehicles be light enough for intra-theater airlift via C-130. He expected that the generation of vehicles after its next fleet would be wheeled, which would be up to 70 percent lighter than the interim fleet.[2]
The technology for Shinseki's desired force was not expected to be ready until beyond 2010. In the interim, Shinseki sought to bring a prototype unit, using commercial off-the-shelf technologies, online by the end of the fiscal year.[2]
Commonality between vehicles was seen as a desired, but not essential characteristic.[4] As of February 2000, the Army believed that most of the Medium Armored Vehicle variants would be based on the infantry carrier vehicle variant. The mobile gun system (MGS) and howitzer variants would be permitted to share less commonality.[5] In March 2000, the Army confirmed it would award up to two contracts.[6] In February, Major General John Caldwell had said the Army would only award one contract, rather than splitting the contract among two winners.[7] In April, Shinseki said the Army had no preference of wheeled versus tracks but said "management could be pretty challenging," if both wheeled and tracked options were chosen.[8]
General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS) and General Motors Defense of Canada proposed a vehicle based on the LAV III.[13] The driveline was re-engineered to accommodate the larger payload requirements of the IAV. Height adjustable suspension was integrated to vary the ride height. The baseline armor was improved to defeat armor-piercing rounds up to 14.5 mm.[14] GDLS would be responsible for the mobile gun system, nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) reconnaissance vehicle, medical evacuation vehicle, and mortar carrier.[15]
United Defense LP proposed the Mobile Tactical Vehicle Light (MTVL) and the M8 Armored Gun System (AGS), both tracked vehicles. The MTVL was based on the M113 armored personnel carrier and could carry 10 passengers.[13][16] For the MGS requirement, three solutions were offered, the AGS and two variants of the MTVL; one with the AGS turret and 105mm gun, and another with a 90 mm Cockerill turret (called MGS 90).[17][16] United Defense planned to upgrade M113A2 APCs in Army storage to the MTVL standard.[16]
ST Kinetics, a subsidiary of the Singapore firm ST Engineering, proposed the Bionix. ST Kinetics said its vehicle would be "100 percent American made" and created a U.S. subsidiary called Vision Kinetics to manage the project. Teledyne Brown Engineering provided integration work. Rather than rely on the private sector, ST Kinetics planned to partner with Army depots for most manufacturing (with the exception of its partnership with the Demmer Corporation, which was to produce the hull).[13]
In its evaluations, the Army noted that it found neither the wheeled nor the tracked candidates to have any definitive edge over the other. All else being equal, wheeled vehicles generally have less internal volume. However, the Army found the wheeled submissions had adequate space for its requirements. No significant differences in weight or mobility over terrain were seen.[18]
In November 2000, the Army awarded the IAV contract to GM-GDLS. At $4 billion, the deal was the largest combat vehicle purchase since the Bradley Fighting Vehicle program in 1980.[19] In its decision, the Army cited the LAV's greater mobility, particularly its high speed on paved roads.[20] The Army was also impressed by the LAV's armor which, in its baseline configuration, could resist 14.5 mm rounds.[21]
The service rejected a split buy of the M8 AGS offered by UDPL, citing the system's lower top speed and different maintenance requirements. The service said a single fleet would simplify maintenance and allow units to "move as a fighting unit."[19]
At the same time as the contract award, the Army announced a 16-month schedule slip due to additional development work required on the MGS and fire support vehicle. The NBC vehicle also required additional integration work. The schedule slippage displeased Shinseki, who pressed GM–GDLS to hasten their work.[19]
In December 2000, UDPL filed a challenge to the contract award, forcing the Army to issue a stop-work order. In its protest, UDLP said its vehicles would be ready one to two years earlier at about half the cost of GM-GDLS's proposal. UDLP also alleged that Army officials had unfairly aided GM-GDLS's proposal by permitting the company to substitute its Stryker ATGM variant for the MGS variant due to a two-year schedule slippage in the latter.[22]
The GAO denied UDLP's protest of the award in April 2001.[23]
Army officials proposed a self-propelled howitzer IAV variant. Officials later tabled this idea as this variant would require considerable technological risk and expense. The service settled on M198 howitzer for its artillery requirement, later to be replaced by the M777 howitzer.[25]
In 2000, the Army studied the differences between light, medium (interim) and heavy brigade combat teams. It concluded that medium brigades equipped with LAVs would cost 40 percent less to operate than heavy brigades. LAVs were expected to go at least 1000 mean miles between failures, compared to 654 for heavy brigades. Medium brigades were expected to move more quickly and provide greater survivability and firepower than light brigades.[27]
In September 2002, the Army conducted a congressionally mandated side-by-side testing of the M113A3 and the Stryker.[28]
Stryker crews operated more effectively in the Stryker. Interior space was less restricted in the Stryker. The quieter ride allowed crews to hold conversations and plan missions. Stryker drivers could sustain longer operations than M113 drivers, who could receive hearing damage after just five hours of continuous operations.[28]
See also
Armored Systems Modernization, a wide-ranging U.S. Army combat vehicle acquisition program cancelled after the end of the Cold War