The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (Chinese: 21世纪海上丝绸之路), commonly just Maritime Silk Road (MSR), is the sea route part of the Belt and Road Initiative which is[1] a Chinese strategic initiative to increase investment and foster collaboration across the historic Silk Road.[2][3][4]
In November 2014, Chinese leader Xi Jinping announced plans to create a USD $40 billion development fund, which would help finance China's plans to develop the New Silk Road and the Maritime Silk Road. China has accelerated its drive to draw Africa into the MSR with the speedy construction of a modern standard-gauge rail link between Nairobi and Mombasa.[6]
In March 2015, the National Development and Reform Commission of China publicly released a document titled Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road,[7] which discusses the principles and framework which form the foundation of the initiative.
Routes and key ports
Although the routes encompassed in the MSR will be copious if the initiative comes to fruition, to date there has not been ample official information released concerning specific ports.
Between 2015 and 2022, China has leased ownership over the following ports:[8]
In the 2018 Xinhua-Baltic International Shipping Centre Development Index Report,[9] the China Economic Information Service cites the following as major routes for the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road:
The MSR route to Europe will begin in China, pass through the Malacca Strait, follow Red Sea through the Suez Canal to the Mediterranean Sea, and visit ports in Greece, Italy, France, and Spain before returning to China. The Maritime Silk Road has also an important role in the connection between East Africa and the Mediterranean region through the Suez Canal. Of particular interest to China is the port of Piraeus in Athens, Greece, which Chinese PremierLi Keqiang stated "...can become China's gateway to Europe. It is the pearl of the Mediterranean. " China is investing heavily in Athens in the port and infrastructure.[10][11]
The Chinese Silk Road Initiative then led Europe to consider adapting the infrastructure to changing conditions. In recent years there have been major investments from Italy, the EU, Germany and Hungary to develop Trieste with its rail connections to Central and Eastern Europe as a central European hub of the Maritime Silk Road. This also applies to the partial relocation of the flow of goods from the northern ports to the Mediterranean.[12][13][14][15][16][17]
There are extensive intra-European infrastructure projects in place to adapt trade flows to current needs. This applies, for example, to the expansion of the Belgrade-Budapest railway line, the Brenner Base Tunnel and the connections on the Adriatic-Baltic and Adriatic-North Sea axes. With regard to costs and environmental protection, in contrast to longer East Asian traffic via northwest Europe, the sea route through the Suez Canal to the Adriatic bridgehead of Trieste with its free trade zone shortens the transport of goods to Central and Eastern Europe by at least four days.[18][19]
Experimental attempts are also being made to organize the movement of goods from China to Europe via the Northeast Passage through the polar sea. There is already resistance from environmental protection organizations who fear significant interference in the sensitive ecosystems in the north.[20]
One of the most important ports in the Mediterranean is Valencia, Spain. The port, in which many Chinese companies have settled, is to be provided with a free trade zone.[21]
There exist a number of unresolved territorial disputes in the South China Sea between China and ASEAN countries such as Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam.[8] Potential routes proposed for the MSR could contribute to increasing tensions over certain areas. However, some academics propose that the MSR initiative will provide a means for China to resolve these sovereignty-related conflicts by providing an opportunity for mutual gain.[22]
It has been suggested that the future of the MSR will be largely dictated by the economic conditions of the participating countries.[23] The possibility exists that China may have to make financial contributions to other MSR countries who are experiencing poor economic conditions. China will need to ensure that any loans allocated to these countries are spent appropriately.[24]
Coordination on the national and subnational levels may be challenging for China. It has been stated that China's subnational actors – such as multinational corporations, provinces, cities, and towns – have a tendency to strongly prioritize their own interests above those of the nation and participate in government initiatives primarily to satisfy their own objectives. This could lead to inappropriate spending on projects outside the scope of China's national interests.[25]
Gaining political approval from countries with different political systems could prove problematic for China. Countries may be wary about joining the MSR initiative due to geopolitical and security factors.[26]
Concerns have been put forth regarding whether China will be able to receive India's cooperation and participating in bringing the initiative to fruition.[27][28][23] India represents a strong economic force and may likely prefer to develop the Indian Ocean region's infrastructure itself rather than allow China to have any control over the region.[27] While Chinese investment in India's underdeveloped maritime infrastructure could benefit India's economy greatly, India remains wary to accept such investment as the possibility exists that China is primarily attempting to expand its own territorial and economic interests.[29] India has also expressed circumspection in participating in a similar initiative, the Bangladesh – China – India – Myanmar economic corridor.[23]
^Harry G. Broadman "Afrika´s Silk Road" (2007), pp 59.
^Marcus Hernig: Die Renaissance der Seidenstraße (2018) pp 112.
^Harry de Wilt: Is One Belt, One Road a China crisis for North Sea main ports? in World Cargo News, 17. December 2019.
^Linda Vierecke, Elisabetta Galla "Triest und die neue Seidenstraße" In: Deutsche Welle, 8 December 2020.
^Bernhard Simon: Can The New Silk Road Compete With The Maritime Silk Road? in The Maritime Executive, 1 January 2020.
^"Trieste, ex Aquila venduta all'ungherese Adria Port" In: Il Piccolo, 18.12.2020
^"Hamburger Hafenkonzern investiert groß in Triest" In: Die Presse 29 September 2020; Thomas Fromm "Hanseatische Seidenstraße" In: Süddeutsche Zeitung 5 October 2020; "Logistica, il colosso Duisport acquisisce il 15% delle quote dell'Interporto di Trieste" In: Il Piccolo, 15 December 2020
^Gerald Pohl: Neue Seidenstraße: China drängt es nach Europa in: Die Presse 17. September 2019; Hafen Triest auf Wachstumskurs: Neue Bahnverbindung nach Rostock. In: Der Trend, 17. October 2018; Frank Behling: Hafenzug Kiel–Triest. Von der Förde ans Mittelmeer. In Kieler Nachrichten: 25. January 2017.
^Harry de Wilt: Is One Belt, One Road a China crisis for North Sea main ports? in World Cargo News, 17. December 2019.
^Birger Nicolai "Im Winter durchs Eismeer? Das geht und hat Vorteile" Die Welt 13.7.2018
^Anja Steinbuch, Jürgen Hoffmann "Was bringt Chinas Neue Seidenstraße?" In: Deutsche Welle 17.11.2017
^J. Yang, ‘Making the Maritime Silk Road a New Promoter of Cooperative Interaction between China and South Asia’, Keynote Speech given at the “Political Economy of China’s Maritime Silk Road and South Asia” conference, 21 Nov. 2015, Shanghai, China.